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Nowadays, instead of investing into large and expensive IT infrastructures, it is pos-
sible to buy computing environments or (complex) electronic services on-demand
in order to perform certain business activities. This approach is typically known as
Cloud Computing. For consumers, Cloud Computing embraces a service-oriented
architecture (SOA) and implies potential for reduced total cost of ownership, great
flexibility as well as reduced information technology overhead (Vouk, 2008). Conse-
quently, one of the most relevant advantages is the increased technical and financial
flexibility for Cloud Computing consumers.
Consumers have various requirements regarding Cloud services depending on
their industry and business, and hence are different with regard to their preferences
and valuations. Providers of Cloud services can be limited in their resource capaci-
ties or flexibility, and they are exposed to the challenge of how to sell their services
efficiently. To address distinctive consumer preferences, service providers can of-
fer numerous classes of services according to service level agreements (SLA). These
classes of services are priced differently. Furthermore, providers allocating their ca-
pacity to various types of consumers have incentives to maximize output, which is
the revenue yielded by the sale of capacity units. Revenue Management deals with
complex decision problems concerning sales, demand, and pricing of services from
a provider’s perspective (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). Recently, the consumer’s
perspective also becomes increasingly important to enable an integrated view of the
complex interaction between the provider and the consumer.
In this thesis both views are examined. At first, the applicability of Revenue
Management methods in Cloud Computing is discussed. The properties of Cloud
services are analyzed and compared to the requirements of Revenue Management.
Current literature does not consider Revenue Management in Clouds and how this
may impact the design of services. Secondly, Revenue Management concepts like ac-
cept/reject policies, dynamic pricing or advance reservation are not always accepted
by the consumers. Consumers in some domains are not used to dynamic prices and
occasionally deny it. In 2000, Amazon for example failed to introduce dynamic pric-
ing for the online store due to customer complaints about the frequent price changes
(Weiss and Mehrotra, 2001). A survey as a part of this thesis was conducted to un-
iv
derstand the consumers’ perception of Revenue Management methods to avoid an
unsuccessful adoption like Amazon, since no research work has covered this topic
in Cloud Computing so far. The design of sophisticated services and computation
of the appropriate price requires an interpretation of consumers’ preferences and
requirements (Chellappa and Gupta, 2002). Conjoint analysis was chosen as a re-
search method to elicit the preferences and the results were analyzed statistically.
The results of the survey foster the application of Revenue Management concepts in
Clouds. Furthermore, the survey revealed on the Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS)
level that operating system and price are the most important factors of the IaaS of-
fer. Consumers seem to prefer a well-known platform instead of comparing the
availability rate of different providers or between the services of one provider and
choosing the cheapest one. Providers can design their customized services based on
these results.
After knowing the consumers’ preferences and designing the services appro-
priately, the provider may face the problem of how to price the services and how
this pricing may impact the resource utilization. One aspect of this problem is how
Cloud service providers would decide to accept or reject requests for services when
the resources for offering these services become scarce. A decision support policy
called Customized Bid-Price Policy (CBPP) is proposed in this thesis to decide effi-
ciently, when a large number of (complex) services can be offered over a finite time
horizon. This heuristic outperforms well-known policies, if interior prices cannot
be updated frequently during incoming requests and an automated update of bid
prices is required to achieve more accurate decisions. Since CBPP approximates the
revenue offline before the requests occur, it has a low runtime compared to other
approaches during the online phase (when requests appear). The performance is
examined via simulation and the pre-eminence of CBPP is statistically proven.
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The problems of Revenue Management are as old as business itself. [...] The true
innovation of Revenue Management lies in the method of decision making.
[Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004]
1.1 Background & Motivation
T hroughout every business sector, Information Technology (IT) is the backboneproviding almost instantly the right information at the right time to the re-
questing user. Recently, services based on IT systems are offered over the Internet
and start to replace desktop applications. Salesforce.com1 as a prominent example
allows users to manage their business contacts online with their Customer Rela-
tionship Management (CRM) software by accessing the application through a web
browser. The upcoming paradigm termed Cloud Computing comprises of services
offered over the Internet from basic computational services like virtual instances
of operating systems (e.g. Amazon Web Services2 or 3Tera3) to complex services
such as Jamcracker Services Delivery Network4 aggregating and enhancing basic
services. According to Armbrust et al. (2009) the original idea behind Cloud Com-
puting, i.e. computing as a utility, was already mentioned by Parkhill (1966) and
has now become a reality through new technologies such as Web 2.0, virtualization
and the interconnected business world via the Internet.
The impact of Cloud Computing on the worldwide IT industry is very signif-
icant. A survey conducted by IDC5 predicts that the worldwide IT spending on
1Salesforce.com (http://www.salesforce.com)
2Amazon Web Services (http://aws.amazon.com)
33Tera (http://www.3tera.com)
4Jamcracker Services Delivery Network (http://www.jamcracker.com/Platform)
5IDC (www.idc.com)
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
services in Clouds will increase substantially and is expected to reach US $ 42 bil-
lion by 2012 (Gens, 2008). Moreover, 50% of the respondents indicate that the main
reason for using Clouds is to save costs, and almost 20% intend to apply Cloud-
based services to quickly implement new business processes. Instead of investing
in large and expensive IT infrastructures, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
especially benefit from buying computing environments or Cloud services in order
to perform certain business activities. Studies have revealed that data centers were
only using 10% to 35% of their actual processing power and 50% to 60% of storage
is wasted due to lack of viable, large-scale utility model (Carr, 2005). This situa-
tion enables possibilities for new markets. Cloud Computing providers offer their
available resources and try to make a profit by using economies of scale (Boss et al.,
2007). Consequently, one of the most relevant advantages is the increased flexibil-
ity for Cloud consumers. They are able to buy services on-demand and no longer
have to pay for the development and maintenance of their own IT infrastructure
anymore. Cloud Computing embraces a Service-oriented Architecture (SOA) and
implies the potential for a reduced total cost of ownership, increased flexibility as
well as reduced IT overhead for the end-user (Vouk, 2008). The usage of Cloud
services will improve the business operations of consumers, thus allowing them to
invest in core business activities and not into supporting IT systems. The risk of
supporting IT infrastructure operations thereby shifts towards the providers of IT
data processing centers. Cloud providers who face these risks have to find ways to
increase their revenues. For example, the pay-as-you-go model benefits consumers
but leads to unmanageable utilization patterns.
Consumers have varying requirements depending on the nature of their indus-
try and business, and hence are different with regard to their preferences and val-
uations. Providers as well as resellers of Cloud services can be limited in their re-
sources or basic service capacities, and are thus exposed to the challenge of how to
sell their capacities efficiently. To address distinctive consumer preferences, service
providers can offer numerous classes of services according to service-level agree-
ments. These classes of services are priced differently. Furthermore, providers al-
locating their capacity to various types of consumers have incentives to maximize
output, which is the revenue yielded by the sale of capacity units. Sophisticated
metering and pricing systems as well as flexible services tailored to the needs of
heterogeneous consumers are the key factors in successfully designing and offering
utility models like Cloud services (Albaugh and Madduri, 2004).
Revenue Management addresses the problem of allocating a company’s capacity
to its customers in order to find a revenue maximizing allocation (Williamson, 1992).
Much literature on Revenue Management is concerned with the airline industry. A
typical situation there is the sale of different types of flight tickets at different times
and at different fares. By offering different fare classes (e.g. economy class, business
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class, and first class) the airline company can segment its customers. The capacity
of an airline is the amount of seats available on a certain flight on a certain date.
Capacity can be allocated flexibly according to the different fare classes.
A company is exposed to numerous complex decisions, for example, how to sell
its capacity, how to set the prices for a certain period of time, or how to segment its
customers. Revenue Management deals with complex decision making processes
involving sales, demand, and pricing (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). These deci-
sion making problems often have to be solved in an uncertain environment due to
incomplete information and dynamic changes in the customers’ demand. Several
factors influence a company’s revenue. Managing demand plays a key role from a
company’s point of view. The term Revenue Management reveals that its goal is
to maximize a company’s revenue by making suitable demand management and
pricing decisions. Revenue Management comprises methods for finding the right
decisions concerning demand, prices, and sales. Kimes (1989) emphasizes four char-
acteristics of Yield or Revenue Management: “Yield Management is the application
of information systems and pricing strategies to allocate the right capacity to the
right customer at the right place at the right time.” Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b)
give a classification for typical decision making problems in Revenue Management:
• Structural decision making problems deal with issues concerning how to sell
services and which channels to use (e.g. auction or posted price) or how to
choose market segmentation. Decisions concerning the bundling of services
or committing to certain prices in advance due to advertisement have a major
impact on the overall business and the revenue of a company.
• Decisions on quantity are concerned with allocating capacity to certain cus-
tomer segments. Furthermore, the decisionof when to sell a service to a certain
consumer or when to cancel the sale is a key component. In a scarce service
market the request of a consumer can either be accepted or rejected in favor of
a better paying consumer or a higher valued service request.
• Pricing decisions are natural methods in the wide area of Revenue Manage-
ment. Pricing is a key factor to control demand as well as revenue. It deter-
mines how much to charge for different groups of customers, how to adjust
prices over a given sales period, or how to grant discounts to customers.
These decision making problems are rather complex. It strongly depends on the
industry, the field of operation, and the application context, which category of deci-
sion is the most appropriate for a certain enterprise. In practice, a company’s Rev-
enue Management concept may incorporate all three categories of decisions. Due to
possible but sometimes complex adaptations Revenue Management is not limited
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to the airline industry. Many research papers have proven that these concepts can
be applied to other domains such as hotels (Vinod, 2004), restaurants (Sheryl, 2003),
car rental (Carroll and Grimes, 1995) or Internet service providers (Nair and Bapna,
2001). In this thesis, the first two decision making problems are examined, whereby
the pricing decision is disregarded.
1.2 Objectives & Contributions
The Revenue Management framework provides promising tools and methods to in-
crease revenue of Cloud service providers. Research papers from Dube et al. (2005),
Urgaonkar et al. (2002) or Nair and Bapna (2001) have analyzed the application of
certain Revenue Management methods to the IT domain in general. Currently, there
is no literature examining the applicability of Revenue Management methods to
Cloud services. The Revenue Management literature has identified several require-
ments, when its methods are applicable to a certain domain. Cloud services have
to fulfill some properties like perishability or consumer heterogeneity so that Rev-
enue Management methods and tools can be applied in Clouds (see Section 2.3.1).
However, the previously mentioned papers have not analyzed the requirements for
applying Revenue Management methods to the IT domain. Hence, one objective
of this thesis is to analyze the requirements of Revenue Management, classify these
requirements according to their applicability to consumer and provider and to scru-
tinize the coherency with the Cloud service properties. This approach will help to
understand how the Revenue Management methods will influence the design of
Cloud services.
The emergence of Cloud Computing was mainly driven by new technologies
like virtualization. It enables the provision of computing power or Software-as-a-
Service (SaaS) over the Internet without the burden of a costly infrastructure for the
consumer. However, the consumer demand for these kinds of service has not been
thoroughly analyzed before. Around year 2000 the “application service provider”
failed to create a viable business model (Desai and Currie, 2003; Currie, 2004). The
authors identified that standard applications did not provide any competitive ad-
vantage in the market and tailor-made applications were to costly for the consumers.
Consumer needs were disregarded to a certain extent. Designing services to match
consumer needs is a well-known method to increase market share and profitability
(Anderson and Sullivan, 1993; Heskett, 1990). The SaaS paradigm, put into practice
by companies like Salesforce.com, was only a first step towards Cloud Computing.
The question arises what consumers prefer and how the infrastructure, platform or
software services can enhance their utility. This thesis focuses on the infrastructure
layer and analyzes consumers’ preferences. A better understanding of preferences
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Figure 1.1: Structure of this thesis
allows Cloud service providers to precisely design services at the infrastructure level
and appropriately set the prices for these services. A survey was conducted to em-
pirically examine the consumer behavior (see Chapter 3) using conjoint analysis as
a research method.
From a provider’s perspective, Revenue Management methods help to effi-
ciently manage the resource utilization, price the services more accurately and to
increase the revenue. The optimization problem for allocating the right services
to the right customer at the right time and place is an NP-hard problem, since a
Bellman equation has to be solved. Existing heuristics approach this problem by
deciding to allocate the resources to the service in the online phase, when requests
occur. Klein (2007) proposed a novel idea of having an automated update of the bid
prices. The bid prices of services are a threshold value, whether a service for a cer-
tain price should be sold or not. First, the parameters for the optimal allocation are
calculated in an offline phase. Then, a linear function automatically updates the bid
prices in the online phase. This thesis scrutinizes and extends this idea known from
the airline business and shows how the automated bid price update, which is called
Customized Bid-Price Policy (CBPP), can be applied to Clouds. Furthermore, differ-
ent demand scenarios can be evaluated via CBPP to determine good price settings
for the services.
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1.3 Thesis Structure
This thesis comprises five chapters (Figure 1.1). After the introduction in Chapter 1,
the preliminaries in Chapter 2 provide the basis to understand the relation between
Cloud Computing and Revenue Management. Section 2.1 describes the difference
between Cloud Computing and other paradigms such as Grid Computing. It fur-
ther discusses the properties of Cloud services. In Section 2.2, the basics of Revenue
Management relevant for this thesis are briefly explained. Section 2.3 discusses the
applicability of Revenue Management methods and tools for Cloud services. Fur-
ther, the research questions that constitute this thesis are derived.
Part II is divided into two self-contained chapters and commences with the dis-
cussion of the research questions. Chapter 3 analyzes the preferences of Cloud ser-
vice consumers. The theoretical foundation is derived from the Revenue Manage-
ment literature. The conjoint analysis method and the survey design are described
in detail and the choice sets for the survey are defined. The results from the survey
are analyzed descriptively and statistically.
Chapter 4 focuses on the capacity management of computing resources for Cloud
service providers. After explaining the Cloud scenario, the application of Revenue
Management heuristics for capacity management is discussed in detail. The CBPP
is proposed to process the rapidly incoming requests in Clouds and to provide a
combination of an offline algorithm for the complex calculation and an online algo-
rithm for an automated update of the bid prices. The applied research method is a
simulation-based optimization. In both chapters the research questions defined in
Section 2.3 are evaluated and answered.
Part III concludes this thesis and examines the integrated view of the results
from Chapter 3 and 4. It explains why these results are relevant for Cloud service
providers and raises further interesting research questions.
Parts of the results presented in this thesis were published in Anandasivam and
Neumann (2009), Anandasivam and Premm (2009), Anandasivam et al. (2010) and
Anandasivam and Weinhardt (2010).
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
It is the new and different that is always most vulnerable to market research
[Malcolm Gladwell, 2005]
T his chapter explains the dependency between Cloud Computing and RevenueManagement. At first, the Cloud Computing concept is set in contrast to
other distributed computing paradigms. Subsequently, services in the Cloud are
discussed and the specific characteristics are outlined. In Section 2.2 the general
Revenue Management framework is presented and the areas of interest are briefly
described. Finally, both streams are consolidated and the appropriate research meth-
ods as well as the research questions are discussed in Section 2.3.
2.1 IT Infrastructure and Service Paradigms
Historically – before the emergence of personal computers in the 1970’s – time-
sharing services were widely spread, allowing access to computing machinery to
those without their own mainframe. The idea of these systems was to rent input-
output equipment instead of a computer. Bemer (1957) introduced the concept of
time-sharing systems already in 1957 derived from his favorite hamburger restau-
rant where orders were put into a revolving drum with elastic bands and the cooks
were often following this lottery principle. McCarthy assumed in 1961 that “compu-
tation may someday be organized as a public utility just as the telephone is a public
utility” (Ivanov, 2008; Foster et al., 2008). The era of time-sharing systems was fol-
lowed by the invention of personal computers, which provided more freedom to
users. Individuals use their own software and customize the system according to
their needs. Today’s concept of Cloud Computing is not a return to the architecture
of time-sharing systems, but in fact a reversal of the long continuing trend of indi-
vidualization; users are willing to give up possession of data centers and let service
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providers control the operation, support and development. This section aims at pro-
viding a common background for understanding the ideas behind Cloud Comput-
ing and how the term is derived from existing terminology like Cluster Computing,
Voluntary Computing or Grid Computing1 (Stoesser, 2009).
2.1.1 Clouds, Grids, and their Predecessors
Cluster Computing:
After mainframes became essential for the daily business of enterprises and
academia, Cluster Computing was a new paradigm in the 1980’s and emerged more
prominently with the success of Personal Computers (PCs). Clusters are a pool of
dedicated single computing systems working together as a single, integrated com-
puting resource and are accessible via PCs to execute computing jobs (Bell and Gray,
2002; Baker et al., 1999). Traditional applications especially built for mainframes
were ported to PCs in order to facilitate programming and management. Further-
more, the computer user was allowed great latitude for creating applications and
having access to computing resources not only on a time-shared basis. PCs pro-
vided resources for calculation on a small scale, while clusters were exploited for
jobs with large resource demand.
Scalability, availability and cost effectiveness were the three major challenges
for a successful collaborative computing environment (Fox et al., 1997). Cluster
Computing helped to master these three obstacles providing scalability for parallel
workloads due to the mostly homogeneous2, large-scale system, and allowing ad
hoc scaling by adding commodity hardware. High availability is secured through
independent nodes and the capability to perform upgrades by only disabling the
nodes that need to be replaced. Cost effectiveness is achieved by using commodity
hardware that is robust and stable. The performance of the clusters was comparable
to the existing mainframes, but the cost for a cluster was much lower (Baker et al.,
1999).
Summing up, Clusters are managed centrally within an organization and are
physically placed at a single location. Each workstation has to share its resources
with other workstations. The systems are homogeneous and lend themselves to
easily adapt and implement changes. The organization prefers to offer a higher
quality of service by keeping the failure rate and response time low.
1Terms like utility computing or on-demand computing are not considered separately, since the
idea is very similar to Cloud on the infrastructure level and these terms have not been defined and
discussed widely in literature.
2One counterexample would be the Beowulf cluster (http://www.beowulf.org/) with a het-
erogeneous environment. In general, the underlying hardware can be heterogeneous due to virtual-
ization. However, the thesis refers to the idea of clusters in its beginning
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Volunteer Computing:
In academia, researchers take a great interest in working together on resource-
demanding computer simulations. Academic institutes face two problems. They are
limited in their budget for buying hardware resources and payment for each submit-
ted job as an incentive for contributing resources is not an option. Thus, they prefer
to cooperate and share resources on a voluntary basis. The management of the Clus-
ter system is centralized. Hence, computing resources can be declared as dedicated
to one specific job. In Volunteer Computing the resources are shared among differ-
ent organizations or individuals. A prominent example is the SETI@Home3 project
with the goal to detect extraterrestrial life by analyzing signals from a radio tele-
scope. Volunteers have to install a small application on their PC to provide their
idle resources to the project (Sarmenta, 2001). In 2001, this project had 2.4 million
clients to process 1.1 billion candidate signals (Werthimer et al., 2001).
Although the management of the jobs and the application to run the jobs is ac-
complished on a central server in Volunteer Computing, the computing jobs are
executed on geographically distributed machines with different operating systems
and hardware specification (Bonorden et al., 2006). A certain quality level is not
guaranteed and jobs are only executed if idle resources are available. Hence, re-
source availability in Volunteer Computing is unpredictable in contrast to Cluster
Computing, where resources are dedicated to the computer users. The distributed
resources are not under a centralized control. The central entity managing the ap-
plication can only access the distributed resources if the contributor authorizes it.
Another distinction to Cluster Computing is that the type of applications are limited
to batch jobs. Interactive applications cannot be realized, since neither a guaranteed
execution time nor a deadline is available. In a Volunteer Computing scenario, there
is one consumer, namely the central entity, and various providers, i.e. the partici-
pants, who like to contribute resources to the project.
Grid Computing:
Parallel to the evolution of Volunteer Computing, the idea of Grid Computing
emerged in 1998 proposed by Foster and Kesselman (1998) to utilize geographi-
cally distributed computing resources. In the beginning the development of the
infrastructure was driven by scientific applications. The major areas of application
are, similar to previously described concepts, computationally-intensive scientific,
mathematical, and academic problems on the one hand. However, Grid Comput-
ing is also relevant to companies performing large-scale simulations in research &
development departments of commercial enterprises and data processing (Austin
et al., 2004b).
3SETI@Home (http://seticlassic.ssl.berkeley.edu/)
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In contrast to Volunteer Computing the focus in Grid Computing was to build
a generic middleware as a common platform for communication and as a basic in-
frastructure for further development of applications4. Foster (2002) emphasized the
necessity of standard, open protocols and interfaces to provide functionalities like
authentication, authorization, resource discovery, and resource access. Institutions
such as OGF5 and OASIS6 expedited the standardization process of communication
protocols and architectures of the Grid system (Foster et al., 2008). Furthermore, the
quality of services should be non-trivial, i.e response, throughput and other user
requirements have to be delivered reliably. The independence of the computing re-
source location and the focus on collaborative usage across different administrative
domains implies a decentralized management of the available computational power
and storage. Compared to Cluster Computing, Grids tend to be more loosely cou-
pled, heterogeneous, and geographically dispersed (Neumann, 2007). Grid Com-
puting has the ability to pool together resources, both hard- and software which
are distributed among users (Alkadi and Alkadi, 2006; Knight, 2006). Due to the
decentralized management, Foster and Kesselman (1998) defined the necessity of
Virtual Organizations (VOs). VOs comprise multiple institutions working together
and sharing computational resources. The goal of VOs is to enable federated man-
agement of resources in distributed environments (Foster et al., 2008).
With further development of Grid networks new challenges arise, for e.g. stem-
ming from the heterogeneity of the available resources that do not meet the specific
needs of applications or services. Dynamic changes in software requirements and
resource availability can lead to under-utilization of resources, if users are not able
to quickly adapt to the new situation (Foster et al., 2006). Concurrently, computation
jobs running on the same machine can execute insecure code to elicit private infor-
mation. Integrity cannot be guaranteed at the operating system level (Figueiredo
et al., 2003). Therefore, the authors suggest an approach that is “based on a com-
bination of ’classic’ operating system level Virtual Machine (VM) and Grid mid-
dleware mechanisms to manage VMs in a distributed environment” to solve these
issues. The concept of virtualization provides advantages in security mechanisms
through isolation, by customization of virtual machines according to users’ needs,
in resource control at instantiation time, and site-independence7 meaning that a VM
can be stopped, migrated, and restarted again.
Adabala et al. (2005) describe the architecture of virtual Grids, which are “dy-
namic pools of virtual resources that can be aggregated on-demand for application-
specific user-specific Grid Computing”. This architecture is similar to the classical
4Currently, three major middleware are dominant in academia: Globus, gLite and Unicore
5Open Grid Forum
6Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
7assuming that the same VM tools are used
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Grid architecture described by Foster (2002) but expands it as the virtual compo-
nents lead to easier customization and a higher level of security. Only the virtual en-
vironments have to be managed across physical resources. The customized services
built on top of the Grid can be allocated to the requesting consumers. Researchers
have developed various concepts to manage the resource allocation problem rang-
ing from technical heuristics (e.g. fair-share or user priorities) over cost functions to
market models (Neumann, 2007).
However, Grids still lack a public utility, as access is limited to those who own the
resources or those who are willing to share their resources. A sustainable business
model is missing and no commercial Grid Computing provider emerged from these
efforts (Foster et al., 2008). Most Grid Computing users are still from academia (e.g.
the Large Hadron Collider project at CERN8).
As claimed by many researchers (e.g. Youseff et al. (2008)) the elements of Cloud
Computing are not a technical innovation itself. Sharing computer resources or
on demand services by SaaS has been there before the term Cloud Computing ap-
peared. Weiss (2007) concludes that the real revolution of Clouds is the combination
of those different IT aspects into a new business model. Virtualization of datacen-
ter infrastructure helped to increase their utilization by offering storage and com-
puter performance to third parties. On demand software offers possibilities to com-
bine different software solutions into one environment(see e.g. SingTel’s myBusi-
ness platform). But combining these software services or development platforms
with virtualized infrastructure really offers opportunities for new services and an
increase in efficiency by economies of scale. Indeed, the idea of recombining dif-
ferent components of a technology to new products or services is not new. Already,
Schumpeter (1935) explained the importance of combination in order to explain why
innovation often appear in waves. Varian et al. (2004) set this idea in the context of
IT and gives another important explanation of innovation in waves. He emphasized
that the development of complements is crucial for the success of an innovation. An
example is the innovation of the automobile, which would not have been possible
without paved roads and the availability of gasoline. Paved roads were initially
created for bicycles and gasoline for stationary engines. But without these comple-
ments, the car would have never been able to be so predominant. This idea well
suits the Cloud Computing. As mentioned before, IT concepts such as Cluster and
Grid Computing and Web 2.0 enabled applications built up the basis. Complements
like virtual machines and a customer-centric view finally pushed the innovation of
Cloud Computing.
8CERN (http://lhc.web.cern.ch)
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2.1.2 Cloud Computing Definitions
Cloud providers offer their services similar to Grid Computing resources. However,
contrary to the mainly scientific driven Grid scenarios, Cloud providers have to de-
fine Service Level Agreement (SLA) and apply business models (Weiss, 2007; Wein-
hardt et al., 2009). The virtualization technologies in Clouds enable the definition
of the exact resource usage for one or more services of a Cloud provider. Moreover,
Grid participants are contemporaneously consumer and provider, whereas Cloud
providers and consumers can be clearly distinguished. If participants in the Grid do
not use their resources, they can provide them to others. In case their own computa-
tion power does not suffice, they can tap into the Grid and get additional resources.
The concept of Cloud Computing has a commercial background and the idea is to
have dedicated providers offering different kinds of services over the Internet. In
Cloud Computing resellers like Jollat9 or RightScale10 come into play by enhancing
standard services from Amazon11 with new services (Buyya et al., 2008; Armbrust
et al., 2009).
The concept of Cloud Computing tries to pursue the goals that have been around
since the early beginning of computing: giving users on-demand access to a public
computing utility with high availability and scalability providing a cost advantage
compared to traditional systems. Hitherto, McCarthy’s vision of computing as a
public utility like the telephone in 1961 has not become true, although the concept
of Cloud Computing promises to reach that state in medium term (Ivanov, 2008;
Foster et al., 2008). At present, there is no commonly accepted definition for the
term “Cloud Computing”. One reason is the fact that part of the concept of Cloud
Computing is still in its developmental phase and at the same time proven comput-
ing methods, like virtualization, are part of the concept. For McKnight and Bailey
(1997) “the term ’Cloud’ implies that a user does not need to think much about what
happens inside this system of networks”, whereas they referred it to the Internet in
general.
Boss et al. (2007) are among the first who tried to share a definition of Cloud
Computing, one that includes both the platform and the type of application. The
platform is characterized as “dynamically provisions, configures, reconfigures, and
deprovisions servers as needed. Servers in the Cloud can be physical machines or
virtual machines. Advanced Clouds typically include other computing resources
such as storage area networks, network equipment, firewall and other security de-
vices”. Cloud Computing applications, however, “are extended to be accessible
through the Internet. These Cloud applications use large data centers and pow-
9Graphical client for Amazon Web Services (http://www.jollat.com/)
10Cloud Management Platform based on Amazon Web Services (http://www.rightscale.
com/)
11Amazon Web Services (http://aws.amazon.com/)
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erful servers that host Web applications and Web services. Anyone with a suitable
Internet connection and a standard browser can access a Cloud application”.
Buyya et al. (2008) provide a definition with higher granularity defining the
Cloud as “a type of parallel and distributed system consisting of a collection of
interconnected and virtualized computers that are dynamically provisioned and
presented as one or more unified computing resources based on SLA established
through negotiation between the service provider and consumers”. Subsequently,
they outline that Clouds are not a combination of clusters and Grids but “next-
generation data centers with nodes ’virtualized’ through hypervisor technologies
such as VMs, dynamically ‘provisioned’ on-demand as a personalized resource col-
lection to meet a specific SLA, which is established through a ‘negotiation’ and ac-
cessible as a composable service via ‘Web 2.0’ technologies”. However, currently
most providers make a posted price offer. Consequently not every provider allows
negotiation of prices.
Wang et al. (2008) outline enabling technologies that drive the development of
Cloud Computing. These are virtualization concepts that have been proven in ar-
eas like Grid Computing and include virtual machines as well as virtual network
advances. Other techniques are the automation of serviceflow and workflow or-
chestration using service-oriented architectures and Web services following indus-
try standards. In addition, Web 2.0 and mashup technologies can be considered as
drivers of communities and collaboration among users. Thereby Weiss (2007) con-
cludes that the real innovation that comes with Cloud Computing is the integration
of the existing technologies, explicitly “the combination of utility computing and
datacenters”. Lin et al. (2009) also emphasize that Cloud Computing is nothing
new, but a confluence of technology and business development within the Internet
leveraging new technologies.
Armbrust et al. (2009) agree on the view of Weiss (2007) and Lin et al. (2009) and
add three additional aspects that emerged with the advent of Cloud Computing.
These are “the on-demand availability of resources which lead to the illusion of in-
finite computing resources”, “abolition for an up-front commitment to resources by
users”, and “the possibility to pay for what you use only, regardless of the time hori-
zon”. In their definition Cloud Computing “refers to both, the applications deliv-
ered as services over the Internet and the hardware and systems software in the dat-
acenters that provide those services”. Staten (2008) summarizes these attributes by
defining Cloud Computing as “a pool of abstracted, highly scalable, and managed
compute infrastructure capable of hosting end customer applications and billed by
consumption”.
Vaquero et al. (2009) offers a good overview of more than 20 definitions. As
Cloud Computing involves a broad range of computing aspects, the definitions vary
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as well. There are definitions focusing on the infrastructure layer and others trying
to reduce the characteristics to a common denominator over all layers and include
business model aspects of Cloud Computing. However, the Vaquero et al. (2009)
limit the definition of Cloud Computing to the pay-as-you-go pricing model. Cur-
rently, there is no dominating pricing model in the Cloud Computing market, since
usage-based pricing as well as flat fee are very common (?).
Foster et al. (2008) compare Grid Computing with Cloud Computing and con-
clude that both have the same vision such as reduce cost or increase flexibility.
However, the commercial interest to create a large-scale system to analyze mas-
sive data makes Clouds more attractive to the industry. Moreover, different levels
of services, namely Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS)
and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), enable the delivery of customized services to con-
sumers. These services can be dynamically configured and combined to more com-
plex services12 via virtualization. Foster et al. (2008) stress the role of virtualization
as an ‘indispensable ingredient’ for Clouds, whereas Grids do not necessarily re-
quire virtualization, although efforts are being made to integrate it. The resource
management concept of Grid and Cloud Computing differs according to the type
of applications. In Grid Computing jobs are batch applications, since Grids do not
natively support interactive applications. Clouds offer SLAs and thus must support
a certain quality level for the consumers. Economies of scale and on-demand de-
livery are further advantages of Cloud Computing. However, security in Clouds is
based on encrypted electronic communication and passwords are sent via email for
a quick initiation process. In Grids the acceptance of a new participant incorporates
an interaction with a trusted party via mail for identification in order to receive elec-
tronic credentials. The initiation process is more secure, but also time-consuming.
All of these definitions assume that the term Cloud Computing is more of a
collective term for Internet-based services both from the technical as well as the
economic perspective. Physical resources required for the offered services will be
owned by one provider, although providers can buy services from a third-party and
resell or enhance them into (more) complex services. Most providers will prefer to
have homogeneous physical resources to facilitate management similar to Cluster
Computing, which is mostly organized within an organization. However, to offer
different kind of services, e.g. different operating systems, virtualization is an es-
sential part of Clouds, whereas in Grids virtualization, although important, is still
in its infancy (Foster et al., 2008). Virtualization enables the provider to offer hetero-
geneous services.
12Blau (2009) defines complex services as services which “typically involve the assembly and in-
vocation of many pre-existing services possibly found in diverse enterprises to complete a multi-step
business interaction”
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From the organizational point of view, the function of a participant entering the
Cloud can be distinguished into three roles. Providers offer services based on the
above mentioned definition of Cloud. Consumers access the services offered in the
Cloud over a Web 2.0 interface and use this information or infrastructure. Integra-
tors buy these services from providers, aggregate or enhance them and sell the new
service to the consumer. A typical example for the latter case is CastIron13. In Clus-
ter and Grid Computing the participants act as a provider and consumer. All of
them can send jobs into the network or the resources are used in idle cases. Volun-
teer Computing, however, only allows providers in a network and the central entity
is the only consumer sending high amount batch jobs to all participants. While
in Grids the number of both parties is almost equal14, in Clouds the number of
providers is rather small compared to the number of consumers. Hence, virtualiza-
tion can help to offer scalable services for the large consumer group.
The applications running in a VM give the resource manager more flexibility and
control to define appropriate SLAs. Although SLAs are not important in an intra-
organizational context like in Cluster Computing, they play a major role in Clouds.
Some providers such as Flexiscale even offer a 100% reliability of their infrastructure
service. These SLAs enable consumers to work with interactive applications, since
workflow systems can be configured reliably and time-sensitively. Usually, Grid
and Volunteer Computing do not take SLAs into account due to the decentralized
nature of control. However, there are approaches in the Grid domain analyzing the
introduction and enforcement of SLAs (e.g. SLA4D-Grid15 project or Balakrishnan
et al. (2008) and Leff et al. (2003)), but none of them have provided a sustainable
model yet or are successfully applied in larger Grid environments.
By offering reliable services, this characteristic entails a viable business model.
Thus, Cloud services are often priced on a pay-as-you-go basis or include a flat fee
model. On the contrary, Cluster and Grid Computing have a shared resource agree-
ment, since the academia background of these concepts condemns the introduction
of pricing models16. Volunteer Computing, as the name implies, assumes that the
participants in the network are voluntarily sharing their idle resources among them-
13CastIron(http://www.castiron.com/)
14In Grids some participants only consume services, because they do not have any resources.
Hence, not every participant acts as both a provider and a consumer in the Grid. In research projects
like the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) institutes without their own resources can have access to the
data of the LHC to be able to contribute to the field of research.
15Project SLA4D-Grid (http://www.sla4d-grid.de/)
16Researchers deny the usage of money for sharing resources for two main reasons. Firstly, re-
searchers are not allowed to spend money without presenting valid reasons for their expenses to the
sponsor. They always take care of the investment they make. An investment can lead to revenue.
In some countries it is prohibited by law for institutes to make profit (e.g. Germany). Secondly, it is
regarded unethical that those institutes with a deeper pocket are in a position to do better research
than others. This is one reason why LHC gives institutes without their own resources access to data
produced by the collider.
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selves. Hence, no pricing model should be adopted. This also has an impact on the
mode of allocating resources. In Volunteer Computing resources cannot be declared
as dedicated for the application from the central entity, since the resources are not
under centralized control. The allocation is based on voluntary sharing. The partic-
ipants have full control over their resources and can offer them to or remove them
from the network. In Cluster and Clouds consumers get dedicated or best-effort re-
source access. The central manager or Cloud provider offers low-priced best-effort
services or the more expensive services with a guaranteed SLA. A similar idea is re-
alized by the Amazon Spot Instances17, where consumers can buy cheap resources
without knowing when their instances are executed. Grids can offer different ser-
vices as well, but they do not have centralized control. Hence, providers and con-
sumers in Grids have to agree on the appropriate service (i.e. dedicated or shared).
Advance reservation is another aspect to distinguish between service offers.
While some Cloud service providers offer advance reservation to get dedicated ser-
vices (e.g. RenderRocket18), Volunteer Computing does not support this kind of
interaction. In Grids it is possible and planned for the Globus Toolkit to implement
such a feature, but is currently not available (Stoesser, 2009). Clusters allow dedi-
cated allocation of resources and thus enable advance reservation for certain com-
puting jobs. Still, some of the big players in the Cloud such as Amazon or Google
do not offer advance reservation yet.
In Clusters and Grids the development of the applications is done locally. Clouds
offer services running under centralized control and thus the applications and ser-
vices are mostly developed on the server. The application in Volunteer Computing
is fully developed on the server and the participants get a software, which is in-
stalled and executed locally. Services in the Cloud are accessed via standardized
Web protocols like Representational State Transfer (REST) or Simple Object Access
Protocol (SOAP). Grid Computing has a specific Grid middleware such as Globus
Toolkit19 or gLite20. Cluster and Volunteer Computing are built on open source or
proprietary software such as Condor21, Moab Cluster Suite22 or BOINC23.
However, the standard Web protocols in Clouds only give access to the services.
The services themselves cannot be easily migrated to other providers, which can
lead to high switching cost. It’s easier for any Grid user to switch from one Grid
provider’s resources to another. Currently, Cloud providers have no big interest
in applying standards, which ultimately makes it harder for potential customers





22Moab Cluster Suite (http://www.clusterresources.com/)
23BOINC (http://boinc.berkeley.edu/)
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to switch among providers. For example, an Amazon EC2 instance cannot be exe-
cuted at the Flexiscale platform. There are some attempts such as the OpenCloud-
Manifesto24 to introduce standards. And Eucalyptus25 enables multiple provider
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). Cluster and Grid Computing have a
standardized environment allowing them to send their jobs to almost any provider
in the network. Participants in Volunteer Computing do not care about switching
costs, since they are the resource provider for one central entity. Instead of providing
another definition of Cloud Computing, this thesis outlines criteria to distinguish
the different computing concepts in their current state (Table 2.1).
Depending on the accessibility to the services in the Cloud there is a distinction
between public and private Clouds (Armbrust et al., 2009). Public Cloud providers
allow the general public to access their services. Private Clouds are operated within
businesses or other organizations and utilize internal datacenter hardware and soft-
ware. While public Clouds need to have standardized interfaces to communicate
with a large audience, private Clouds might even have proprietary protocols on
purpose e.g. to avoid typical cloud connected problems such as security, privacy
and lock-in effects. Some also predict the rise of hybrid Clouds, a composition of
public and private infrastructure (Won, 2009; Mell and Grance, 2009). In this sce-
nario critical data is processed in a private environment and public Clouds are used
for non-critical data processing, which are provided by third parties. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)26 augment this definition by introduc-
ing the term community Cloud. Several organizations share the community Cloud
infrastructure, since they need these infrastructure for collaboration to achieve a
(common) objective (Mell and Grance, 2009). While the definition of public, private
and hybrid Clouds are reasonable and fit into the context of the various computing
concepts, community Clouds is blurry. If resources are shared among communities,
it is hard to distinguish community Cloud from other concepts like Grid or Cluster
Computing. It is not clear who owns the resources or if switching costs play a role.
24OpenCloudManifesto (http://www.opencloudmanifesto.org/)
25Eucalyptus (http://www.eucalyptus.com/)
26An Agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce
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2.1.3 Cloud Services
In the so-called developed nations such as the United States of America, Japan and
Germany, the percentage of labor in the service sector is above 50% (Maglio et al.,
2006). Stahel (1997) states that a sustainable society is incompatible with the goals
of the industrial economy, which will lead to the service economy with new and in-
novative services. According to Verma et al. (2002) the rapid development in IT has
a great impact on the shift towards a service economy. Although services seem to be
essential for the future growth of the world economy, the term service is often used
ambiguously and not defined in a consistent way across different domains. Rath-
mell (1966) already outlined in 1966 that goods are perceived as tangible economic
products, which can be seen and touched. Services, however,“seem to be every else;
and an understanding of them is not clear” (Rathmell, 1966). In the 60s, marketing
researchers were interested in the service sector and identifying its characteristics.
A first distinction between goods and services can be made by the following classi-
fication for services (Judd, 1964):
• Rented-goods services: the right to possess and use a product,
• Owned-goods services: a value creation on an owned product like repair ser-
vice,
• Non-goods services: no product is mainly involved (perhaps only supportive),
but the experience or emotional change of a person is the result (e.g. entertain-
ment).
Rathmell (1966) generalizes the difference by determining a good as a thing and
a service as an act or performance. Although there might exist pure services or goods,
most transactions between a buyer and a seller comprise of services as well as prod-
ucts, which underlines the mixed nature of the transaction object (Vargo and Lusch,
2004). Hill (1999) emphasizes that a service automatically involves a relationship
between the service producer and the service consumer, since a service has to be
provided to another economic unit. This process implies a change of condition of
one or more persons, their property or good. A service cannot exist independently
of its producer or consumer. Since a service is not an entity like a good, ownership
rights are not applicable over a service. Contrary to the definition of Judd (1964),
Hill (1999) gives a more abstract definition, which does not depend on the underly-
ing good. Consequently, a service cannot be transferred from one economic unit to
another. For example, a service cannot be stored in a warehouse and sent to other
economic units in other countries like a good. Blau (2009) summarizes the key char-
acteristics of services and, in particular, e-services.
Uno-Actu: The provision and consumption of a service cannot be separated (Hill,
1999). A barber can only cut the hair of a customer if both are at the same loca-
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tion. According to Blau (2009), this property of a service is the main distinctive
characteristic from a conventional good. It further implicates the following
characteristics as well. The producer and consumer are continuously involved
during the provision and consumption process.
Not storable: Services in general are perishable by nature. Volatile demands have
a higher impact on services than on goods, since services are created and exe-
cuted immediately. Services can neither be produced in advance nor be stored
for future consumption.
Co-Creation: The interaction between consumer and provider enables the con-
sumer to influence the outcome of a service. The service consumer can have
different roles in the service execution process (Bitner et al., 1997). First, con-
sumers can be passive, but their presence might be required. The execution
should be isolated as much as possible from the consumers (e.g. the time
of delivery of standard mails usually cannot be influenced by the consumer).
Second, the participation of the consumer is necessary to fulfill the requested
service, e.g. health care or entertainment. The third category describes the con-
sumer as a competitor to the service provider. The consumer can either choose
to create part of the services independently or to buy the service externally. A
car owner can either choose to repair the car on his own, to hand it over to a
car repair shop or to share the work (simple tasks himself and complex task by
the repair shop).
Intangible value creation: Services are created without the transfer of ownership
in this type of service. If the change of condition of an economic unit is accom-
plished, the consumer gains value from the change, which is often based on
his expectations (Lovelock and Wirtz, 2001). This rather subjective evaluation
of the delivered service can be challenging regarding the assessment of service
quality by objective attributes.
Fuzzy inputs and outputs: The coincident production and consumption cannot be
always created in a standard way. For example, a consultancy service may
vary depending on the constitution of the service provider. Furthermore, a co-
created service with a consumer will be influenced by the consumers behavior
as well. Thus, the same service will not necessarily lead to the same outcome
or the expected results (Gallouj and Weinstein, 1997).
The success of IT has entailed new business models and services in the last
decade. The Internet enabled new opportunities to design, provide and consume
services as well as to involve the consumer much better in the service creation pro-
cess. As soon as a service is provisioned over an electronic network, it is known as an
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e-service (Rust and Kannan, 2003). This definition includes the exchange of informa-
tion over the Internet or other electronic networks in general such as IT services, Web
Services or infrastructure services. For example, the operation of an ATM machine
is an e-service as well. The authors emphasize that e-services is a customer-centric
concept, which is in line with the co-creation characteristic of a service. Further-
more, a service is not storable by nature, since the service is created and executed
while it is used. Electronic data can be stored, but the access to the data is a ser-
vice, which is provisioned and consumed when the consumer downloads the data,
is not storable. Hoffman (2003) arguments that an e-service is available 24/7 and if
this service is not consumed one day it is available the next. The major difference,
though, is that the value of the service is generated, when it is provisioned and con-
sumed. The availability of the service does not directly increase the utility of the
consumer. In particular in a market with dynamic prices, the utility often depends
on the current price. If the price is too high, the consumer will not buy the service
and hence no value is created. However, in some cases only the availability of ser-
vices can indirectly increase the utility for a consumer. For example, a high number
of providers will foster the competition on the service market and subsequently the
prices often drop compared to monopoly.
The value created by downloading the data is only assessable by the consumers
themselves. If the data service does not contain any valuable information, it is use-
less. However, as with all information services the value can only be evaluated
by consumption. This can further result in fuzzy inputs and outputs. A vaguely
defined electronic request by the consumer will perhaps not return the expected re-
sult. Though, most electronic services are defined more precisely than a service in
general (Blau, 2009). Especially, Web services have a predefined description language
and standard interface for communication (Papazoglou, 2008). An electronic service
for gathering information about the weather can be defined by clear input parame-
ter such as country, location name and zip code.
E-services also follow the uno-actu principle. For example, the definition and imple-
mentation of a Web service interface will be done once by the provider (production).
In certain cases one or multiple requests can be served at the same time (provision
and consumption). An example for the former case is an ATM machine, which can
only serve one person at a time. A Web Service can be accessed by more than one
person simultaneously. IT allows an automate process via algorithms in a way that
no physical interaction of the provider is necessary. This allows the scalability of
certain e-services.
Since the term Web service has been mentioned several times in the context of e-
services, there exist ambiguous definitions of this term. Alonso et al. (2004) discuss
these definitions and conclude that the World Wide Web consortium is quite accu-
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rate27: “A Web service is a software system identified by a [Uniform Resource Iden-
tifier], whose public interfaces and bindings are defined and described using XML.
As the name implies, a Web service leverages the Internet to communicate with
other software systems. Its definition can be discovered by other software systems.
These systems may then interact with the Web service in a manner prescribed by
its definition, using XML based messages conveyed by Internet protocols” (Austin
et al., 2004a). These definitions apparently stick Web Services close to XML. The au-
thors emphasize that the standardization aspect (XML-definition, -description and
-discovery) of a Web service is as important as the loosely coupled development of
these services underlining the service-oriented paradigm. Papazoglou (2008) aug-
ments this definition by a business-oriented characteristic. He says that a Web ser-
vice can be a simple passive information service or a complex business application
combining information from multiple sources.
This thesis focuses on Cloud services. Cloud services can be subsumed under
e-services, since e-service is a much broader term. However, some characteristics
might only apply to Cloud services compared to other e-services like ATM ma-
chines. As already mentioned above, e-services provided over the Internet, such as
Cloud services, have the advantage to serve multiple requests simultaneously. Fur-
thermore, the condition of a physical economic unit is changed or can be changed
remotely (writing data on a server). In fact, the service gives access to remote data
or computing resources for consumption. A transportation of a physical good or
the provision of the consumers themselves (like in a barber shop) is not applica-
ble. But physical resources are still necessary to create, provide and consume Cloud
services28. The consumers gain access to Cloud services with a browser or a well-
defined protocol to access the service via a desktop application. A browser interface
is mandatory to give consumers access from various devices such as mobile phones,
since the vision is to access Cloud services from anytime and anywhere.
According to Papazoglou (2008), Web services operate at the code level and are in-
voked by other software systems. Software applications incorporate Web services to
enable human interaction. However, a Cloud service uses Web service technology
for communication and comprises abstracted services from the underlying compu-
tational resources. In particular, a Cloud service provides a software system for
a consumer over a Web browser to offer ‘anytime, anywhere’ access. While Web
services are not targeted for human interaction, the main purpose of Cloud ser-
vices is to deliver the user an enhanced communication interface (via browser and
optionally software application) to hardware resources (e.g. storage) or software
environments such as the Windows Azure Platform supporting .Net developers or
27Note that the definition from 2004 has slightly changed to the definition Alonso et al. (2004) has
reviewed from 2002
28This is an important aspect. In this thesis it is assumed that every service can be mapped to the
consumed physical resources.
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Salesforce’s CRM Cloud service. Thus, the web access via browser is a necessary
part of a Cloud service. The provider can additionally offer APIs or proprietary
software to access these services as well. Furthermore, Cloud services can be com-
bined to complex services. Complex services provide added value for the consumer
by aggregating or combining functionalities of other (basic or complex) services (Pa-
pazoglou, 2008). Mell and Grance (2009) identify multi-tenancy as one of the main
characteristics in the software architecture of a Cloud service to distinguish it form
other services. However, in general, it is hard to distinguish Cloud services from
other electronic services and there is no explicit definition of this term. Since there is
no agreement on the unique attributes of Cloud services and the term is often used










Figure 2.1: Three service layer architecture in the Cloud.
Youseff et al. (2008), Motahari-Nezhad et al. (2009) and other researchers basi-
cally differentiate between three levels of services, on which Cloud services can be
provided (see Figure 2.1): Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service
(PaaS) and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). Others like Armbrust et al. (2009) do not
believe in such a “XaaS” separation as to their understanding the different layers are
not clearly defined: “but we were unable to agree even among ourselves what the
precise differences among them might be”. They comment that SaaS has been there
already before the rise of Cloud Computing and only on an infrastructure layer a
Cloud revolution is happening, so that they only call the infrastructure providers
Cloud providers. Hence, this thesis will mainly focus on the IaaS layer, although
the differences between the three layers are outlined below to enable a concrete def-
inition for the remainder of this thesis.
Infrastructure as a Service:
IaaS is the virtualized provision of (external) datacenter services. The IaaS layer
consists of storage and computational services (Vaquero et al., 2009). Consumers
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can access providers’ datacenters over the Internet and can dynamically adjust their
requested computing resources. In order to separate different consumer requests
within the same datacenter, virtual machines play a crucial role. They allow the
setting up of different computing environments for each consumer, so that the vir-
tualized instance appears to the consumer like a personal datacenter. Still, the in-
frastructure layer remains the most basic level of Cloud Computing, requesting con-
sumers to have profound skills of datacenter technology or of the virtual environ-
ment. Armbrust et al. (2009) point out that especially the infrastructure layer builds
the new aspects of Cloud Computing with the illusion of infinite computing re-
sources available on-demand, the elimination of an up-front commitment by Cloud
users and the ability to pay for use of computing resources on a short-term basis
and release them as needed. Especially, the infrastructure as a service paradigm
offers the possibility to increase datacenters’ utilities. Currently, datacenters suf-
fer from very low utilization rates (10-35%) as they are built to confront peak load
times (Carr, 2005). With the possibility to share and dynamically adjust datacenter
resources, the infrastructure layer offers great possibilities to cut down datacenter
running costs through outsourcing.
Platform as a Service:
PaaS is situated at a higher abstraction level than IaaS, as Briscoe and Marinos (2009)
and Youseff et al. (2008) agree consistently. The offered platform services provide an
application environment instead of plain computing resources. This environment
can help developers to accelerate the deployment of their applications in a Cloud
environment and makes concerns about scalability inconsiderable. Developers can
gain several advantages from platform services. They can profit from included “au-
tomatic scaling and load balancing, as well as integration with other services (e.g.
authentication services, email services, user interface)” (Youseff et al., 2008). Briscoe
and Marinos (2009) mention similar advantages but name as well that the devel-
opers have to deal with constraints as they are limited to the platform providers
programming language. The most famous ambassador of the platform providers is
Google’s App Engine, which offers a python as well as a Java programming lan-
guage environment. Though, other vendors like SingTel, a big Southeast Asian
telecommunications company, are now entering the market. They have recently
launched their SingTel Innovation Exchange platform29 in July 2009. Within this
platform service, developers cannot only benefit from the previously listed advan-
tages, but also have direct access to SingTel’s 250 million customer base which offers
additional value to developers to deploy their applications.
29SingTel Innovation Exchange (http://business.singtel.com/innovation/index.
asp)
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Software as a Service:
SaaS is the most visible layer to end-users, because the SaaS paradigms compre-
hends on-demand online applications for a wide variety of users. SaaS providers
can bundle software applications and therefore offer additional service within one
packet and deliver it to their end customer across the Internet (Ma and Seidmann,
2008). Vaquero et al. (2009) describe those services as an alternative to locally run ap-
plications. As Youseff et al. (2008) mention, SaaS offers the advantage that end-users
are no longer burdened by “software maintenance and the ongoing operation and
support costs”. Furthermore, they can profit from less restrictions on their hardware
equipment and run even Central Processing Unit (CPU)- and memory-intensive ap-
plications without owning the expensive hardware. Users can “access the service
‘anytime, anywhere’, share data and collaborate more easily” than in previous solu-
tions (Armbrust et al., 2009). The SaaS providers on the other hand can benefit from
simplified software development. The central control of the application makes ver-
sioning and upgrading of applications much easier than individual requests to each
end-user. The standard of a Cloud environment offers in addition opportunities to
combine several different services in order to create a new value for end-users. SaaS
was available prior to the hype of Cloud Computing, however, the advantages of
SaaS remain in Cloud Computing. With the possibility to host software services in
combination with infrastructure services, software providers do not even have to
worry about the datacenter any longer. As Armbrust et al. (2009) sum it up: “Anal-
ogously to how SaaS allows the user to offload some problems to the SaaS provider,
the SaaS provider can now offload some of his problems to the Cloud Computing
[infrastructure] provider”.
Foster and Tuecke (2005) outlined that Utility, On-Demand and Grid Computing
have a big overlap in fostering the idea of IT in general as a service. The under-
lying idea is to provide physical resources and other services (such as platforms
or software) over the Internet via some standardized protocols. Cloud Computing
seems to be a promising paradigm towards this vision of computing as a utility
like electricity. It leverages technologies like virtualization, Web 2.0 software tools
and paradigms to provide access to physical resources, development platforms and
business software environments through a Web browser, which was not done before
in such a way.
2.2 Traditional Revenue Management
The term Revenue Management is most commonly used for the theory and practice
of maximizing expected revenues by opening and closing different fare classes or
dynamically adjusting prices for services. The development of the scientific research
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in this discipline started after the deregulation of the American airline industry in
1978, which relaxed restrictions over standardized prices and profitability targets
(Belobaba, 1987). Secomandi et al. (2002) define Revenue Management as the mar-
riage of “OR/MS (operations research/management science), statistics, economics,
software development, and consulting to manage demand for a firm’s resource in-
ventory with the goal of maximizing revenue (or profit)”.
Netessine and Shumsky (2002) define Yield Management as a part of Revenue
Management although boundaries between both are often ambiguous. However,
most authors perceive the term Yield Management as the predecessor for what is
nowadays called Revenue Management. To develop industry-independent mod-
els for revenue optimization, Weatherford and Bodily (1992) introduced the term
Perishable Asset Revenue Management. This term relates to one of the main char-
acteristics of Revenue Management: The perishability of the offered services. For
example, a Cloud Computing provider cannot save up resources at a certain point
in time in order to sell them later. Instead, an unsold service becomes worthless
without creating any revenue (Netessine and Shumsky, 2002). The resources are
time-dependent and have to be consumed at a given time. Otherwise, the resources
for this certain timeslot are not available any more. Throughout this thesis, the term
Revenue Management will be used synonymously with Yield Management and Per-
ishable Asset Revenue Management.
Revenue Management techniques assume that Cloud service consumers can be
classified into different segments. The key advantage of Revenue Management sys-
tems is the possibility to extract consumers’ willingness to pay for the identified
market segments by offering services with different levels of restrictions and charg-
ing those at different prices. The preferences are distinguished by different needs
at different points in time and by varied willingness to pay. Shen and Su (2007)
model the consumer heterogeneity along two dimensions: their willingness to wait
for a better offer and their willingness to pay (i.e. their reservation price). Impatient
consumers, who need a service soon, will be willing to pay more or they will in-
crease their reservation price over time. The unpredictable behavior of consumers
characterizes the high complexity of the appropriate application of Revenue Man-
agement tools. Consequently, from the service provider point of view the main topic
in Revenue Management theory is to find the right combination of consumers buy-
ing different kinds of services to provide the highest possible revenue. Therefore, a
choice has to be made between offering a service for sale or protecting it and wait-
ing for a more profitable consumer. If vendors decide to protect a service for future
demand, they take the risk of ending up without selling the service (Goldman et al.,
2002; Netessine and Shumsky, 2002).
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When applying Revenue Management models, there are numerous types espe-
cially for the airline industry that show an increase in the firm’s revenue, some con-
sidering single leg models (e.g. Belobaba (1987) or Gosavi et al. (2002)) and others
considering network models (Gallego and van Ryzin, 1997; Bertsimas and Popescu,
2003). Single leg models represent only one resource in the optimization model. Thus,
more complex dependencies like several airline routes or multiple resources con-
sumed by various services are not taken into account. The latter case is modeled
in the Network Capacity Control (NCC). All these models are based on several as-
sumptions especially about the behavior of the consumer, e.g. a consumer will not
switch between the service offers or react to price changes. Customer Choice models
try to identify and formalize consumers’ behavior to improve the Revenue Man-
agement models according to their booking limits and prices. Further aspects of
Revenue Management like price-based control, overbooking, forecasting, passenger
diversion (buy up) or degradation costs are disregarded. Interested readers for these
topics are referred to the papers of e.g. Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003), Gosavi
et al. (2002), Subramanian et al. (1999), Botimer and Belobaba (1999) or Zhao and
Zheng (2001). Figure 2.2 outlines the dependency between the different areas. This
thesis will focus on capacity control and customer segmentation or customer choice
models, respectively.
2.2.1 Capacity Control for Single Leg
The problem of optimally allocating resources to several classes of demand is simpli-
fied by restricting the number of used resources to one. This single resource might
be, for example, seats in an airplane or, in the context of IT, an Internet service
provider who offers Internet access. In the latter case only the usage of bandwidth
as resource is considered. Littlewood (1972) suggested that in a simple two fare
model, discount bookings should be accepted as long as the expected future rev-
enue for the remaining full fare services is lower than discount sales.
Let n be the capacity of maximum customers or connections for an Internet
service provider, where customers can be distinguished by discount and full fare
classes. The protection level30 for full fare services is denoted by qi and each unit
is sold for a certain price. The provider can decide whether to accept or reject a
request for the discount fare class. In case of acceptance the provider will gain a
revenue of r2 for the discount fare class (r1 for the full fare class). The demand for
the full fare class depends on the expected demand. To accept a discount request
the expected marginal value for the full fare class must be lower than the price for
the discount fare class. Formally, r2 ≥ r1 · P(D1 ≥ q1), where D1 is the expected
30The amount of seats which are explicitly reserved for a certain fare class.












Figure 2.2: Revenue Management process flow in the e-Business context (adapted
from Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) and Bichler et al. (2002)).
demand for the full fare class. Consequently, the optimal protection level satisfies
r2 < r1 · P(D1 ≥ q1) and r2 ≥ r1 · P(D1 ≥ q1 + 1) (Netessine and Shumsky, 2002; Tal-
luri and van Ryzin, 2004b). There are several extensions of this simple two-class to a
n-class model. One of these general approaches was introduced by Belobaba (1987)
and is called Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR). Although the model does
not create optimal revenue in the general case especially when revenues of differ-
ent classes are close together, it is easy to implement and therefore widely used in
airline Revenue Management (Gosavi et al., 2002).
There are three common types of availability control that are distinguished. The
first one is to strictly split the given capacity into fare classes with independent book-
ing limits. But with uncertain demand a lot of revenue might be lost due to rejected
full fare booking requests although capacity from other classes are still available.
To overcome this problem, virtual nesting defines the booking limits qi for strictly
monotonically decreasing revenue in fare classes i as qi = n− qi+1 with capacity n.
In comparison to the first type, it simply enables that higher-valued fare classes i can
be extended by decreasing the capacity of lower valued by one, i.e. i + 1 (Smith and
Penn, 1988; Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). The third and very popular method is to
set a bid price that represents the lower bound for the price of a booking request.
2.2. TRADITIONAL REVENUE MANAGEMENT 31
If the price of the service is below the bid price the request will be rejected. Other-
wise, it will be accepted. The bid price has to be updated after every sale to result in
near optimal solution and generally follows a monotonically non-decreasing func-
tion for a decreasing remaining capacity. Accordingly, low valued classes are closed
first and higher valued ones are reserved for short term bookings (Smith and Penn,
1988; Williamson, 1992).
2.2.2 Network Model of Capacity Control
The single leg model as described in the previous section only takes one resource31
into account. However, complex services are built on resources or basic services
with different capacity limitations. The demand for one complex service can change
the requested units for the basic services or resources simultaneously. This inter-
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Figure 2.3: An example for the dependencies between services and resources on
the IaaS layer.
Compared to the single leg problem the Network Capacity Control (NCC) prob-
lems are better suited for real-life situations by taking the resource dependencies
between the offered services into account. Services use different kind of resources,
e.g. the storage service in Figure 2.3 consumes five units of bandwidth. The amount
of each resource consumed by the services define the usage mapping. In general,
the change on the number of users of one service affects the resource usage and the
31e.g. bandwidth of an Internet connection or one origin-destination route for airlines
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availability of the resources for other services. The application of network models
implies a more accurate estimate of the expected revenue. However, NCC problems
are more complicated than single leg controls, require more effort concerning im-
plementation, and are methodologically challenging. They arise in industries where
customers demand bundles of resources. Glover et al. (1982) were one of the first
to theoretically describe the problem of optimizing profit in the scheduled airline
industry taking into account different fare classes, demand and flight-segment ca-
pacities. By considering different services at the same time the problem becomes far
more complex. But there is a high probability for significant revenue enhancement.
For example, a hotel might consider every room and night as a single service. Be-
cause in general a one night booking creates less profit then a multiple night stay,
the use of a multiple resources approach would be likely to raise profits. Availabil-
ity control can be applied from the single resource problem. In particular, bid-price
control is easy to adapt by setting bid prices for every resource and accumulate them
for the requested service.
The major task of network capacity controls is to support optimal accept/reject
decisions on dynamically arriving requests for complex services. Services differ in
their prices, and can also differ in their resource demands depending on the appli-
cation context. A successful establishment of such a system can yield high potential
profit. Compared to the single-resource case, optimization is much more complex
and exact optimization in many cases is not feasible (Williamson, 1992). NCC is
very intuitive, but Talluri and van Ryzin (1998) also show that it is not generally
optimal. However, bid-price control achieves good results for most situations and
is gaining popularity against virtual nesting controls (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b).
Furthermore, virtual nesting control uses a process called indexing, which clusters
each complex service to a virtual class. This process inherently introduces noise into
the existing data and affects the forecast as well. Therefore, this thesis will focus
on the bid-price approach of NCC and this approach will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 4.
2.2.3 Customer Choice Model
Currently, Cloud services and offers are based on a trial and error principle. Ama-
zon, as one of the first, successfully started offering virtual machines for a relatively
low price. Microsoft and others followed with different kind of services. From a the-
oretical point of view, the profitability of such offers are not well-known. It seems
that the prices and service design are chosen rather arbitrarily. Customer choice
and market response models are part of Revenue Management and offer researchers
the ability to analyze and incorporate consumers’ behavior in a structured manner.
General Revenue Management models for quantity- and price-based control usu-
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ally simplify the scenario regarding the reaction of consumers to price changes or
rejected requests. This approach allows certain properties of the model to be proven
analytically, but neglects the complex interaction with the consumer of a service.
However, the preferences of consumers are of great importance. Consumers may
decide to wait until a service becomes cheaper or expect a certain quality level of
the offered service. They may switch or upgrade to another service if the requested
service is not available at that moment (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). Their willing-
ness to pay may be lower than a Cloud service provider assumes. Or the consumers
are ready to pay more for the service than the offered price (Belobaba, 1987; An-
derson et al., 1992). Hence, the understanding of consumers’ preferences is directly
linked to the decision making process consumers go through. Uncertainty about the
consumers has a great impact on providers’ strategy. If services can be reserved in
advance, Ng (2008) identifies that consumers’ behavior can be stochastic, probabilis-
tic and deterministic. The time of arrival is not known to the provider and is thus
a stochastic process. The process of a consumer making the choice whether to buy,
not to buy or to wait for buying a service later can be described probabilistically.
The behavior of a consumer can be influenced by pricing policies and service de-
sign, which is the deterministic component in the model from Ng (2008). The goal is
to determine the most significant attributes that identify the best choice of a group
of alternatives and how the offered services can be designed. Especially in Cloud
Computing, providers have a high degree of flexibility to design various services
individually for a certain group of consumers.
Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) present a framework for choice theories that con-
sists of five steps: in step one the choice problem has to be defined. After defining
the problem the different possible alternatives have to be generated. In the third
step the attributes of the alternatives are evaluated. Subsequently, a choice is made
according to the decision rules that apply. Step five is the implementation of the
choice. It is important to note that individuals can diverge from these procedures
and follow their habits, their intuition or imitate a trendsetter.
Four elements are part of the procedures that form the specific theory of choice.
These are decision makers, alternatives, attributes of alternatives, and decision rules. The
decision maker is any individual or group who faces different choice situations.
Each decision maker behaves differently and has a different willingness to pay as
a result of individual preferences. Considering the individual’s unique preference
a set of choices is derived from the universal set of choices which contains all pos-
sible combinations of attributes. The individual set includes the alternatives that
are known and feasible to the decision maker. Feasibility is defined by constraints
like physical and time availability, financial issues, informational constraints. The
decision rule describes the mechanism used by the decision maker to identify the
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preferred choice. There are four categories of decision rules which are described
below:
• Dominance: The preferred alternative has at least one attribute that is better
than all other alternatives and is not worse for all others. It is very unlikely
that in real world scenarios one alternative is the cheapest, performing best
and most comfortable. However, this procedure can be used to sort out redun-
dant alternatives. Furthermore, an indifference threshold value can be defined,
when small changes in the attribute levels are not considered as significant for
the overall utility (e.g. the decision maker is indifferent between the availabil-
ity of 25MB/s or 35MB/s of bandwidth.)
• Satisfaction: For each attribute there exists a level of satisfaction that has to be
reached to take the associated alternative into consideration. Alternatives that
do not fulfill the desired level of aspiration are not taken into consideration.
Although this does not necessarily lead to a distinctive choice, the combination
with other rules can have a big impact on the final decision.
• Lexicographic rules: If attributes are ranked by importance, the decision
maker can choose the alternative that is most attractive to him. If more than
one alternative is left by deciding on the most important attribute, the decision
maker goes on with the second most important attribute and continues until a
final choice is made.
• Utility: Utility is defined as the single objective function which expresses the
attraction of an alternative. In economics, ordinal and cardinal utilities are
distinguished. Ordinal utility captures only ranking while cardinal utility also
captures the strength of preferences numerically.
The Cloud service consumer as the decision maker can also combine these rules.
A common way is to combine the lexicographic rules with the satisfaction, which
is known as the elimination by aspects (Tversky, 1972). Given this orientation on
the consumers’ decision making process, the question is: How can the consumers’
preferences be analyzed in order to offer the revenue maximizing set of alternatives?
There exist two ways to analyze consumers’ preferences: composition and decomposi-
tion (Hahn, 1997). The compositional approach lets consumers value the attributes
of each alternative separately and indirectly. The respective part-worth utilities are
then composed into a total utility. In contrast, an overall judgment is split into its
part-worth utilities in the decompositional approach. Therefore, either multivariate
methods or linear optimization is used. In the empirical study described in detail
in Chapter 3 the decompositional approach is performed, as this approach leads to
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a better estimation of consumers’ preferences compared to the compositional ap-
proach (Akaah and Korgaonkar, 1983). The information about individual utilities
has to be aggregated to allow vendors to segment the market and structure the of-
fers with respect to each segments’ preferences.
2.3 Research Approach
The previous two sections highlighted the key characteristics of Cloud Computing
and Revenue Management. This section describes the intersection of the research
domain Cloud Computing and the research methodologies used in this thesis in de-
tail. The similarities and differences between the traditional Revenue Management
and the peculiarities of Cloud Computing will be outlined. Subsequently, the meth-
ods applied to analyze the application and the effectiveness of Revenue Manage-
ment to Cloud Computing will be discussed and research questions will be derived.
2.3.1 Towards Revenue Managed Clouds
The first paper analyzing Revenue Management concepts for on-demand IT scenar-
ios was published by Dube et al. (2005). In the suggested model one resource is
offered at different prices. By assuming that the customer behavior follows a logit
model, the authors analyzed an optimization model for a small number of price
classes and provided numerical results. Although the authors state that "in an on-
demand operating environment, customers and jobs, or service requests arrive at
random", the behavior of price sensitive customers can be influenced by offers dif-
ferent prices for the same product, which in turn reduces the randomness (Bitran
and Caldentey, 2003; Wilson, 1995).
Nonetheless, a certain degree of uncertainty still exists due to the unpredictable
customer behavior and unpredictable events. Customers may cancel their resource
reservations or may not show up. Overbooking strategies developed for the air-
line sector, for instance Coughlan (1999), can be used to accept more reservations
than the actual available capacity, which can effectively minimize losses of revenue
caused by customer no-shows. The benefits of overbooking for shared hosting plat-
forms was emphasized by Urgaonkar et al. (2002) as well. They did not optimize the
revenue by classifying different services, but only the throughput rate. Cancelations
and no-shows reduce the efficiency of resource usage. Sulistio et al. (2008) analyzed
how overbooking strategies can be applied to maximize revenue. Different prices
were charged for one resource and three overbooking policies were implemented
and compared via simulation.
Nair and Bapna (2001) introduced Revenue Management concepts for a similar ap-
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plication domain, namely for an Internet Service Provider. The provider has to de-
cide whether to accept an incoming customer request or to reject it. The application
domain is different from Cloud Computing as it does not take advance reservation
and resource-service dependency into account. Customers can get an internet access
only instantly.
Revenue Management deals with complex decision problems. Therefore, the
question arises under which conditions the application of Revenue Management
methods is beneficial for a company. First of all, Revenue Management is a frame-
work to optimize resource allocation and pricing from a providers’ perspective. Ac-
cording to Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), there are numerous conditions, which add
complexity to a company’s decision making processes, and therefore motivate the
use of Revenue Management techniques to support this process. The requirements
of Revenue Management can be distinguished into three categories: service proper-
ties, consumer behavior and policy & design (Figure 2.4). The services offered by the
provider should be perishable and inflexible in production. The addressed con-
sumers should have a heterogenic demand characteristic and their consumption
should be unpredictable to a certain extent. Furthermore, the business model from
the provider has to take overbooking for a better resource utilization into account
and the services have to be able to be broken down to the consumed basic services
or resources. A service-resource mapping should be feasible and the services should
compete for the scarce resources. The conditions for applying Revenue Management












Figure 2.4: Requirements for applying Revenue Management.
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Perishability:
As discussed in Section 2.1.3 for Cloud services, the perishability of the offered ser-
vices is one of the main characteristics that have to be fulfilled for an appropriate
use of Revenue Management (Netessine and Shumsky, 2002). For the traditional
industries, this means that every unused seat in an airplane or every vacant room
in a hotel signifies that potential revenue could not be realized. This property can
be directly transferred to a Cloud Computing environment: As long as enough re-
sources are left to provide at least one service32, revenue is lost. Cloud services are
perishable with time, i.e. resources can be utilized at a given time or they perish.
Inflexibility of production:
The production of some services is inflexible, that is, variations in demand cannot be
counterbalanced easily by simply adjusting the supply. This implies delays, higher
fixed costs, more capacity constraints, or even higher switching costs. These fac-
tors complicate the possibilities of correctly reacting on fluctuations in demand as
well as decisions concerning supply. These factors make the application of Revenue
Management methodologies useful. The airline sector is extremely inflexible in pro-
duction. A flight from an origin to a destination is limited by the number of seats on
the flight, and the total cost of the flight is fixed, independent of how many passen-
gers are on the plane. Hence, it is beneficial for an airline to sell as many seats on a
flight as possible in order to reduce the unit cost per seat. Therefore, the correlating
service offerings are considered as limited and without the possibility of an exten-
sion in a specific time horizon (Weatherford and Bodily, 1992).
In the case of Cloud services, the production of additional capacity is much more
flexible. Paleologo (2004) states that it is possible to increase the capacity of phys-
ical resources by integrating additional hardware into a present system. However,
this highly depends on the hardware, the infrastructure, the architecture, and the re-
quired support of applications. Therefore, production and supply of Cloud services
can be less inflexible, but this is not the general case.
Moreover, physical limitations still apply from a provider’s perspective, which lead
to higher inflexibility (Bailey, 2008). A survey by IDC Research, Inc. revealed that
limiting factors can be either the space of data centers or power and cooling issues.
Although the user currently gets the impression of unlimited resource usage by one
provider, the physical constraint can be an obstacle. The deployment of new servers
to extend an existing server farm can last up to 24 days on average (Lin et al., 2009).
Another example is that providers such as Terremark33 have limited the number
of available VMs to 60 per customer. This restriction allows Terremark to better
32Note that every service requires one or more physical resources (e.g. CPU, memory, storage etc.)
for creation, provision and consumption
33Terremark (http://www.terremark.com/)
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forecast utilization and allocate capacity. Consequently, the available resources can
be considered as fixed for a certain time horizon to effectively implement Revenue
Management techniques.
Same resources for multiple services (service-resource mapping):
For Cloud Computing there is the desired advantage of flexible services. Compared
to an airplane, where every seat may be used to satisfy any element of a certain set
of final services, the resources of a Cloud Computing center are also able to provide
different service offerings. Therefore, several resource bundles may be defined as
Cloud services, e.g. containing different amounts of CPU power and storage. It can
be seen that the flexibility of the initial capacity is given and also copious quanti-
ties of possible resource combinations are enabled. However, leaving the possibility
open for every feasible combination, the problem of computing an optimal pricing
strategy becomes more expensive (Bitran and Caldentey, 2003). From a technical
perspective, virtualization technologies foster the implementation of multiple ser-
vices, e.g. multiple operating system environments, on a single physical machine.
The definition of resources is not limited to physical resources. Resources in the
service-resource mapping can also represent basic services. Complex services in-
voke these pre-existing basic services to support a business process. Hence, a map-
ping can be defined between the complex services and the basic services. If the basic
services are created and provided by a third-party, they can be limited in their ca-
pacity by determining different prices for different amounts. These prices will affect
the revenue of a complex service provider.
Overbooking:
Due to cancelations and not arriving customers, so called no-shows, airlines began
to overbook flights. The problem is to find the optimal relation between real seats
and additionally sold seats that do not exist. This procedure stimulated to put more
focus on forecasting of customer behavior (McGill and van Ryzin, 1999). Every ser-
vice provider using overbooking has to define a service level that a certain amount
of requests cannot be satisfied (Rothstein, 1971). The Cloud Computing overbook-
ing procedure would be to sell more of the computing and storage capacity than the
computing center has. In this case, not every costumer will exploit its reserved re-
sources completely. Overbooking of Cloud Computing resources allows more flex-
ibility. Urgaonkar et al. (2002) show that the usage of overbooking techniques can
increase utilization drastically: Already an overbooking rate of just 1% may increase
the utilization of the entire data center by a factor of two without losing meaningful
availability guarantees. However, these guarantees are one way to provide a sug-
gestive limitation for the overbooking practice. Especially for Cloud services, where
overbooking can theoretically be used limitlessly by scaling down the resources for
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every instance, service guarantees have to be established to ensure a certain service
quality for the user. Therefore, a SLA is introduced which defines a minimum avail-
ability for the offered service, measured in percentage. Finally, for not fulfilling a
SLA, economic penalties for the provider have to be defined. Amazon as one of
the first virtual instance providers offered a 99.95% availability of their operating
system. In April 2009 3Tera was one of the first providers committing to a 99.999%
availability (only 6 minutes of downtime per year). FlexiScale has outnumbered this
offer by a 100% availability guarantee.
Advance reservation:
The ability to reserve future services, like booking a room for a special day in the
future and ordering a rental car on the same day, is naturally integrated in every
industry that traditionally uses Revenue Management. In contrast, this naturalness
is not directly rejected in Cloud Computing services. Currently, there are only a few
Cloud Computing providers offering this possibility (e.g. RenderRocket34 or the
Cloud toolkit OpenNebula35 in combination with Haizea36). This useful feature has
some relevant advantages that are outlined by Boss et al. (2007): On the one hand,
it gives the user the possibility to ensure a prospective computation demand by re-
serving the required services for the desired time. On the other hand, it provides the
seller with the ability to easily discriminate customers not only by their valuation
but also by varying terms in the SLA. Otherwise, there would be exclusively imme-
diate bookings. Furthermore, it seems to be a good supporting feature to smoothen
the demand for services, and thus the resource utilization. Hence, it has to become
relevant in the near future.
An example comes from academia, where advance reservation led to better plan-
ning and scheduling of computing instances. The North Carolina State University
in Raleigh, USA, piloted a virtual computing lab37 system in fall 2004. It deliv-
ered computing lab applications and virtual machines with Windows and Linux to
remote users via a Cloud Computing infrastructure. This infrastructure could be
exerted for lectures to show students different applications. Especially, course in-
structors at the university had the ability to reserve computing instances for courses
at a certain time. The pre-configured instances could be loaded for the requested
time period, e.g. for two hours from 2pm to 4pm, and the number of instances
could be reserved (obviously depending on the number of students on the course).
Starting with 700 reservations per semester at the beginning in 2004, the number of
reservations rapidly increased to 80,000. In 2007 the number of reservations was at




37Virtual computing lab of the University in Raleigh (http://vcl.ncsu.edu/)
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vant for commercial providers as well.
From a consumer perspective, for advance reservation, the consumers must accu-
rately know how long they need the services or have a good estimate of their de-
mand in order to efficiently use the reserved service. Providers benefit from a better
demand identification and forecasting. They can schedule the resource usage effi-
ciently for the different kinds of offered services.
Fluctuations in demand and uncertainty:
Changes in demand are natural in many industries. In the case of demand for air-
line tickets there are strong variations, i.e. some customers travel only on certain
weekdays or depending on the season. This leads to additional uncertainty about
future demand and makes the demand-management decisions more complex. Con-
sequently, the company is exposed to a certain risk of poor decision-making.
The demand for Cloud services also varies depending on a company’s changing
business requirements for Information and Communication Technology. A famous
example is Animoto38, which had to scale from 50 instances of Amazon’s EC2 to
3500 instances within three days. As mentioned above, this is practically impossible
without Cloud services. It is also hard to predict how long applications will run in
different environments (Barker et al., 2009). Thus, applications and especially com-
plex workflow systems with various dependencies between computing jobs induce
a big uncertainty in runtime. Another issue is outage in the Cloud, which is a key
part of the SLA (Leavitt, 2009). Providers have proven not to be perfect. Figure 2.5
depicts some of the outages announced in the news between January 2008 and June
2009. A provider whose systems are still online can face an unpredictable demand
for his services during the outages of other providers. For example, the six hours
outage of Salesforce already reduces the availability of the service per year to 99.93%
or 99.2% for the outage of FlexiScale in 2008.
Heterogeneity of customers:
It has already been mentioned that it is a very common method for companies using
Revenue Management to enforce price discrimination. Of course, perfect price dis-
crimination, also known as first degree price discrimination, is extremely difficult
to establish, especially when a seller faces at least one competitor. Accordingly, the
offered services have to be simultaneously differentiated by adding or restricting
certain features to reach the desired customers in every price class. In most cases,
the demand for these price classes differ particularly in their valuation for special
service features and price sensitivity (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). For example,
Amazon started the EC2 service in 2006 with a pay-per-use model. In March 2009
38Animoto (http://www.animoto.com/)
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Figure 2.5: Outage examples from January 2008 to June 2009
they introduced “Reserved Instances”. Consumer pay a one-time fee and can use
the instances at a lower rate per hour than the standard on-demand price for a finite
time. In December 2009 Amazon announced a new model called Spot Instances. Ev-
ery consumer submits a bid and if the bid is higher than the current market price, his
instance will run. Otherwise, it will be frozen and restarted at a later point in time,
if the market price falls again below his bid. Hence, Amazon offers different pric-
ing models for the same service. However, the third service comprises uncertainty
when the instance will run, but the price is usually much lower than an on-demand
instance.
To establish service differentiation by Internet Service Providers, Nair and Bapna
(2001) proposed to use quality of service as the basis for a segmentation. This
suggestion can be directly adapted to Cloud Computing: For example, a service
level might indicate the minimum percentage of availability, which is defined in a
SLA. Additionally, different needs for resource combinations between price seg-
ments might be identified and with advance reservation, restrictions can be addi-
tively adopted for reservation changes.
Price segmentation:
In the Internet context McKnight and Bailey (1997) already emphasized the necessity
of pricing models, in particular, flat-rate models, capacity-based pricing and usage-
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based pricing. Different pricing models can separate the demand for certain service.
Users with unpredictable usage and few peaks in their usage behavior may prefer a
usage-based pricing model, if they will gain less utility from a flat-rate model (de-
pending on the price for flat-rates). Users with high-demand are better off with a
flat-rate model. Different prices for the pricing models can also result in price dis-
crimination. McAfee (2008) identified three conditions when price discrimination
may apply: “consumers differ in their demands for a given good or service, a firm
has market power, and the firm can prevent or limit arbitrage”. Currently, Cloud
service offers are heterogeneous between the providers. All pricing models and dif-
ferent kind of service levels characterize the different prices for Cloud services. The
goal is to serve different kind of consumer needs, if consumer show a heterogenic
demand. Hence, the price segmentation is executed by the provider, but it highly
depends on the consumers’ acceptance and needs.
Overall, the requirements from Revenue Management seem to fit to the Cloud
Computing domain. However, some research questions are still to be answered. In
particular, the consumer behavior in Clouds has been very convoluted. No attempt
has yet been made to analyze how consumers select the offered service and which
attribute of the services they value most. The required analysis for the sample ques-
tion and further questions will be approached by appropriate research methods as
described in the subsequent section.
2.3.2 Applied Methodologies and Research Questions
Research in the Information Systems discipline is a contentious issue in the com-
munity. According to Hevner et al. (2004), two paradigms dominate the research
area: behavioral science and design science. The goal of behavioral science is to de-
velop and justify theories for understanding organizational and social interactions
by designing, implementing and analyzing Information Systems. The outcome is
a more efficient and effective way of managing information in an organization or
in a community. Design science follows the engineering approach. The artifacts
created in this context seek to create innovative methods and tools to solve an ex-
isting problem (Simon, 1996). Artifacts comprise four phases: constructs (vocab-
ulary and symbols), models (abstraction and representations), methods (algorithms
and practices) and instantiations (implementation and prototype systems). Hevner
et al. (2004) argue that both paradigms are complementary and Information Sys-
tems research can contribute to solving problems in the productive application of
IT. Technology and human interaction with this technology are inseparable. How-
ever, Hevner et al. (2004) do not take into consideration how the interaction with
other disciplines affect the research methods in the Information Systems discipline.
Furthermore, research in Information Systems can also be executed on a conceptual
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level without the instantiation phase of the artifact. The definition of Banker and
Kauffman (2004) provide a more comprehensive view on the research streams in
Information Systems. They identify the following five streams:
• Decision support and design science
• Value of information
• Human-computer systems design
• Information Systems organization and strategy
• Economics of Information Systems and Information Technology
The relevant stream for this thesis is the decision support and design science stream.
Related disciplines in this stream are operations research, computer science, eco-
nomics, marketing and strategic management (Banker and Kauffman, 2004). Rev-
enue Management is an interdisciplinary approach taking economics, statistics, soft-
ware tools and strategic decisions into account to maximize the revenue (Secomandi
et al., 2002). Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) stress the relevance of marketing meth-
ods for Revenue Management to identify consumer behavior in order to apply the
mathematical models to practice in a better way. Hence, there is a great concurrence
between these two research methodologies.
This thesis is divided into two parts. Chapter 3 analyzes the heterogenic charac-
ter of Cloud service consumers. Its goal is to elicit the preferences from consumers
for certain Cloud services at the infrastructure level. This approach gives a first
indication which attributes are valued most by consumers. Preferences can be re-
vealed by marketing methods. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) and Ng (2005) suggest
conjoint analysis as an appropriate method to identify preferences in the Revenue
Management context. As mentioned in the previous section, Revenue Management
is applicable from a provider’s perspective. But it has to be analyzed whether the
Revenue Management framework is applicable from the consumer’s perspective as
well. It is not clear if consumers would endorse price discrimination or different
kind of service levels with different prices. Moreover, the price sensitivity of Cloud
consumers is an important topic. It is interesting to know the condition under which
price discrimination is accepted and what valuation for a certain service is appro-
priate. Following research questions will be answered in Chapter 3:
RQ 2.1. Are revenue management models applicable to Clouds so that consumers would
accept the pricing and capacity management policies of the providers?
RQ 2.2. Under which conditions does a Cloud user accept price discrimination?
RQ 2.3. Which service attributes of an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) offer are most
valuable to the customer?
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The second part of this thesis (Chapter 4) concentrates on the scenario of scarce
resources and how consumer requests in such a scenario can be accepted or rejected
in a heuristic manner. Cloud providers will face a stochastic demand with a fre-
quent number of incoming requests over a finite time horizon. Requests will appear
for different kinds of offered services by the provider. The provider must decide
whether to accept a customer at a certain point in time without rejecting demand
for higher-valued services or face under-utilization of the resources at the end of
the period. Different kinds of algorithms already exist and the proposed heuris-
tic considers a scenario, where updates of bid prices cannot be performed after each
request. Thus, the heuristic automatically updates the bid prices according to prede-
fined parameters. These parameters are determined offline via a genetic algorithm
before the entire time period starts. Banker and Kauffman (2004) indicate that sim-
ulation is a common research method to analyze and solve the identified problem
in the Information Systems discipline. Genetic algorithms have been proven to per-
form well for simulation based optimization (Holland, 1975). Hence, the challenge
is to find a self-updating bid price algorithm, which suits the Revenue Management
scenario:
RQ 2.4. How accurately can a simple linear function approximate well known algorithms
for bid price calculation without reoptimization between two or more timeslots, taking the
assumptions and requirements from Revenue Management in general and from Cloud Com-
puting into account?
Simulation as a research method is applied here for two purposes. First, the
parameters for CBPP are determined via simulation-based optimization to identify
the optimal values. Second, simulation help to understand complex interaction be-
tween various parameters in different kind of settings. Hence, data for statistical
analysis is created via simulation in order to reveal the dependencies.
Currently, Cloud service providers are mainly technology-driven. This thesis
focuses on consumer requirements and analyzes if providers can apply Revenue
Management methods to the Cloud. While Chapter 3 identifies the preferences of
consumers, Chapter 4 assumes that these preferences are already considered in the
design of the services. Consequently, prices and services are set and the consumer
will request these services, where the proposed heuristic comes into play.
Part II




Customer Choice in Clouds
What business thinks it produces is not of first importance. What the customer thinks he is
buying, what he considers value, is decisive. And what the customer buys and considers
value is never a product. It is always utility, that is, what a product does for him.
[Peter Drucker, 1974]
I n this chapter the preferences of Cloud service consumers will be analyzed andthe applicability of Revenue Management concepts will be discussed. A sur-
vey was conducted to analyze their preferences. After the introduction, the related
work about previous surveys are discussed and the conjoint analysis method is de-
scribed in detail. The steps for setting up a conjoint analysis are presented. To un-
derstand the customer choice models from Revenue Management in detail, several
approaches are compared and important aspects for the questions are derived. In
Section 3.3.1 the descriptive questions for the conducted survey are determined and
the research questions are outlined. The survey design as well as the stepwise de-
velopment of the conjoint analysis are explained in section 3.4. Section 3.5 describes
the results from the survey.
3.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of trade, vendors have faced the problem of how to price their
goods and what quantity to produce in order to fulfill the demand. For example,
the vendor could be a farmer who has to decide on the amount of fruits he harvests
on a day-to-day basis and on the prices he sells his fruits at the market. Even from
this very simple example one can understand the difficulty of the problem. There
is uncertainty about the future market demand as exogenous factors influence cus-
tomers’ buying behavior and customers’ valuation of the product. This uncertainty
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of customers’ valuation leads to the problem of setting prices, not to deter potential
buyers on the one hand and not to loose potential profits on the other hand. More-
over, customers act strategically. In the previous example, this could be a customer
waiting for the main harvest period before satisfying his demand. At that time the
supply is high and it is not possible for the seller to postpone his sales because oth-
erwise the fruit would get spoiled. In almost the same manner the seller can delay
when he harvests his crop and offers his products at a time of low supplies and high
demand.
In this sense the problem of Revenue Management is a very old idea. In fact,
the innovation introduced by Revenue Management does not lie not in the deci-
sion management process itself, but rather, as Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) de-
fine, "in the method of decision making - a technologically sophisticated, detailed,
and intensely operational approach to make demand-management decisions". This
raises the questions whether Revenue Management is applicable to Cloud Com-
puting and how this can be done? These questions were already answered par-
tially in Section 2.3. However, only the requirements for the applicability were an-
alyzed. Furthermore, it is interesting to investigate, whether customers for Cloud
services will accept Revenue Management methods like dynamic pricing strategies
of providers in practice. Revenue Management concepts like accept/reject policies,
dynamic pricing or advance reservation are not always accepted by the consumers.
Consumers in some domains are not used to dynamic prices and occasionally deny
it. In 2000, Amazon for example tried to introduce dynamic pricing for the on-
line store. Customer complained about the frequent price changes for certain prod-
ucts and Amazon stopped the price changes (Weiss and Mehrotra, 2001). Today,
Amazon is still changing the price, but it is not as frequent as in 2000. Therefore,
a survey as a part of this thesis was conducted to understand the customers’ per-
ception of Revenue Management methods to avoid an unsuccessful adoption like
Amazon. The design of sophisticated services and computation of the appropriate
price requires an interpretation of users’ preferences and requirements (Chellappa
and Gupta, 2002).
3.2 Related Work
This section is divided into three parts. At first, previous surveys are presented to
give an overview of the results achieved before the survey conducted in the work
at hand. Then, the advantages of the chosen method to elicit the customers opinion,
namely conjoint analysis, are outlined. The theory for the customer choice analysis
was derived from the literature related to Revenue Management, which is described
in Section 3.2.3.
3.2. RELATED WORK 49
3.2.1 Previous Surveys
Most Cloud service offers are mainly driven by companies creating innovative ser-
vices. Since the term Cloud Computing has been coined, a bunch of new services
have arisen or were rebranded to Cloud services. However, the introduction of
these offers were not based on a thorough market analysis. Software services are
not very costly like other products (e.g. pharmaceutical) and thus can be tested on
a trial an error basis. Google is a successful company, which has focused on web-
based services. Even applications like Microsoft Office have been transferred to the
web by Google (Google Docs1) and it has been improved step by step, although its
functionality has neither outperformed nor superseded Microsoft Office. An exam-
ination of the demand is completely missing. There are several concerns from the
customer side not to use such Cloud services. The company Hosting.com2 identified
that 64% of the participants are afraid of the security risks in using Cloud services
(Hosting.com, 2009). Data is often an intangible asset and companies avoid to out-
source these data to a third party company. Especially the banking sector possesses
sensitive data for evaluating future investments. The transfer of data as well as the
storage on a server should be protected against intruders into the system or elec-
tronic eavesdropper. In another survey conducted in 2008 by CIO.com3, 59% of the
participants supported the statement about security concerns (McLaughlin, 2008).
The survey from Avanade determined that as much as 72% have more confidence in
internal than external computing resources (Leipold et al., 2009). The main reasons
are the lack of security and control.
The outsourcing of data to a Cloud provider is coupled with the loss of control
over the data. Both studies pinpoint this issue as a major concern besides secu-
rity. The outsourcing company does not know how the data is managed and who
is using or distributing the data. Since the data transfer depends on the Internet,
the servers hosting the data cannot be completely cut off from the outside world
and only hosted inside the company. Furthermore, in case of a downtime of the
servers, the company depends on the performance of the provider, i.e. how quick
he can solve the problem. An in-house solution would give the choice to ask differ-
ent maintenance providers to tackle this issue instead of relying on one partner. In
urgent cases more money can be spent to prioritize this issue.
Although these obstacles persist, users still see the benefits of Cloud services.
According to Hosting.com (2009) the primary reason to switch to Cloud Computing
is cost saving (34%) followed by high availability (17%) and performance as well as
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Gens (2008), it transpired that customers prefer the ease of deployment of software
component (63%) and also the pay-per-use model (61%). Cost savings are men-
tioned in third place (57%). McLaughlin (2008), on the other hand, ranks scalability
as the most important factor. Secondly, saving hardware and maintenance cost are
listed. Although the answers of all studies seem to be heterogeneous, the cost seems
to be the main driver for moving to the Cloud. However, the Cloud is not a solution
considered by all companies. In fact, 75% of the participants of a German IDC sur-
vey did not consider using Cloud services yet (IDC Research, Inc., 2009). Avanade
says that 80% of the companies, who do not use Cloud services, are not planning to
use them in the future.
All of the above mentioned surveys were conducted by companies. Most of the
participants were Chief Information Officers (CIOs) and not Cloud service users.
Currently, there is no scientific survey available for Cloud Computing usage. More-
over, this chapter focuses on understanding the application and design of Revenue
Management models to the Cloud. Thus, it is interesting to know from a customer
or Cloud service user perspective, if concepts like advance reservation of computing
resources or price discrimination will be accepted.
3.2.2 Conjoint Analysis
Conjoint analysis is known as a multivariate data analysis method (like the regres-
sion or variance analysis) to understand the dependency among the examined pa-
rameters of a product or service (Green and Rao, 1971; Green and Srinivasan, 1990).
It is often used in marketing research to evaluate a product before it is introduced
to the market. It is one of several methods to elicit preferences from customers. A
utility of a service for every customer can be derived from the evaluation of the cus-
tomers’ perception for different combinations of service attributes. Fishburn (1967)
lists 24 different methods for empirical determination of additive utility functions.
These can be distinguished into two classes of models. One way is to investigate the
utility of attributes and their characteristics separately. Another way is to derive the
utility by using holistic statistical methods. The traditional conjoint analysis is part
of the second group of methods using a decompositional approach. It is a widely
accepted method for identifying customer preferences (Hahn, 1997; Kaul and Rao,
1995). In general, two approaches dominate this research area (Figure 3.1):
• The compositional approach allows the participants to evaluate the attributes
separately. Afterwards, the attributes are combined to give a total valuation of
a product or service. The total valuation is often determined by a simple linear
function adding up the attributes’ utility.
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• In the decompositional approach the user is faced with different services dis-
tinguished by their attributes and he has submitted a valuation for these ser-
vices. Afterwards, the total valuation is broken down into every single at-









Figure 3.1: Comparison of compositional and decompositional models (Hahn, 1997)
Both approaches can lead to completely different results for the same surveyed
domain (Green and Srinivasan, 1990). Examples for compositional approaches are
the Self-Explicated method (Srinivasan, 1988), the Analytical Hierarchy Process by
Saaty (1980) or the Multi-Attributive Value Theory (Keeney, 1969). The disadvan-
tage of these methods is the isolated evaluation of every single attribute, which does
not reflect a realistic scenario. Furthermore, it is hard for the participant to provide
a valuation for a single attribute, since she often does not know or is not able to
express it explicitly. Instead she can only know her benefit from the entire service.
In the decompositional approach the participant faces a more realistic scenario by
ranking the entire service (Akaah and Korgaonkar, 1983). Hence, this thesis focuses
on the decompositional methods, in particular the conjoint analysis, and thus disre-
gards the compositional approaches.
Historically, holistic ratings were seen as the central attribute of conjoint analyses
(Green and Srinivasan, 1978), but that condition has been weakened lately resulting
in a non-existent clear definition (Green et al., 1997). However, Teichert (2001) con-
siders simulated decision making, decompositional approach, model specification
and experimental design as the four key characteristics. Meanwhile, two additional
characteristics indicate problems of the method: utility evaluation and individual
approach. Since there is no linkage between the observed utility and the values of
interest (e.g. market share), the inquirer has to transform the outcomes of the utility
evaluation into choice decisions. Comparisons between utility evaluations of dif-
ferent individuals are questionable because of the individual approach of conjoint
analyses. Therefore, conjoint analysis focuses on the analysis of individual utility
functions and the aggregation is done in a second step.
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One significant advantage of conjoint analysis compared to other methods for
identifying preferences is the fact that the buying decision is explicitly modeled and
thereby the decision process of customers is captured better compared to directly
asking for their preferences (Teichert, 2001). In his paper, Neslin (1981) demonstrates
the benefit of using statistical methods, i.e the Analysis Of Variance (ANOVA)
model, for linking features to perceptions compared to self-stated methods. The
author’s conclusion is that statistical methods are analytically rigorous and allow to
examine more complex interaction effects. Hsee (1996) outlines that a direct eval-
uation of preferences is impossible for attributes that are dependent with regards
to their content, indicating the need for a decompositional approach like conjoint
analysis.
The general process of executing a conjoint analysis is not unambiguously de-
fined, but Green and Srinivasan (1990) propose a widely accepted and applied pro-
cedure which is divided into six steps (Table 3.1). At first, the relevant attributes
of the service have to be identified and the parameter value must be reduced to a
few. Then, the preference model has to be determined to understand the depen-
dencies of the attributes and their impact on the total utility. Thirdly, the choice of
an appropriate survey model is important to estimate the amount and quality of
data. The collection of the data is done in the fourth step. Afterwards, the evalu-
ation requires an estimation method to analyze the utility values of each attribute.
Finally, the utility values are aggregated for each participant to a total utility for cre-
ating an overall ranking of the attributes (Hahn, 1997). Since conjoint analysis is a
multivariate approach, the independent variables are the attributes and the param-
eter values, whereas the preferences for the fictive good describes the dependency.
Moreover, the preference of a single customer is of no value, if it is not representa-
tive for a group of customers. Thus, the aggregation of the individual valuation is
more relevant for the service designer (Backhaus et al., 2008).
The goal of the conjoint analysis is to analyze the preferences of the customers
and to identify the utility of every single attribute via a linear-additive model (Te-
ichert, 2001). In general, conjoint analysis comprises different approaches. Three
well-known approaches are the traditional conjoint analysis, the choice-based variant
and the adaptive conjoint analysis. In the traditional version, the participants have to
evaluate all possible combinations of the parameter values. The drawback of the
traditional method is the restriction of the number of attributes. To avoid too many
combinations of the different levels, the adaptive conjoint analysis first explores the
important attributes in a compositional way and then uses a reduced set of impor-
tant attributes and levels for the decompositional survey. Hence, it allows to take
more attributes into account. For a small set of attributes the adaptive conjoint anal-
ysis does not provide significant improvements (Teichert, 2001).
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Table 3.1: Steps for operating a conjoint analysis (Green and Srinivasan, 1990)
Step Methods
1. Preference Model Vector model, ideal-point model, part-worth
function model, mixed model
2. Data collection
method




Fractional factorial design, random sampling




Verbal description (multiple cue stimulus
card), paragraph description, pictorial or three-





Rating scale, Rank order, paired compari-
son, constant-sum paired comparisons, graded
paired comparisons, category assignment
6. Estimation method Metric methods (multiple regression); Non-
metric methods (LINMAP, MONANOVA,
PREFMAP, Johnson’s nonmetric algorithm);
Choice-probability-based methods (logit, probit)
Choice-based conjoint analysis has the advantage to directly elicit the choice be-
havior of the participants. Its binary choice structure does not require an underlying
solid transformation model like the traditional approach. The user has to decide,
whether to buy a sample product A or B (with their specified attributes) or none of
them. However, the binary choices come along with the loss of information, since
the utility cannot be derived from the binary choices. Hence, the information is
more useful on an aggregated level than for individuals, e.g. to determine market
share or sales volume. The aggregation process disregards the heterogeneity of the
customer characteristics. The traditional conjoint analysis emphasizes the investiga-
tion of the individual utility function and thus aggregates the data in a second step
via a transformation model.
The results of a conjoint analysis are often used to forecast the utility of the par-
ticipants based on the estimated utility parameter. Hahn (1997) ascertained no sig-
nificant difference of the forecast quality between the traditional conjoint analysis
and the choice-based conjoint analysis, if a probabilistic estimation method is cho-
sen. Moore et al. (1998), however, depict a difference between both methods and
point out that the traditional conjoint analysis performs even better.
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Since this thesis focuses on deriving the utility for every individual (a hetero-
genic character of the respondents are expected) a choice-based approach is not
meaningful due to the above mentioned disadvantages (Teichert, 2001).
3.2.3 Customer Choice Models
The process of structural decision making can be divided into three steps. In the
first step the focus is on the observation of historical demand and the estimation of
customers’ utility functions. This information is aggregated to generate a demand
forecast and define the customer segmentation. The goal of all structural decisions
is to clarify what to sell and how to do it. Pak (2005) outlines these decisions on a
strategic level comprising the bundling of services, the differentiation of services to
target customer segments, the selection of appropriate sales methods and the design
of the general price structure over a longer period of time. In contrast, day-to-day
layered price and quantity decisions are made on an operational level. These in-
volve decisions such as: what price to charge at a certain point in time, when to
give a discount, what part of the total capacity to reserve for each customer seg-
ment and whether to accept or reject a specific sales offer. The structural sales de-
cisions obviously have a substantial impact on the day-to-day price and quantity
decisions. Although structural decisions are sometimes considered to be marketing
decisions, it is essential to integrate customers’ preferences and historical demand
patterns into operational decision making and Revenue Management models (Boyd
and Bilegan, 2003; Pak, 2005). Classical Revenue Management models fail to account
for strategic customer behavior as they assume myopic customers (Belobaba, 1989;
Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994). However, when customers act strategically, Revenue
Management models need to incorporate such behavior into revenue maximization.
The survey in this thesis aims at identifying customers’ preferences at the struc-
tural level and at exploring how customers make their decisions on buying Cloud
Computing services at the operational level. An example for the operational level
decision would be customers deciding after comparing competitive offers or strate-
gically delaying their purchase in expectation of better prices in the future. Shen
and Su (2007) present a complete overview on recent research focusing on customer
behavior. They distinguish between strategic customer behavior with intertemporal
effects and customer choice behavior for multi-product settings. Strategic customer
behavior includes models on dynamic pricing, capacity rationing and valuation un-
certainty as well as, from a consumers’ perspective, customer response to dynamic
pricing. Models of customer choice behavior consider demand dependencies re-
sulting from customers’ selection of a set of services as well as from substitutable
or complementary effects across services. In what follows the important aspects of
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these models will be explained in detail. An overview in tabular form can be found
in the appendix A.3.
Dynamic Pricing under Strategic Customer Behavior:
Su (2007) describes a model of dynamic pricing taking endogenous intertemporal
demand into account. Having a monopoly, the seller who has a finite inventory
over a finite time horizon, maximizes his revenue by adjusting prices dynamically.
Customers meanwhile can decide to buy the service, stay in the market and wait
for a lower price, or exit the market. The population is heterogeneous along two di-
mensions having different willingness to pay and willingness to wait. The compo-
sition determines the optimal pricing policy. Hence, Su (2007) derives four distinct
groups of customers: patient-high-types, impatient-high-types, patient-low-types
and impatient-low-types. For example, the impatient-low-type, on the one hand, is
not willing to wait for a lower price and on the other hand, is not ready to pay a high
price. Furthermore, Su (2007) determines optimal pricing policies for cases when
each customer segment dominates the market. The findings are summarized in a
framework considering markups and markdowns. Markdowns should be applied
when impatient-high-type customers and patient-low-type customers dominate the
market, while markups increase revenues when patient-high-type customers and
impatient-low-type customers are present. Meanwhile, the benefits of strategic be-
havior are that demand is not immediately lost, as it possibly leads to sales after
markdowns and that there is increased competition for availability at lower prices.
This leads to higher reservation prices and generated purchases.
In a series of papers, Levin et al. (2006) first present a stochastic, game-theoretical
dynamic pricing model and later Levina et al. (2009) incorporated demand learning
into their model. Customers’ so called “degree of strategicity” is consistent with a
discount factor which takes the value one, when customers are myopic and there
are no discounts on future purchases and zero, when customers disregard future
purchases (Levin et al., 2006). They demonstrate the existence of a unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium pricing policy, providing equilibrium optimality conditions for
both customer and seller. Vendors who do not account for strategic behavior and do
not use the strategic equilibrium pricing policy, receive lower total revenues. The
model proposed in Levina et al. (2009) develops “an adaptive procedure that per-
mits learning of consumer response through observation of sales over successive
planning horizons”. They show the robustness of the learning approach by model-
ing a simulation-based technique to determine optimal prices.
In contrast to the previous models Yin et al. (2009) study the effect of inventory
information on strategic customers. They consider a model with two types of cus-
tomers and two in-store display formats to analyze effects on the retailer’s profit and
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order quantity. All customers are either myopic or strategic and arrive in a Poisson
process. In their case, the retailer can display all available units or one unit at a time.
As a result, they prove analytically that firms earn higher expected profits and or-
der more, by displaying one unit at a time on the sales floor, when all customers act
strategically.
Capacity Rationing:
In another group of papers the interaction between pricing and rationing is studied.
When facing strategic customers, rationing can be considered as a strategic tool for
firms along dynamic pricing. Thereby these models investigate the likeliness that
customers purchase earlier at higher prices.
Gallego et al. (2008) suggest a two-period model with deterministic demand. As
the remaining capacity is not visible, customers need to interact with the firm to
estimate the capacity. In that model customers update their expectations in each
period with respect to the outcomes of previous periods. This process converges
to an equilibrium point. The conclusion is that it is beneficial for a firm to ration
capacity by disposing of excess units instead of training customers to wait for sales
when all customers are strategic.
In the context of supply chain management, Su and Zhang (2008) apply a model
of customer behavior and outline positive effects of quantity and price commitment
for the firm’s revenue. The idea is derived from the news vendor problem where
leftover units have to be sold at a lower price. To overcome customers’ strategic
behavior – waiting for price reductions – the seller commits to a certain capacity
level or price implemented through contractual arrangements. This leads to a better
overall performance in decentralized supply chains.
Valuation Uncertainty:
Valuation uncertainty relates to the fact that customers strategically delay purchases,
because they anticipate better deals in the future (see Dynamic Pricing under Strategic
Customer Behavior). Another reason for valuation uncertainty is the lack of infor-
mation or the need to wait until more details are released. There is only a small
amount of work available in Revenue Management for valuation uncertainty. The
most important one for the survey is from Koenigsberg et al. (2008) who based on
the empirical analysis of easyJet’s pricing patterns study stated: “the conditions un-
der which offering a last-minute deal is optimal under the single price policy”. They
found that, especially when customers are uncertain whether firms offer last-minute
deals, it is beneficial to sell the remaining capacity at lower cost.
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Customer Response to Dynamic Pricing:
It is important to understand strategic customer behavior in revenue management.
Several models were proposed to explain how customers respond to firms’ pricing
strategies. They can either wait for special offers or accept prices, if they fall below
a threshold value.
In their model, Anderson and Wilson (2003) assume that firms set prices dynam-
ically according to Belobaba’s EMSR rule (Belobaba, 1989) or the optimal pricing
policy suggested by Gallego and van Ryzin (1994). Both are widely accepted in
practice. Furthermore, they assume that firms have a fixed capacity and set protec-
tion limits to restrict the number of units sold contributing only low-revenue. High-
revenue generating customers are expected to arrive later. The authors then calcu-
late the probability that at the end of this procedure, part of the resource remains
unsold. They show that if this probability is high enough, high-revenue customers
may wait for last-minute discounts. In addition, they perform numerical studies to
investigate the effects of this strategic waiting behavior on the firm’s revenue.
Zhou et al. (2005) model the case of a single strategic customer facing the optimal
pricing policy by Gallego and van Ryzin (1994). They find that the customer should
immediately buy if the price is below a threshold depending on the his valuation at
a time. Subsequently, they investigate the case with multiple customers and show
that strategic customer behavior benefits the seller. The reason is that customers are
not immediately gone, if a service is not available. They are open to other service
offers or return in a later point in time, when the price is lower.
Choice from a Set of Services:
In the context of airline Revenue Management, customer choice models investigate
how customers choose between firms’ different services. Thereby, firms have to de-
cide which service to make available to customers and what price to charge. Talluri
and van Ryzin (2004a) introduced a Revenue Management model under a discrete
choice model of customer behavior where the supplier has to choose at each point
in time which set of services to offer. The customers then choose an option from
that subset including the no-purchase option. The latter option can motivate the
customer to buy this service or a similar one from another Cloud provider.
The papers from Zhang and Cooper (2005, 2009) consider a framework of paral-
lel flights with separate inventory and customer choice behavior. In their first paper,
they formulate the problem of parallel flights with similar origin and destination as
a Markov decision process. Furthermore, they derive computable bounds for the
value function, and simulation-based procedures to obtain good policies. In their
second paper they focus on pricing decision rather than on quantity decisions. They
show that policies, motivated by bounds for the value function, dominate pooling
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heuristics for symmetric problems. The approach can also be transferred to larger
problems.
Substitution and Complementarity across Services:
Substitution and complementary effects are modeled using multi-dimensional de-
mand functions having customers who choose among different services. Apart from
these effects, methods like cross-selling or up-selling are also covered.
Based on the observation that offering complementary services in e-commerce
settings has become very popular, Netessine et al. (2006) propose a model where
cross-selling in the dynamic settings is identified as an opportunity complementary
to single-service Revenue Management. In their setting, they consider a firm that
manages a set of services and faces stochastic customer arrivals. The goal of their
model is to select complementary services from the set and to define the price of
such a package to maximize revenues. They find that their model is most effective
when service inventory is approximately equal to expected demand.
Aydin and Ziya (2008) investigate the practice of up-selling by introducing a pro-
motional service. The promotional service is offered at a possibly discounted price
only if a customer purchases a different good. They investigate how the discount
depends “on the inventory levels, [the remaining] time, type of pricing policy in use,
and the relationship between the customers’ reservation prices for the promotional
product4” (Aydin and Ziya, 2008). The results show inter alia that under dynamic
pricing the up-selling decision is independent of the level of inventory and the re-
maining time.
These six categories of customer choice models build the basis for designing the
questions. Moreover, the classification from Su (2007) is required to classify the
customers according to their willingness to pay and willingness to wait.
3.3 Model Formulation
The survey as well as this section are divided into two parts. The first part is based
on descriptive questions. The theoretical motivation to asking these questions is
outlined. Although the related work of customer choice in Revenue Management
was analyzed in the previous section, the following section incorporates literature
beyond Revenue Management and relates the descriptive questions in the survey
with the theoretical background derived from the literature. In the second part, the
appropriate hypotheses are generated to answer the Research Questions 2.1 and 2.3.
4The concept also applies for services.
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3.3.1 Theoretical Background for the Survey Questions
As Armbrust et al. (2009) outline in their article, moving business operations to
Cloud Computing providers is mainly a question of cost effectiveness. There-
fore, users have to compare the Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and Operating
Expenditure (OPEX) when owning a datacenter to the OPEX for using Cloud ser-
vices. CAPEX refers to the acquisition and installation costs while OPEX refers to
the variable costs that originate during the operation. In addition, customers have
different prices in mind and respond differently to dynamic pricing (Anderson and
Wilson, 2003; Zhou et al., 2005). Thus, at first, the participants were asked about
the appropriate standard CPU hour (Questions 1 & 2). This gave insights about
the estimation of the users’ valuation. Furthermore, in Question 10 the participants
had to reveal their expectation about the future development of price and quality of
service.
The economic benefits for Cloud users increase in cases of underutilization of
their own datacenter. In other words, Cloud Computing is extremely beneficial to
those who need an elastic computing resource due to a volatile utilization of its
own resources. For Cloud users this means shifting the risks of under- or over-
provisioning to the Cloud provider. In addition to the shifting of risks and cost
effectiveness, moving data processing to the Cloud leads to advantages in mainte-
nance. However, Cloud providers consequently face the problem of handling the
volatile demand of numerous users. Thus, from a provider’s perspective the ques-
tion is, whether consumers can somehow predict their usage behavior or if it is
totally random (Question 4). In conjunction with Questions 1 & 2 it can be revealed,
if uncertain customers can be convinced by a last-minute offer (Koenigsberg et al.,
2008).
Currently, there is no dominant pricing policy that would help to control the uti-
lization level of resources for Cloud providers. Pricing strategies currently applied
throughout the industry also fail to maximize revenue and to control volatile be-
havior of the customer. Weinhardt et al. (2009) survey the applied pricing models
and find that most Cloud providers use metered pricing to charge for their services
on posted price basis. Apart from the pay-per-use policy, subscription models are
applied as well. Although other dynamic pricing policies may result in more ef-
ficient allocations and prices (Lai, 2005), customers prefer more practical pricing
policies that are easy to understand (Dasilva, 2000; Fishburn and Odlyzko, 1999). In
a market that some consider purely competitive (Carr, 2005), meaning that a com-
modity or public utility is traded, the question remains how firms can differentiate
themselves without getting locked into a ruinous price war. Netessine and Shum-
sky (2005) name it in the context of Revenue Management “the horizontal competi-
tion” among providers and analyze how horizontal competition affects the decision
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about the capacity allocation for airlines in a two-player game. As Dixit et al. (2008)
outline, the key is to use IT enhanced pricing strategies to determine customers’
willingness to pay in a way that customers’ perceive pricing strategies as fair. It
would be interesting to know, whether the Cloud service consumer would change
their provider depending on prices or for any other reason and if the consumer is
interested in comparing prices at all (Question 7, 8 & 9).
Varian et al. (2004) strengthen the point from Dixit et al. (2008) by outlining
the possibilities of differential pricing for information goods in contrary to physi-
cal goods. He suggests to reduce the speed of operation for lower valued services or
to provide less capabilities. Apart from differential pricing, Bakos and Brynjolfsson
(1999) suggest bundling of goods to increase the profitability. Netessine et al. (2006)
outlined the benefits of cross-selling products. In the context of capacity rationing in
supply chains Su and Zhang (2008) proposed contractual agreements to overcome
strategic customer behavior. This raises three further questions in the Cloud Com-
puting context:
1. Would consumers accept differentiated pricing, which would help providers
to segment customers into separate classes according to their willingness to
pay to increase revenue (Question 11i)?
2. Would consumers accept a subscription model (Question 11v)?
3. Do consumers prefer bundling of products over individual offers
(Question 3)?
Maglaras and Zeevi (2005) theoretically analyze the quality of service for best-
effort services vs. guaranteed services regarding bandwidth. Users can choose be-
tween these two services, which have non-substitutable characteristics. These char-
acteristics are usually defined in SLAs. A question derived from this case is that if
the consumer accepts a lower price for a lower performance level (Question 5).
According to Su (2007) markdowns should be applied for impatient-high-type
customers and patient-low-type customers while markups increase revenues in
presence of patient-high-type customers and impatient-low-type customers As out-
lined in previous section this leads to higher reservation prices and generate pur-
chases. Furthermore, Nair and Bapna (2001) suggested a decision model for Internet
providers. They stated that "request and service happen simultaneously. This is not
the case in airlines and hotels, where the request is made at one time (making the
reservation) and the capacity is used up at another (the flight taking off or the ho-
tel room [getting] occupied)". However, the virtual lab in Raleigh requires advance
reservation for computing resources and labs for the course instructors (see Section
2.3.1). Consequently, request and service happen at different points in time. Hence,
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it would be interesting to know what types of customer a Cloud provider faces and
especially if they accept future purchases (Question 6). This will foster strategic
behavior (Levin et al., 2006).
In Clouds, providers hide information from their customers about the total ca-
pacity they possess. Of course, the customers would act strategically based on these
information to receive a better price (Gallego et al., 2008; Yin et al., 2009). However,
currently providers with a fixed price model like Linode5 reveal this information to
the customer. Thus, the question of how consumers evaluate such information is
important (Question 11iv).
Moreover, it was interesting to see, if common sales practice would apply for
Cloud Computing as well. Cross-selling is well-known from Amazon’s bookstore.
Companies have to think about how the bundles are created and how to price
the bundles, which is a combinatorial problem. The challenge is to bundle and
price the services in a revenue maximizing way (Netessine et al., 2006). The ques-
tion is, if customers would generally pay attention to such complementary offers
(Question 11ii). Furthermore, loyalty programs are widely applied in the airline
and retail business Aydin and Ziya (2008). Customers can receive an upgrade for
staying with the same provider and using his service for a certain period of time.
Providers have to plan such offers in advance to consider it in the quantity and
pricing decisions. How do customers value such an offer (Question 11iii)? These
models indicate the variety of modeling approaches of customer behavior in Rev-
enue Management. Based on the authors’ findings the survey aims to test the op-
tions of transferring these models to Cloud services. Therefore, the topics of interest
are the importance of prices and their willingness to change providers as well as
the importance of prices when changing provider. Furthermore, users’ opinion to-
wards multi-service offers and the willingness to receive complementary offers are
investigated. Another important aspect is users’ valuation of the possibility to re-
ceive reduction for advanced booking or best effort services. Currently, the common
opinion is that Cloud services are mostly unpredictable. However, the experience
from the scientific driven Grid Computing domain is that users tend to increase
usage of Grid resources few weeks before conferences or important events to run
simulations or analysis on particle physics data. Therefore, the ability to predict
one’s usage behavior was inquired. An overview of all the questions can be found
in the appendix A.1.
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Table 3.2: Impact of consumer behavior, provider offer and trading object factors
on the Revenue Management requirements
Predefined factors Service design influenced by





Advance reservation X X
Price segmentation X X
Multiple service offers X
Overbooking X
3.3.2 Hypotheses
First and foremost, the motivation for this survey is to elicit the opinion of the con-
sumers about typical Revenue Management characteristics (e.g. price discrimina-
tion), when Revenue Management methods are introduced for Cloud scenarios.
In Section 2.3.1, the requirements for a successful application were derived from
the existing literature. These characteristics are influenced by consumers’ behav-
ior, providers’ offer and the trading object itself. Although Revenue Management
techniques are implemented and controlled by the provider, consumers can deny
offers or pricing policies like the dynamic pricing approach of Amazon in 20006.
For example, customers may not accept price discrimination or they cannot predict
their behavior. Hence, advance reservation cannot be applied successfully in the
Cloud. Requirements like inflexibility or perishability are predefined by the service
itself. They cannot be changed, neither by the provider nor by the consumer. How-
ever, heterogeneity and demand uncertainty are determined to a certain extent by
customers’ behavior and their ability to predict their service usage (see Table 3.2).
Presumably, certain groups of consumers will have different kinds of demand char-
acteristics. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.1. The usage frequency of computing services depends on the role of the user.
It is assumed to have a group of consumers, who are able to predict their demand
in advance. Though, it cannot be concluded that these consumers would also book
5Linode (http://www.linode.com)
6see Section 3.1 or Weiss and Mehrotra (2001)
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in advance. From the provider’s perspective, predictable demand is beneficial, since
he can reserve and allocate the required resources and calculate his profit. Thus,
consumers, who can predict their behavior and book in advance, clearly put the
provider in a favorable position:
Hypothesis 3.2. Users, who are able to predict their behavior, also book the resources in
advance.
Companies are able to offer different kinds of services by making only small or
restrictive changes to a service and keeping the underlying good or resource con-
sumed by these services as is. This is also known as versioning (Varian, 2002). For
example, services can be categorized into free and premium products, where the
free version only offers a low bandwidth access to the storage and the premium one
yields a high connection speed. The consumers’ demand is segmented by the price.
Thus, it would be interesting to know, whether users who ask for a lower price also
accept a lower performance level of their requested service:
Hypothesis 3.3. Users, who support price discrimination, also prefer best effort services.
The RQ 2.1 (see Section 2.3) can be answered by analyzing hypotheses 3.1, 3.2
and 3.3.
Moreover, another RQ 2.2 focuses on the conditions, when a consumer would
accept price discrimination. In the survey, three aspects were analyzed to answer
this question. Hypothesis 3.3 already mentions the condition of best effort service
usage in conjunction with price discrimination. The other two aspects are whether
user favoring price discrimination would also book in advance or prefer a subscrip-
tion model. If consumers support price discrimination and do not book in advance,
the discrimination has to focus on differentiating the services itself by offering dif-
ferent support level or limited software enhancements for the low price segments.
Otherwise, price discrimination can be mainly based on the intertemporal dynamic
pricing strategy. Subscription models as the second aspect can also be offered for
different price segments. If the participants do not necessarily support price dis-
crimination and subscription model, then they do not necessarily expect a lower
price for a subscription model than for an instance hour. However, it is common in
practice to receive a discount for buying a large amount of service in advance. For
example, Amazon offers so-called Reserved Instances to pay a one-time fee valid for
one year in order to receive a discount of 70% for each CPU hour of a Linux instance.
Hypothesis 3.4. Users, who support price discrimination, also prefer to book in advance.
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Hypothesis 3.5. Users, who support price discrimination, also prefer a subscription model.
Subsequently, consumers have different preferences according to the offered ser-
vices. In particular, the attributes defining the services and their parameter value
have an influence on the consumer decision for a service. It is necessary for a
provider to know, which attributes have a greater value than others in order to offer
the appropriately designed services. The conjoint analysis in this survey focuses on
the IaaS level and tries to identify the crucial attributes in order to answer RQ 2.3.
3.4 Customer Choice Survey
This section commences with the explanation why this specific survey design was
chosen. Subsequently, the steps for conducting a conjoint analysis are operational-
ized as described in Section 3.2.2. After determining the Conjoint analysis design,
the choice sets are selected and their relevance for the analysis is motivated.
3.4.1 Survey Design
Preparing an empirical analysis to test theoretical assumptions is a well approved
method in marketing research. There are three approaches to collect empirical in-
formation: oral interview, written survey or telephone interview. With the advent
of the Internet, online surveying has become a fourth accepted option. As the tar-
get group of this survey is actively creating the future of the Internet addressing
them through an online survey is a logical approach. In order to reach the highest
possible number of participants and meanwhile offer customers an anonymous par-
ticipation, the survey is hosted on a website with open access instead of an invitation
based approach.
The Web-based approach includes several advantages in processing a survey.
The respondents cannot be biased by the relationship with the interviewer. This
leads to more objective results. Likewise, the survey data is directly stored into
a database avoiding the error-prone transfer of results. This automation not only
cuts the cost of data processing but also allows great scalability in the number of
participants with very little additional costs. The subjective perception of an online
survey is shorter compared to traditional approaches leading to higher quality in
data due to less exhaustion (Decker, 2001).
However, there are some disadvantages when conducting a Web-based survey.
These can either be technical problems, like displaying errors in different browsers
and the response time of the Website, or problems related to the participants’ iden-
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tity. Homburg and Krohmer (2003) warn about the fact that anonymous participants
may not be part of the target group and thereby lead to less reliable results. Espe-
cially when offering monetary incentives or vouchers the primary goal of respon-
dents might be to get these prizes, which may eventually lead to multiple participa-
tion. To ensure that there are no such effects, there will be no monetary incentives
for the participants. In the underlying survey, those specifying their email address
receive a summary on the outcomes of the survey in order to validate that the ma-
jority of participants is included in the target group. At this point, it should be noted
that due to the self-selection bias the group of people being studied depends on the
participants’ decision to take part. This can lead to a distortion of results, if answers
from the non-participating group of people differed from those who participated.
Nonetheless, the advantages of this surveying method outweigh the obstacles and
the fact that the target groups’ primary area of work is the Internet supports the
conduction of a Web-based survey (Welker et al., 2004).
Oppenheim (2000) outlines a detailed summary of how to develop the survey
design. Bearing this in mind, the survey had a subtle design (e.g. moderate colors)
and no unnecessary graphics to speed up the load time. The questions were short
and explanations were only added where needed. In order to minimize the flop
rate, the survey only contained the relevant number of questions (Lütters, 2004).
The processing time for the 26 questions was approximately 10 to 15 minutes. The
website consisted of five pages which can be found in the appendix A.
At the beginning, a welcome screen was shown where the goal of the survey was
outlined and the privacy policies were explained. Subsequently, the questions were
split into three groups. While the first group of questions focused on customer be-
havior, the second group of questions aimed at identifying customers’ preferences
using a conjoint analysis. A third group of questions was related to sociodemo-
graphic factors like age, residence, industry and role of the respondents. After an-
swering all questions and submitting the data a notification was given to show that
the survey has been completed.
Before the roll-out of the survey, a pre-test was performed with a group of peo-
ple clarifying any misunderstandings. Based on these findings the questionnaire
was adopted as suggested by DeShazo and Fermo (2002). Target group for this sur-
vey were users of Cloud services. To reach this target group 750 users were directly
addressed via email and an undefined number was addressed indirectly via post-
ings in Cloud Computing related user groups and in social networks like Xing7 and
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projects like D-Grid10, a German initiative which fosters the development of Grids
in Germany and active user groups with their focus on Cloud Computing11. The in-
vitation included a link directing recipients to the website containing the questions.
The survey was conducted in February 2009 in line with the four to eight week pe-
riod suggested by Werner and Stephan (1998) for data collection of online surveys.
Within this period satisfying 65 data sets were collected.
3.4.2 Preferences, Stimuli and Data Collection Method
When designing a conjoint analysis, two factors have to be taken into considera-
tion. First, a definition of the stimuli and second the number of stimuli. A stimuli
is defined as a combination of different product characteristics which is presented
to respondents for evaluation (Green and Srinivasan, 1978). There are two types of
stimuli that are common in conjoint analysis design. Using the two-factor method
or so called “trade-off analysis” by Johnson (1974) respondents have to rate all com-
binations of two attributes at a time. That means that for every pair of attributes a
trade-off-matrix is developed so that respondents have to rate (n2) trade-off-matrices
surveying n attributes. The full-profile method considers combinations of a single
levels of each attribute. The number of stimuli thereby depends on the number of
attributes and the respective levels. For n attributes with m1 levels for the first at-
tribute, m2 levels for the second attribute,..., and mn levels for the n-th attribute,
there exist m1 ×m2 × ...×mn different stimuli in total.
In terms of expenditure of time and requirements towards the respondents, the
trade-off analysis has an advantage over the full-profile method. The evaluation
of two attributes together with their respective levels simplifies the survey design
and needs less explanations to the respondents. With higher numbers of attributes
and levels, the number of stimuli grows faster using the full-profile method. The
full-profile method offers a set of alternatives with all attributes and their parameter
values reflecting a more realistic scenario for the participants. The unrealistic de-
cision scenario and the empirically validated inferiority make the trade-off method
unattractive and thus the full-profile method is chosen for this survey (Segal, 1982;
Safizadeh, 1989).
3.4.2.1 Evaluation of Stimuli
For the conjoint analysis, a 7-point Likert-type scale is used to evaluate the sample
products. This type of rating scale is called semantic differential and was introduced
by Osgood et al. (1957). The concept of semantic differential is a multi-item measure
10D-Grid (http://www.d-grid.de)
11e.g. Google Groups http://groups.google.com/group/cloud-computing
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that allows a relatively direct indication of attitude. Although nowadays it is used in
various contexts, it was originally designed to measure the meaning of a concept as
it consists of bipolar evaluative adjective pairs, such as good-bad (Ajzen, 2005). The
7-point scale is one of the most common formats. Malhotra and Peterson (2005) and
Dawes (2008) found that there is little difference in using either a 5-point, 7-point or
10-point scale. Other common methods beside the rating scale like the dollar met-
ric or the constant-sum method are discussed by Green and Srinivasan (1978). All
these methods are based on metric scales whereas pairwise comparison and rank-
based scale are non-metric approaches. Wittink et al. (1994) state that rating scale
and rank-based scale are most often used in practice and research. However, metric
scales provide more information about the relation between different service rating
than the other. Hence, the rating of two different items can provide the informa-
tion, how strong one item is preferred Likert scales produce usually ordinal data,
although an assumption of symmetry of response level by offering odd number of
levels allows to interpret the results on an interval scale. Hence, the 7-point Likert
scale is appropriate for the conjoint analysis.
3.4.2.2 Estimation of Part-worth Utilities
The data gathered through the empirical study is then processed in the conjoint
analysis to calculate the part-worth utilities. From those values, the metric total
utility and the relative importance of the different attributes are derived.
A part-worth utility β is estimated for every level and these single part-worth
utilities are then linked to determine the total utility y for a distinct stimulus. The
determination is based on an additive model. Equation (3.1) defines the general for-
mulation of the additive utility model used for conjoint analysis. It follows the idea
to construct a total utility yjk from the part-worth utilities β jm so that the empirical
observations are represented as accurately as possible.







β jm · xjmk
with
yk = estimated total utility for stimulus k
β jm = part-worth utility for level m of attribute j
xjmk =
1 , if stimuli k consists of attribute m with level k0 , otherwise
The variable µ equals the average score of the scale or, in other words, the average
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utility from which the attributes positively or negatively deviate. The metric
analysis of variances is based on the central assumption that the distance between
the different ratings of stimuli is considered equidistant. Hence, the additive model
like in equation 3.1 can be applied. In case of ordinal scaled data the monotonous
analysis of variance leads to the appropriate evaluation of the dataset (Backhaus
et al., 2008).
The part-worth utilities are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates being calcu-
lated by minimizing the squared distance between the empirical observation and the
estimated utility as in equation 3.2. Just as well the regression analysis of p-values







To calculate the part-worth utilities in general, the analysis of variances is used,
which estimates the part-worth utilities based on the metric OLS algorithm. The
OLS method is widely applied in practice (Green and Krieger, 1993). Carmone et al.
(1978) and Darmon and Rouziès (1994) confirm that OLS has been widely accepted
for metric scaled stimuli. Even for non metric scales OLS has been successfully
applied (Wittink et al., 1994; Carmone et al., 1978). Moreover, OLS in combination
with a 7 point scale leads to the most accurate results compared to a 4 point scale
and slightly better than 9 point and 11 point scales (Darmon and Rouziès, 1999).
3.4.2.3 Aggregation of Part-worth Utilities
The estimation of the part-worth utilities can be executed for every individual. A
generic view on the preferences comprising all individuals requires an aggregation
of the utilities. There are two approaches to obtain aggregated results from a con-
joint analysis. The first results from the individual conjoint analyses are normalized
for every individual. These normalized part-worth utilities are then summed up.
The other possibility is to conduct a conjoint analysis that delivers aggregated part-
worth utilities over a population.
The idea behind the first approach is to identify the minimum between each
part-worth utility and the smallest part-worth utility of its attributes. The following
equation formulates this relationship:
(3.3) β∗jm = β jm − βminj
with
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β jm = part-worth utility for attribute j and level m
β∗jm = minimal part-worth utility for attribute j
These so called transformed part-worth utilities are then used to calculate the
normalized part-worth utilities β̂ jm. It is important to identify the combination of
levels with the highest part-worth utilities. The sum of these part-worth utilities is
the maximum value of the domain and is set to β̂ jm = 1 in order to normalize the
part-worth utilities.






The absolute values thereby only allow to draw conclusions in terms of impor-
tance of attribute levels for the total utility of a stimulus. One cannot conclude that
if one attribute has significantly higher part-worth utilities than the other, this de-
termines a change of preferences. Furthermore, the size of the spread between the
different part-worth utilities of one attribute influences the choice decision. In case
of a huge spread, a change from a low level to a significantly higher level will affect
the total utility and may change the choice. To measure this relative importance of





















The second approach requires the assumption that the individuals are under-
stood as replications of the attribute design to receive aggregated results from a
conjoint analysis. To use the methods presented in section 3.4.2.1 for calculation of
the conjoint analysis, the index k has to be adjusted by the number of participants
N.





The variable J thereby represents the number of attributes and Mj the number
of levels of attribute j. k represents every individual instead of every stimulus (see
equation (3.1)). Although the calculated part-worth utilities using both methods
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may vary, the relative importance leads to the same results. According to Backhaus
et al. (2008) in most cases researchers are primarily interested in the average util-
ity of their customers and therefore, the aggregated approach provides them with
satisfying results.
3.4.3 Choice Set for the Conjoint Analysis
The design of the choice set is crucial to the outcome of the empirical results. In
particular, a survey with a high number of attributes and choices can lead to a more
realistic situation a participant is confronted with. Furthermore, it can increase the
quality of the answers, because more details are asked. However, this complexity
of the questionnaire can result in a large amount of information. A participant faces
a lots of choices and feels overstrained. Consequently, it can result in a negative
impact on his answers. He will simplify his answering strategy and may not always
reply truthfully (Mazzotta and Opaluch, 1995). Another possibility is that the over-
whelming amount of information cannot be considered in detail by the participant.
His answer may not represent his opinion, since he adopted heuristic decision rules.
Hence, it may undermine the reliability of the data (DeShazo and Fermo, 2002).
Several studies scrutinized the impact of the number of attributes and alterna-
tives on the results. DeShazo and Fermo (2002) tested four to seven attributes with
two to seven alternatives and in another set nine attributes with six to nine alter-
natives. An increasing number of attributes will have a negative impact. Lee and
Lee (2004) analyzed nine and 18 attributes and had similar results. However, they
used 18 and 27 alternatives, respectively. The number of alternatives did not have a
significant impact on the results. According to DeShazo and Fermo (2002), more al-
ternatives have even a positive effect, although they analyzed a smaller set than Lee
and Lee (2004). Hence, in this thesis seven attributes are considered. The set of alter-
natives is determined to be 18. Furthermore, the number of levels vary between two
and three to avoid the number-of-levels effect (Currim et al., 1981), which induces
participants to prefer attributes with higher number of levels more than attributes
with lower number of levels. Hence, this configuration allows to receive reliable
results.
To receive significant results, Backhaus et al. (2008) outline seven aspects, which
have to be taken into consideration when defining attributes and their levels. The
following three principles relate to the selection of attributes.
• Relevance: The attributes have to be relevant meaning that they influence cus-
tomers’ decision making in the buying process.
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• Interference: The vendor has to be able to control the attributes that are ana-
lyzed within the conjoint analysis. In other words, variation of the respective
attributes should be possible within the design process of the product.
• Independence: The utility of one attribute shall not be influenced by the char-
acteristics of other attributes. Respondents shall not consider characteristics of
different attributes as dependent on another.
Furthermore, there are four principles that need to be considered when selecting
the characteristics or levels.
• Feasibility: The vendor has to have the knowledge to produce and deliver the
investigated characteristics and bundles.
• Compensatory relationship: Based on the assumption that the total utility
is calculated by accumulating all part-worth utilities, this means a low part-
worth utility of one attribute can be counterbalanced or compensated by a
high part-worth utility of another attribute.
• Knock-out criterion: It is of great importance that no characteristic is seen as
a knock-out criterion which would contradict the compensative nature of the
characteristics.
• Limit: Since the complexity of the survey grows exponentially with the num-
ber of characteristics, it is advisable to limit the number of attributes and levels.
Table 3.3 summarizes the attributes and respective characteristics being selected
for the conjoint analysis. They are selected by studying the service design of success-
ful vendors like Amazon Web Services and interviewing experts from Sun’s Asia
Pacific Science & Technology Center12. Subsequently, a definition for each of the
attributes is provided:
• Price: For the following sample products there are three different prices ($0.70,
$1.10 and $2.00). The prices are on an hourly basis and include CPU, mem-
ory, data transfer, storage and the subsequently presented characteristics. The
prices stem from various providers like Amazon Web Services, 3Tera or Flex-
iscale offering services with different kind of characteristics.
• Performance: The survey distinguishes between guaranteed-performance and
best-effort service types. Guaranteed performance means a guaranteed high
service level and thereby high performance. A best-effort service has a lower
priority and jobs may have to wait before being executed. This attribute was
12SunŠs Asia Pacific Science & Technology Center (http://apstc.sun.com.sg/)
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Table 3.3: Attributes and their levels
Attributes Levels Attributes Levels
Price $2.00 Operating System Both
$1.10 Windows
$0.70 Linux
Performance Guaranteed Availability 99.95%
Best effort 99.75%
99.50%





motivated by the work of Maglaras and Zeevi (2005) for Revenue Manage-
ment. Furthermore, so far most providers did not specify SLAs, but only of-
fered best effort services.
• Support Level: Products include different levels of support (phone, email and
documentation). Documentation is provided on the Website if products in-
clude documentation only. It has an impact on the cost for the provider. A
phone supports requires a call center infrastructure. For example, 37signals13
has only email, blog and documentation support for his web-based collabora-
tion software unlike AppNexus14, who offer a 24/7 phone support.
• Start-up Time: Start-up Time defines the period between ’book-
ing’/registering and set-up of an instance. This survey distinguishes
between instant start-up, which means within minutes the instance is ready
for calculations, and prolongated start-up. In the latter case, there is a signif-
icant time delay between ’booking’ and set-up. Companies get the flexibility
to delay the virtual machine start up in order to favor high class customers,
when resources are scarce.
• Operating System: Within this survey, it is distinguished between instances
provided with Windows or Linux only and an environment where a choice
between both operating systems during set-up and operation is possible. In
1337signals (http://www.37signals.com)
14AppNexus (http://www.appnexus.com)
3.4. CUSTOMER CHOICE SURVEY 73
the beginning Amazon’s EC2 service had only Linux instances in its service
portfolio. Since October 2008, a Microsoft Windows Server is available. How-
ever, a strict requirement can be the request for both operating systems, since
some software development teams need both for testing and compatibility
purposes.
• Availability: There are three different availability-levels: a) 99.95% equals less
than 4.5 hours downtime per year b) 99.75% equals less than 22 hours down-
time per year c) 99.50% equals less than 44 hours downtime per year. Outages
of provider sites are a well known problem (see Section 2.3.1). Flexiscale is
among the first companies giving their customers a 100% available IaaS. The
EC2 service from Amazon promises at least 99.95% with a limited 10% re-
fund of the Service bill, if the availability drops below 99.95%. The reason for
limiting the refund is determined by their outage experience of EC2 and S3
discussed in Section 2.3.1.
• Value-added: Value-added services can be a Firewall, Load Balancing or none.
The motivation stems from the service offer of 3Tera, where virtual machines
can be preconfigured with Firewalls or specification of Firewalls can be sug-
gested. FlexiScale15 allows to add a firewall for £0.10 extra per hour. Load Bal-
ancing allows workload-intensive applications to shift jobs from one machine
to another automatically or by predefined rules. Hence, resources can be uti-
lized more efficiently, when consumers have multi-CPU applications. Linode
and AppNexus offer Load Balancing over several virtual instances.
Except for price and availability, all attributes are regarded as discrete. Price
and availability are considered as linear. Lower price and higher availability are
valued as the more favorable options, respectively. The participant will receive the
highest benefit of each attribute, if the service is for free or if 100% availability can be
guaranteed. For example, Flexiscale offers a 100% SLA of their IaaS and until June
2009 Mor.ph16 allowed to create a free account and use their application server by
uploading Java Web applications.
The previous section emphasized the advantages of the full-profile method over
the trade-off method. As a consequence, the number of stimuli for the attributes pre-
sented above would be (3× 2× 3× 2× 3× 3× 3) = 972 for the full-profile method.
Hence, the necessity arises to reduce the complete set of stimuli to a reduced de-
sign. This reduced design represents the complete design but decreases the num-
ber of stimuli to allow a focused expenditure of time. A methodology to create
an asymmetrically reduced design17 was proposed by Addelman (1962) and Street
15FlexiScale (http://www.flexiscale.com)
16Mor.ph (http://www.mor.ph)
17it is asymmetric, because the number of levels are not equal for every attribute
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et al. (2005). 22 profile cards were derived including four holdout cards, which are
used to check the robustness of the individual utility functions. This is in line with
Green and Srinivasan (1978) who outline that a sample should consider not more
than 20–30 stimuli. A complete list of the profile cards can be found in the appendix
A.2.
3.5 Results & Implications
The results from the survey were analyzed in two different ways. The following
section covers the descriptive results derived directly from the data. In Section 3.5.2
the data is analyzed via statistical methods to corroborate or discard the hypotheses
from Section 3.3.2.
3.5.1 Descriptive Results
Figure 3.2 illustrates the composition of the respondents who took part in the survey.
The composition is split into industry distribution, global distribution and age. As
these questions were not obligatory, the ’no answer’ option is included. The topic
of Cloud Computing still is technology driven with focus on developing standards
and not on addressing Chief Information Officers’ needs. Other surveys have al-
ready analyzed opinions from Chief Information Officers regarding a strategic view
on Cloud Computing (see Section 3.2.1). However, the high share of IT workers
(55.4%) and researchers (21.5%) in the population validate to conclude that the re-
sults drawn in the following are based on professionals’ opinions and valuations.
The accuracy of the answers is further emphasized by the age distribution with the
greatest share of the population being between the age of 26 and 45 (66.2%) and
another 21.5% being older than 45. Another important aspect to mention is the
global distribution of the population with 38.5% working in the Americas, 30.8% in
Europe, 13.8% in Asia and in Australia as well as 3.1% from the Middle East. For
classification reasons, the user type is of importance. While developers (38.5%) form
the biggest group of participants, corporate (enterprise and SME) users with 35.4%
are almost equally present. Whereas scientific and end users are underrepresented
with 15.4% and 10.8% respectively.
The participants’ predominant areas of application18 are application hosting
(64.6%), Web hosting (38.5%), and high performance computing (33.8%). As Figure
3.2 shows most of the users work with IaaS providers (55.4%) while 29.2% predom-
inantly use PaaS offers. The small share of participants who primarily works with
18at most three answers were possible
3.5. RESULTS & IMPLICATIONS 75
Figure 3.2: Characteristics of the participants in the survey
SaaS solutions (15.4%) again indicates the high skill level of the survey population
and thereby the robustness of the results.
In the following, the results from the questions considering choice and change
behavior are evaluated. A topic of great interest is the change behavior of Cloud
Computing customers. Three questions address this topic. Question 7 asks if cus-
tomers compare offers from different providers before registering for a service. The
next question investigates if customers have already changed their provider and the
reason for changing, if the question was answered in the affirmative. Question 9
explicitly asks for the price reduction that would motivate a customer to change
his provider if everything else remains the same. Although at least 72% of the re-
spondents19 state that they compare different offers before selecting a Cloud service
provider, the actual change behavior shows different results. Out of all 65 respon-
dents 37 (56.9%) have not changed their provider yet. Especially end users (90.0%)
and scientific users (71.4%) display a low change rate. When comparing the usage
frequency with the change behavior, it shows that only those who use Cloud ser-
vices daily actively switch providers (64.3%). Those who only use Cloud services
rarely, meaning less than monthly, stick with the same provider (85.7%). The rea-
sons to change the provider are in the first instance better prices, better service, and
19At least 72% compare Content Delivery Network (CDN) offerings and at most 88% compare
storage solution offerings.
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better performance. Users who have not changed their service provider state three
major concerns: missing compatibility/SLAs and as a result the complexity of mi-
gration, missing trust in other providers, and migration costs.
The results from Question 9 show that the majority of respondents is only will-
ing to change the provider when the price is at least 25% lower than the price of
their current provider (53.8%). Only 23.0% of the users are willing to change their
provider when others offer a price reduction of up to 10%, and 15.4% of the respon-
dents would not change their provider for a better price. Interestingly, the groups
of respondents who would only change their provider for a significant reduction
of 25% to 50% have a median price, considered appropriate, of US-$0.25 and US-
$0.15 for one standard instance per hour. In contrast, the groups of respondents who
would change their provider for a price reduction of at least 10% or less have median
prices of US-$0.70 (at least 10% reduction) and US-$0.50 (in any case), respectively.
The group of respondents that would not change the provider for a better price has
a median price of US-$1. Only 21.5% of the participants, however, have changed the
provider since using Cloud services. More than 50% have never gained experience
with another provider (see Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: Reasons for changing current provider
As expected, the appropriate price for one standard instance per hour differs
between the different user groups. Figure 3.4a shows that median value for SME
users and developers is the lowest within the population with values of US-$0.18
and US-$0.45. Especially for SME users the variance of 0.081 indicates that the value
is accurate. By eliminating the outliers, all values above US-$5 or at least four times
the average value, the results for the group of developers become more robust and
the median value is US-$0.40. In contrast, the willingness to pay for enterprise and
end users is considerably higher. Their median values are US-$1 and US-$0.65. The
currently used pricing policy of metered pricing for every part of the service finds
great acceptance within the population. More than three quarters (76.9%) prefer to
customize their services instead of buying bundles that have a fixed configuration
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of resources and services. Comparing the estimated hour price to the monthly price,
78.4% of the participants value the hour price higher compared to the monthly fee
assuming that they would use the service 24 hours a day for 30 days. Hence, either
they expect a discount on the monthly fee or they would not use it 24 hours a day.
Expectations of future development of prices and quality of service are derived
from Question 10. The overwhelming majority of 84.6% expects prices to decrease
and meanwhile an increase in quality of service. 11.3% anticipate an increase both
in price and quality of service. Only two participants (3.2%) expect a decrease both
in prices and quality of service.
(a) Expected price for one hour (b) Expected price for one month
Figure 3.4: Expected price clustered by each user group for hourly and monthly prices
Apart from all pricing issues, Question 11 focuses on other aspects that influ-
ence customers’ valuation. Respondents are asked to rate the introduction of a sys-
tem utilization monitor, differential pricing, a subscription model, a loyalty pro-
gram, and complementary offerings on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ’strongly
agree’ to ’strongly disagree’. The system utilization monitor shows the utilization
of the resources running a job or application and could display a light in green for
low utilization, in yellow for moderate utilization, and in red for high utilization.
The respondents rate the introduction of such a function very positively as 90.8%
either agree or strongly agree. 54 participants confirm the introduction of differen-
tial or tiered pricing would be beneficial. Differential pricing in this case denotes
to different pricing in peak and off-peak periods. The introduction of a subscrip-
tion model implies the booking of a certain number of server instances permanently
at a lower price, and additional instances later depending on workload. The re-
sponses show an almost equally positive rating as compared to differential pricing
with 52 participants agree or strongly agree on the introduction and the median
value is 2 (“agree”). The introduction of a loyalty program like those offered by air-
lines giving redemptions in terms of higher performance or discounts attracts less
acceptance, although still positive. 40 respondents support the introduction, 20 nei-
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ther agree nor disagree on the introduction and 5 even disagree. The introduction
of complementary offers, referring to promotions offered to complement used ser-
vices is positively regarded, though receiving the least acceptance. 31 respondents
who agree or strongly agree to the introduction face 11 respondents who disagree
or strongly disagree to the introduction.
The idea of revenue management is to offer discounts when customers are will-
ing to take restrictions. Based on that assumption, Question 4 checks for the ability
to predict usage behavior and Question 6 asks for the willingness of customers to
book a time slot in order to receive price reductions. 52.3% of the respondents are
able to predict their usage behavior, 12.3% of the respondents are able to predict
their behavior one week in advance and at least 23.1% are able to estimate their re-
source requirements two days ahead. The group of those that is willing to receive
discounts and meanwhile can predict its usage behavior consists of 40.0% of the
population. 12.3% of the population can predict their behavior but has no interest
in receiving discounts. The group of users that is willing to receive discounts con-
sists of 39 (78.5%) respondents. The possibility to receive discounts for a best effort
service, meaning jobs or applications of other privileged users get higher priority, is
favored by 56.9%.
Further interesting results are derived from the comments sent in by some of
the respondents. They give insight into their own definitions of Cloud Computing
calling it rather a mash-up that “involves leveraging services that you could not pro-
vide yourself relating to a specific widely needed resource”, like Amazon or Google
Maps. Meanwhile, one respondent is skeptical about generalized computing ser-
vices because of three reasons. First, packaged software is always highly customiz-
able, like SAP and solutions that are useful for different businesses, would therefore
need to have numerous complex interfaces. The second obstacle that is mentioned
refers to performance and reliability with Cloud services involving higher latency
compared to in-house solutions. A third point is the fact that differentiating busi-
ness objects and developing innovations is very difficult using commodity applica-
tion software. The respondent concludes by predicting a spread of specific services
like Google Maps but no success for generalized Cloud services.
In contrast, another respondent outlines the benefits of Google’s App Engine
that “have abstracted the hardware and system administration” leaving no need
for a system administrator so that the company can focus on developing software.
Being an SME company they could not afford to employ staff with the high level
of expertise on system administration that Google has and compared to Amazon
Web Services the basic version of the App Engine is for free, although they would
be willing to pay more because of the benefits they receive.
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3.5.2 Inductive Results
The goal of the conjoint analysis is to identify the most important level of each factor
and the most important factor (RQ 2.3). The distribution for the aggregated "rela-
tive importance" levels of the seven factors outlines what determines the decision
process. Operating system clearly ranks first as the most important factor followed
by price (see table 3.4). With values of 24.3% and 18.9% these two factors have sig-
nificantly higher influence on the decision making process than support which is
ranked third with 14.6% followed by value added services with 13.0%. Performance
(11.1%), availability (9.5%) and start-up time (8.8%) have less influence on the par-
ticipants’ choice. The correlations between the observed and estimated preferences
indicate a good estimation model. Pearson’s R which estimates the correlation be-
tween the metric total utility and the empirical observation, is significantly high
with Pearson′s R = 0.96.
Apart from the relative importance, the part-worth utilities of the different fac-
tors show interesting results (see table 3.4). The optimal product offers both oper-
ating systems, at the lowest price, with phone support, no value added services, a
guaranteed performance level at the highest availability rate, and is ready to use
immediately after start-up. The total utility U∗ for the optimal Cloud service is cal-
culated as follows20 (see equation (3.1)):
U∗ = 5.03 + 0.53− 0.57 + 0.25 + 0.57 + 0.29− 0.22 + 0.16 = 6.0421
The results for the respective factor levels explain customers’ preferences in de-
tail. For the factor “operating system”, users prefer to have a system running on
Linux, if not both operating systems are offered, while a Windows only instance
has a negative utility. This valuation changes when the population only consists of
enterprise users. They refuse Linux only based instances even stronger than those
running on Windows only. Thereby higher prices are considered worse than lower
prices. Unlike in other cases prices are not regarded as indicators for the quality of
the product. Results for the factor support level indicate that all users value phone
support as the most important support level. Email support also has a positive util-
ity and documentation only receives a negative utility. While value added services
receive a negative utility from the total population, the group of scientists differs
from the average user because load balancing has a strong positive utility for them.
20Note that this approach considers empirical value simultaneously (also known as combined
conjoint analysis). Hence, the information loss is lower on an aggregated level, but the path-worth
utility can significantly differ from aggregated values of every individuals. However, the relative
importance remains almost the same (Backhaus et al., 2008).
21Please note that due to rounding errors the total value does not exactly deviate by one from the
average utility.
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Table 3.4: Utility estimates and standard error rates for each level
Factors Relative Levels Utility Estimates Std. Error
importance
Operating System 24.30% Both 0.53 0.13
Windows -0.63 0.13
Linux 0.10 0.13
Price 18.90% $ 0.70 -0.57 0.12
$ 1.10 -0.90 0.18
$ 2.00 -1.63 0.34
Support Level 14.30% Phone 0.25 0.13
Email 0.09 0.13
Documentation -0.34 0.13
Value-added Service 13.00% Firewall -0.60 0.13
Load Balancing 0.03 0.13
None 0.57 0.13
Performance 11.10% Guaranteed 0.29 0.10
Best effort -0.29 0.10
Availability 9.50% 99.95% -0.22 0.11
99.75% -0.45 0.22
99.50% -0.67 0.36
Start-up time 8.80% Instant 0.16 0.10
Prolongated -0.16 0.10
Constant µ 5.03 0.32
Developers also value load balancing positively although they prefer not to have
any value added services. As expected, the population of respondents values a
higher availability more than a lower availability.
The applicability of Revenue Management models in the Cloud from the cus-
tomers’ perspective was summarized in RQ 2.1, if Revenue Management models
are applicable for Clouds. The questions from the survey (except the conjoint anal-
ysis) were mostly nominally scaled. Thus, the three hypotheses were tested via
a chi-square test22. The goal of Hypothesis 3.1 is to find out whether the usage
frequency depends on the role of the user. Revenue Management models cluster
users into different groups in order to provide a certain price for a certain group
of users. According to the chi-square test, business users and developers use these
22For more information on Pearson’s chi-square test see e.g. Cowan (1998)
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services more often than scientific or end users (Pearson’s chi-square test, p-value
= 0.004<0.01). This allows a provider to offer high price and low price segments of
services and differentiate them by determining better conditions for more frequent
consumers. However, it cannot be concluded whether more frequent consumers are
able to predict their requirements better or not (Pearson’s chi-square test, p-value =
0.746).
Table 3.5: Hypotheses results
H1 The usage frequency of computing services depends on the role of the user. X
H2 Users, who are able to predict their behavior, also book the resources in advance. X
H3 Users, who support price discrimination, also prefer best effort services. X
H4 Users, who support price discrimination, also prefer to book in advance. X
H5 Users, who support price discrimination, also prefer a subscription model. X
Another positive result was derived for the second Hypothesis 3.2. Consumers,
who are able to predict their service usage also accept booking in advance. Oth-
erwise, advance reservation will not make any sense, if consumers do not accept
it, although they were able to do so. The test shows that there is a relationship be-
tween both questions (Question 4 and Question 6) according to Pearson’s chi-square
test with a p-value=0.034<0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis (independence of both
answers) can be rejected.
Furthermore, price discrimination is essential to price services according to con-
sumers’ needs (Hypothesis 3.3). In particular, if scientific users would prefer low
bandwidth for a lower price, then low fare classes and high fare classes increase the
revenue of the provider. The null hypothesis states that price discrimination and
different levels of service quality are dependent, i.e. consumers, who prefer price
discrimination seem to prefer different service levels as well. The null hypothesis
is rejected. Hence, there is a relationship between these two parameters (Pearson’s
chi-square test, p-value = 0.016<0.05).
Besides the above mentioned context, price discrimination can be tested accord-
ing to booking in advance (Hypothesis 3.4). A user who prefers price discrimination
will also take the chance to reserve instances beforehand. This hypothesis cannot be
confirmed (p=0.60>0.05). However, the participants seem to significantly favor a
subscription model with advance reservation (p=0.047<0.05). Hence, a subscription
model combined with a prolongated start-up time or comprising a condition to re-
ceive the instance with delay for a lower price would be beneficial to the provider,
since he can sell the on-demand services for a higher price.
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Inferentially, would a supporter of price discrimination also choose a subscrip-
tion model in order to receive a lower price (Hypothesis 3.5)? The chi-square test
does not identify a significant relationship between subscription model and price
discrimination (p=0.21>0.05). Therefore, no statement can be derived from this re-
sult. In the context of RQ 2.2, only price discrimination and different service levels
have a strong dependency.
The classification of consumers into certain groups to apply price discrimina-
tion is an important aspect in Revenue Management. Su (2007) classified the con-
sumers into four different categories (see Section 3.2.3). An impatient customer may
not want to wait too long and has a higher valuation for a service than a patient
customer, who chooses to wait longer and pay a lower price. Thus, a clear prefer-
ence classification will ensure the success of Revenue Management. It is assumed
that impatient high-type customers will have a higher willingness to pay and can-
not predict their behavior, whereas patient low-type customers will request a lower
price and can predict his usage. High class customers are determined by their es-
timated value for one computing instance for one hour. They are selected from all
participants with a valuation above the third quartile (≥ $1.00). Table 3.6 illustrates
the distribution over the classes. Interestingly, one third of the participants need
resources often instantly and are not ready to pay a high price (low class, impa-
tient customers). 58% of the customers are patient high-type or impatient low-type.
When these two customer groups dominate the market, Su (2007) recommends to
increase the price over time, which is in line with the common practice in Revenue
Management. Additionally, this table outlines the heterogeneity of the customer
behavior. Intertemporal price discrimination are only applicable for a heterogenic
customer group (Stokey, 1979).
Table 3.6: Crosstabulation based on participants’ valuation for a one hour in-
stance and their usage predictability
High class Low class Total
Patient 16 18 34
Impatient 9 22 31
Total 25 40 65
3.5.3 Implication
Summarizing the results, three major findings can be listed. At first, the conjoint
analysis revealed that price is an important factor, but it is dominated by the Oper-
ating System offered by the provider (RQ 2.3). The IaaS layer is based on the chosen
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Operating System and the current software running on top of them do not seem
to be flexible enough. Users of IaaS seem to prefer a well-known platform instead
of comparing the availability rate of different providers or between the services of
one provider. Contradicting the results from previous surveys, performance and
availability are not the most important factors of an IaaS. Service sellers should con-
sider designing Operation System, the service price and the support level crucially
by offering different kind of factor levels for the heterogenic customer classes. The
heterogeneity allows application of price discrimination for Cloud services.
Secondly, consumers are open towards price discrimination and more than 50%
would book time slots in advance or accept best effort services for discounts (RQ
2.2). Revenue Management models can be applied to the Cloud from a consumer
perspective. Important characteristics of Revenue Management models like price
discrimination and advance reservation will be accepted in line with other factors
like service level differentiation. However, price discrimination is not supported
in conjunction with all Revenue Management aspects (Hypothesis 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5).
This characteristic also underlines the heterogenic customer classes.
Last but not least, comments from the respondents also indicate what other sur-
veys point out: changing providers is very complex, and missing standards make
it harder to transfer operations from one provider to the other (Gens, 2008). Even
though prices influence the first choice decision, migrating operations to another
provider for a better price is only an option for non-critical operations and for sig-
nificantly (at least 25%) lower prices.
Providers of Cloud services should crucially analyze the market situation. Al-
though consumers seem to accept price discrimination under certain condition,
McAfee (2008) states that three conditions have to be fulfilled to successfully ap-
ply price discrimination. Besides a heterogeneous consumer behavior, Cloud ser-
vice provider needs market power and he has to prevent or limit arbitrage options.
While the last two arguments depend on the market situation or on the service de-
sign of the provider respectively, the survey results confirm the heterogeneity of
the consumer behavior. All these factors are important to successfully apply Rev-
enue Management models to the Cloud (RQ 2.1). Furthermore, operating system
and price have a great impact on the provider selection process of the consumer.
Thus, offering various Linux or Windows versions (or even other operating sys-
tems) can result in a higher market share. However, a provider should consider
other additional services like phone support as well to distinguish his service from
the competitors’ offers.
84 CHAPTER 3. CUSTOMER CHOICE IN CLOUDS
Chapter 4
Capacity Management in Clouds
The problem of seat inventory control is complicated by the high uncertainty in the
demands and the diverse arrival patterns of the requests for the various fare classes.
[Lee and Hersh, 1993]
T he goal of this chapter is to define and evaluate sa heuristic called CustomizedBid-Price Policy (CBPP) to calculate bid prices in the Revenue Management
context for Cloud services. Section 4.2 outlines the existing approaches for the bid
price calculation. In Section 4.3 an example for applying bid price models to Cloud
services is given and the drawbacks of existing approaches are discussed. The
heuristic is evaluated via simulation. Simulation configuration and the hypotheses
are described in Section 4.4. The results are summarized in Section 4.5.
4.1 Introduction
In the Cloud Computing market, Cloud service providers face dynamic and unpre-
dictable consumer behavior. The methodology, through which prices are set in a dy-
namic environment by providers, can influence the demand behavior of price sensi-
tive consumers (Bitran and Caldentey, 2003). Consequently, consumers with a low
valuation for a service would use it during cheaper periods. Business consumers are
willing to pay a higher amount for its usage (see Chapter 3). By identifying the right
price for a customer and a requested service at a certain point in time, providers can
achieve higher revenues (Kimes, 1989). However, in some settings, it is difficult to
change prices over time or the service is designed to be offered for a fixed price. For
example, Amazon currently offers its Elastic Compute Cloud1 service at a fixed price
of $0.085 for a CPU hour without frequently changing the prices. Price changes can
1A small Linux instance (http://aws.amazon.com/ec2)
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be realized with specific markets like auctions. Historically, Amazon started with
their on-demand fixed price model in 2006. In March 2009, they announced the “re-
served instances” payment model. It comprises of a one-time fee valid for a certain
time period and allows access to instances for a much lower price per hour than the
on-demand model. This model is beneficial to the consumer, who uses the service
quite frequently. In December 2009, Amazon presented the “spot instance” model,
where prices change dynamically over time. If the spot price (i.e. the current mar-
ket price) decreases below the consumer’s bid, the instance of the consumer will be
started and the consumer pays the current spot price. If the price increases above
his bid, the running instance will be stopped until the price decreases again or users
cancel their bids. However, it is not clear how the spot price is determined by Ama-
zon. One option would be to apply Revenue Management methods to support the
identification of appropriate prices for Cloud services. Generally, Amazon aims to
satisfy different kinds of demands of the heterogenic consumer preferences by of-
fering three different pricing mechanisms.
Another important aspect in Revenue Management is the comprehensive view
of prices in conjunction with advance reservation (see Section 2.3). Advance reser-
vation is already applied to Cloud services. For example, RenderRocket2 offers
on-demand access to rendering software to create animated movies or to render
architectural and industrial designs. They charge users “on-demand hourly” with
rates starting from $1.50 per server hour. But they also offer advance reservation of
servers on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. This offer allows a guaranteed priority
on reserved instances and an on-demand scalable system.
Although advance reservation and the analysis of consumer behavior can reduce
uncertainty in demand, there are still unpredictable occurrences. An example of un-
predictable service requests is the problem Animoto3 faced in spring 2008. Animoto
offers to create customized web-based videos automatically by uploading images
and music. It needs substantial computing power for video processing. In spring
2008, Animoto had an unpredictable demand for their service, when 750,000 people
signed up for it within three days. However, the existing infrastructure was not able
to manage it. The instant availability of Amazon’s EC2 allowed them to add up to
an additional 3,500 virtual instances to satisfy the spike in demand4.
Furthermore, Cloud services are characterized by various properties defined in
SLAs, which enable the implementation of price discrimination strategies for distin-
guishing similar services based on their SLA attributes (e.g. higher throughput or
2http://www.renderrocket.com
3http://www.animoto.com
4NY Times article: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/technology/25proto.
html?_r=3&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&ref=business&pagewanted=print&adxnnlx=
1212768774-L4fMNfgaHc/0lDK5wKcevQ, last accessed on 03.03.2010
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lower availability rate). From a provider’s point of view, offering various kinds of
services based on advance reservation and on-demand instances can lead to uncer-
tain demand requests. When demand outweighs supply, a provider has to decide,
whether to accept an incoming request or reject it in favor of a request arriving later
for a service with higher revenue. In the case of Amazon’s Spot instances the price
can be calculated by analyzing several scenarios with different price settings and
virtual resource limitation in order to determine the appropriate pricing strategy.
In this chapter, a decision concept for a provider is presented to accept or reject
incoming requests for services in order to increase revenue in a scarce resource mar-
ket. A provider offers several Cloud services, which use the same resources from
the provider’s resource pool. The goal for a provider is to sell the most expensive
services to the paying customer(Phillips, 2005). When a consumer requests a service
with low revenue, the provider has the possibility to accept this request or to wait for
a prospective customer asking for the high valued services. Different decision rules
well known from Revenue Management for the Airline Industry are analyzed to un-
derstand how to apply Revenue Management concepts to Cloud Computing. This
contribution comprises of a more efficient decision rule called Customized Bid-Price
Policy (CBPP), which is based on the bid-price control concept introduced briefly in
Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. Its efficiency is analyzed via simulation-based optimization
in Section 4.5.
4.2 Related Work
Each offered service represents a booking class, which has a fixed price. The
provider has to decide, if a service request should be accepted or rejected. Thus, a
limit defining how many requests are operable for each booking class has to be iden-
tified, which is known as capacity control (see Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). Nested book-
ing limits allows the prevention of bookings for services with higher revenue being
rejected in favor of bookings with lower revenue. They define how much capacity
is reserved for a certain booking class. Every service has limited access to resources
like CPU, memory, storage, or bandwidth. Due to multiple resources a nested book-
ing limit control must be defined for each resource. This is called virtual nesting
control (Williamson, 1992; Smith and Penn, 1988). It is difficult to forecast demand
appropriately for virtual classes. The requirement of mapping services to virtual
classes also increases complexity (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). Furthermore, the
assumption that demand for low-class services occurs earlier than for high-class ser-
vices is common in Revenue Management (Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994). If demand
arrives in a strictly high-to-low order the providers simply need to accept consumer
requests in a ‘first-come first-served’ order to maximize their revenue. On the other
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hand, when demand is stochastic, the strict low-to-high order is also less appropri-
ate. For a more realistic scenario, the assumption must be made that the demand
for low-class services is more likely to arrive earlier and the demand for high-class
service is more likely to arrive later in time (Kimms and Mueller-Bungart, 2007).
Bid prices are interpreted as an approximation of the opportunity cost of reduc-
ing the resource capacities, which are needed to satisfy incoming service requests
(Bertsimas and Popescu, 2003). Möller et al. (2008) describe bid prices as monetary
values of a single capacity unit for a resource. The sum of the resource demands of
a request weighted with the corresponding resource bid prices defines the bid price
of a service. If this sum exceeds the revenue yielded by the sale of one unit of the re-
spective service, the request is rejected, otherwise it is accepted (Williamson, 1992).
Regular updates of bid price values are necessary to guarantee a continuous preci-
sion of the bid prices. Less accurate bid prices can lead to accept/reject decisions of
minor value. Continuously updated bid prices are based on the current booking sit-
uation at a certain point in time t. That is, if a large amount of capacity has already
been sold, the bid prices turn out to be higher.
Bichler and Setzer (2007) propose an admission control for media on-demand ser-
vices, e.g. a media streaming service. The authors compare an adaptive admission
control based on a Deterministic Linear Programming (DLP) model (Williamson,
1992) with static admission rules, and point out the benefits of the adaptive method.
Their results show, that the adaptive DLP control rejects early service requests, and
thereby is able to accept high-revenue service requests arriving later.
Bid prices vary depending on the current state of the system. The availability of
revenue information enables a bid price control to accept more requests which yield
higher revenues. This is a major advantage over class-based controls as protection
levels, because these controls either accept a class of requests or reject it (Talluri and
van Ryzin, 2004b) . If a class is under-utilized, these capacities cannot be automati-
cally allocated to other classes with high demand unless special policies are defined.
4.3 Optimization Approach
The decision of accepting or denying a request depends on the applied policy or
heuristics. Capacity control comprise heuristic approaches for the original dynamic
programming problem. A Bellman equation defines the optimal policy for accepting
or rejecting requests. Since the speed of computation matters (especially for large
resource/product settings), bid-price control is an approximation method to quickly
update the policies after the arrival of new requests. It provides a good estimate, but
not always an optimal solution. Especially in the Network Capacity Control (NCC)
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setting, the calculation of the optimum increases exponentially with the number of
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Figure 4.1: Incoming requests for different services in different timeslots
Cloud services in the Revenue Management context depend on various param-
eters. A service provider offers different kinds of services. Each service is based on
physical resources to generate the services. These services are requested at different
points in time. The decision when to accept or reject a request may change during
the time horizon for the same service, since the calculated bid price for every re-
source depends on the current utilization of the resource. To model the request for
Cloud services, probabilistic models such as Poisson processes are used to estimate
the demand. The parameters, their interrelation and the induced assumptions are
described below:
Time: A customer has the possibility to book a service within a booking period T.
T corresponds to the total amount of time remaining to book services and is finite
and countable. Furthermore, time is discrete with a point in time t ∈ {T, T − 1, . . . ,1}
(Adelman, 2007). Requests for services arrive at discrete points in time t. Customers
book services in advance according to their computational needs (Figure 4.1). In
practice, the booking period in the Cloud service domain is considerably smaller
than in airline Revenue Management. This contributes to a more spontaneous set-
ting with customers booking services according to the more agile business envi-
ronment and changing requirements for Cloud services. The duration of a booked
service is fixed. For example, the duration can be set to one hour (e.g. Amazon
EC2), and the customers have to plan how long they will need the service by reserv-
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ing multiple units of these service units. The availability of services depends on the
resources possessed by the provider.
Resources: The provider has to manage and control m different resources h ∈
{1, . . . ,m}. In the present context, the term resources stands for computing capaci-
ties. Examples for resources are CPU power, memory, storage or bandwidth. Every
resource needs to be quantifiable, and must be dividable into discrete segments. For
example, the allocation could be done as follows: One unit of resource h = 1 rep-
resents one (virtual) computing unit, one unit of resource h = 2 consists of 500 MB
of memory, one unit of resource h = 3 corresponds to 1 GB of storage space, and
one unit of resource h = 4 conforms to 1 GB data traffic in both directions. Every
resource h is restricted by a finite amount of capacity ch. The amount of capacity
already reserved at time t for previous customer requests is denoted by cht.
Services: Resources are necessary to provide Cloud services consuming these re-
sources. Resources are allocated to n different classes with each service i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Each service class represents a (virtual) computing environment that can be used by
the customer for computational purposes. The definition of the services depends on
the defined setting m × n (resources × services), e.g. setting 3× 3 considers three
resources and three services. Classes can be distinguished by their resource usage or
by the different prices. For example, a service class consuming the highest amount
of storage can be denoted as a "high storage" service. The service, which consumes
the highest amount of the most valuable resource, is likely to cost more than a low-
fare service with less valuable resources. However, the design of the classes highly
depends on the strategic goal of the provider and on the consumer preferences for
the offered services.
Formally, the matrix A describes the mapping between the resources and ser-
vices. An element ahi represents the usage of resource h by one unit of service i.
Ai shows all resources consumed by service i and Ah the services using resource
h. The resource consumptions of the different services are expressed by matrix Ai.
The price of service i is denoted with ri, and depends on the amount of resources
required by the service. ri is the revenue yielded by the sale of one unit of service i.
Prices are fixed over a predefined booking period.
Demand: Demand can be modeled in a variety of ways (McGill and van Ryzin,
1999). For instance, Bitran and Mondschein (1997) model demand as a time-
dependent Poisson process with arrival rate λt. The demand between the different
classes of services is assumed to be independent, which is a common assumption
in Revenue Management (Belobaba, 1989; Williamson, 1992; Gallego and van Ryzin,
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1994; Bertsimas and Popescu, 2003). A consumer, who desires a cheap service, will
not book a higher class and, hence, a more expensive service. However, a consumer
with a high valuation of the service may prefer a low-fare service. Currently, most
Revenue Management literature assume independency between fare classes. Con-
sequently, users will not switch between different fare classes. Furthermore, the
arrival of group requests is not taken into account. It is assumed that at most one
service request can arrive per discrete unit of time t (Talluri and van Ryzin, 1998).
Another question of Revenue Management in practice is how to perform an ap-
propriate forecast of demand. Forecasts are a complicated statistical concept ad-
dressing the uncertainty of possible future outcomes. They aim to predict future
demand, or to give an estimate of the probability distribution of demand. Forecast-
ing is usually based on historical sales data (Chen and Kachani, 2007). However, it
is assumed that providers have certain demand information from past booking pe-
riods. Therefore, they are able to perform almost accurate demand forecast. Fluctu-
ations in demand will be handled by passing through different demand scenarios in
the simulation. Some models for capacity control in Revenue Management consider
the fact that some customers do not show up or cancel their bookings. Depending
on the company and the fare classes booked by the customers, in some cases a re-
funding - in part or even in full - is possible. Concepts, which incorporate customer
no-shows, refunding, as well as overbooking are not considered in the bid-price
model for Cloud services. Furthermore, demand in this context is not influenced by
the supply of other provider companies. Competition between providers is not ex-
amined. Aspects concerning strategic customer behavior, such as willingness to pay
vs. willingness to wait, are not examined (Su, 2007). The focus of this thesis is on a
provider, who is exposed to incoming customer requests for the offered services in
a market with a scarce amount of resources.
Arrival process: DiT represents the amount of requests for service i arriving in
the complete booking period T. DiT can be subdivided into the expected demand
arriving between the current point in time t and the end of the booking period,
denoted as Dit (demand-to-come), and the demand prior to the beginning of the
booking period until t as D̂it(see Figure 4.2).
A request for service i at time t arrives with probability pit, and thus, the
arrival of a request for service i at time t is a random variable Xt with Xt =
({0, i} |i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}), i.e. Xt = 0 if no request comes in at t. T is finite and countable,
and thus, the arrival process of requests by the customers is a time-discrete stochas-
tic process X, which is a sequence of random variables Xt. The demand for service
class i arrived from T until t is described by D̂it. If a request for service i occurs in
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Figure 4.2: Demand definition in a finite time
time slot t, the demand arrived until t changes from its previous value D̂it at time
t + 1 to its new value D̂it + 1 at time t (note that the time runs backwards).
In Revenue Management it is often assumed that the so-called low-fare cus-
tomers book earlier than the high-fare customers (Belobaba, 1989). This assumption
is also valid in this chapter. The probability of arrival of a low-class request (service
i = 1) is high at the beginning of the booking period, and decreases over time. On
contrary, the probability of arrival of a high-class request is low at the beginning of
the booking period, but increases in time. In the present setting the provider offers
several services. The low-before-high restriction is always held for the cheapest and
for the most expensive service, although due to the stochastic nature, there is a small
probability that high-fare requests can arrive in the early stage as well.
4.3.1 Bid Price Control
The dynamic programming problem was heuristically approached by several au-
thors. In this section, three different models are presented, of which two of them
serve as a benchmark for the simulation results in Section 4.5. The Randomized
Linear Programming (RLP) model is not considered, since the improvement to the
deterministic version was on the one hand not significant in the Cloud context and
on the other hand aggregated values with different demand scenarios were inher-
ently incorporated in the simulation.
4.3.1.1 Deterministic Linear Programming Model
The network model for bid-prices assumes expected demand information and ex-
cludes the stochastic nature of the demand (Glover et al., 1982; Williamson, 1992).
Based on demand forecasts the expected aggregate demand-to-come Dit for the re-
maining booking periods is calculated, and it is assumed that the demand is equal
to its mean values. An approximation for the objective-value function V is obtained
by:
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(4.2) s. t. ∑
i∈Ah
ahi · xi ≤ ch − cht ∀h ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
(4.3) 0≤ xi ≤ Dit ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
The condition for accepting a request is: The revenue ri yielded through the sale
of service i must be greater than or equal to the sum of the resource consumptions of
service i weighted with the corresponding bid-prices (Talluri and van Ryzin, 1998):
(4.4) ri ≥ ∑
h∈Ai
ahi · πht.
Additionally, it must be ensured that there is still sufficient capacity of every
resource available to satisfy the request. This is expressed by the condition:
(4.5) ahi ≤ ch − cht ∀h ∈ Ai
(4.1) is the objective function, which maximizes the total revenue. The total rev-
enue results from the sum of the prices ri charged for each service multiplied by
the number of units of each service sold in the booking period xi. Constraint (4.2)
ensures that enough capacity of each resource is available to satisfy the need for ca-
pacity by the number of allocated units of the services. Constraint (4.3) guarantees
that the number of services sold are not below zero and do not exceed the expected
demand-to-come.
The solution vector of the primal problem is discarded, and the variables of the
optimal solution of the dual problem are used as bid-prices (Talluri and van Ryzin,
1998). If the constraint (4.2) is linearly dependent for all resources h, then only one
solution for the dual prices exists. Otherwise, according to Paris (1981), the optimal
solution can have multiple optimal dual bid-price vectors. The Deterministic Linear
Programming (DLP) can either be solved at the beginning of the booking period
with the given demand forecast by using static bid-prices or, as a more dynamic
approach, by recalculating the bid-prices at certain data collection points during the
booking period. The former approach has only one bid price over the entire horizon
and thus deterministically accepts or rejects certain services, e.g. all service i = 1
are rejects, while service i = 2 and i = 3 are accepted. The latter is advantageous
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in order to keep up a certain precision of the bid-prices. The main benefit of the
DLP model is that it can be solved efficiently, which makes it popular for practical
applications. Its performance strongly depends on the size of the network as well
as on the reliability of the demand forecasts. However, this model does not imply
any uncertainty in demand. Furthermore, the accuracy of bid-price values in the
DLP model depends on how frequent these recalculations are performed. The most
frequent calculation of bid-prices is carried out by recalculating bid-prices each time
a request occurs. Another drawback of the DLP model is that the dual variables
of resources can be zero. Hence, capacity for a resource is higher than the mean
demand (Talluri and van Ryzin, 1998). Consequently, too low bid-prices can be the
result. A simple numerical example is provided to illustrate the problem: consider
a network with two resources and two services with the following resource usage
(matrix Ai) and prices ri (Table 4.1):
Table 4.1: Dual variables example of the DLP problem
Services i = 1 i = 2
Resources h = 1 2 4
h = 2 4 2
Prices ri 4.00 5.50
The expected total demand for service i = 1 is D1T = 5, and for service i = 2
D2T = 8. Furthermore, assume that the available capacities of both resources are
c1 = c2 = 40. Given this information, the dual problem looks as follows:
(4.6) Min. V(y) = 40y1 + 40y2 + 5s1 + 8s2;
(4.7) s. t. 2y1 + 4y2 + s1 ≥ 4.00;
(4.8) 4y1 + 2y2 + s2 ≥ 5.50;
(4.9) y1,y2, s1, s2 ≥ 0
The total demands for the services can be converted into the total demands per
resource by calculating: 2 · 5 + 4 · 8 = 42 for resource h = 1 and 4 · 5 + 2 · 8 = 36 for
resource h = 2. Obviously, the total demand for resource h = 1 exceeds the available
capacity c1 = 40 of resource (42 > 40). Contrarily, the total demand for resource
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h = 2 is below the capacity of resource h = 2 (36 < 40). Solving the dual problem
leads to the solution vector with the optimal dual variables y1 = 1.375 and y2 = 0.0.
For resource h = 2 the capacity is higher than the demand for the resource, and
thus, the optimal dual variable y2 is zero. Using such low values as bid-prices can
result in inefficient outcomes in terms of revenue performance as well as resource
utilization, because condition (4.4) can be fulfilled for too many of the low-revenue
requests. Hence, low-fare services are sold too frequently and less capacity can be
reserved for the ‘later arriving’ high-fare requests yielding more profit.
4.3.1.2 Randomized Linear Programming Model
The Randomized Linear Programming (RLP) model induces stochastic information.
The expected demand as in the DLP case is replaced by a random demand vector
D (Smith and Penn, 1988). For instance, Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) model the
demand as a Poisson process. The probability distribution of the demand for each
service is used to generate different scenarios of demand-to-come Dit. The optimal
solution of this problem represents a random variable, which provides the approxi-
mation to the objective-value function V. According to Talluri and van Ryzin (1999)
the application of RLP leads to a significantly higher revenue than DLP. However,
in various test settings in this thesis, no significant difference to DLP could be iden-
tified for Cloud services and thus this approach is disregarded.
4.3.1.3 Certainty Equivalent Control
Another approach called certainty equivalent control extends the concept of bid-
prices and directly calculates an approximation of the opportunity cost for every
service and not for every resource (Bertsimas and Popescu, 2003). For this pur-
pose it solves two instances of the DLP problem described above: The first instance
solves the initial DLP problem (4.1) and the second instance subtracts the amount of
resources demanded by the request from the remaining capacity of the resource
(4.10) ch − cht − ahi,∀h ∈ {1, . . . ,m} .
The approximation of the opportunity cost of service i is then obtained by sub-
tracting the objective function value of instance 2 (V′(x)) from the objective func-
tion value of instance 1 (V(x)). This approximation does not depend on the optimal
dual variables. Thus, the drawback of multiple optimal dual variables of the linear
programming model is eliminated. The Certainty Equivalent Control (CEC) policy
requires forecasts for the total demand for each service, as well as forecasts for the
expected demand-to-come (Dit). The main advantage of the CEC policy arises from
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the numerous and periodic updates of the approximation of the opportunity costs,
thereby guaranteeing a certain accuracy. Since CEC is based on the DLP problem,
it shares the same disadvantage of only incorporating expected demand and not
considering uncertainty of the demand process. However, Bertsimas and Popescu
(2003) have proven that CEC outperforms DLP.
4.3.2 Customized Bid Price Policy
A different NCC approach for calculating bid prices was proposed by Klein (2007).
The idea of this approach is to use simple linear additive functions to calculate bid
prices every time a request occurs. The functions are based on parameters, which
can easily be kept on track during the booking period, such as the current amount
of reserved capacity cht as well as the expected demand-to-come Dit. It uses a con-
tinuous time model with a booking period represented by the time interval [T;0].
The concept further involves the determination of coefficients (control variables)
via simulation-based optimization. The control variables are used for calibrating
the bid-price functions adequately, which are evaluated offline before the time hori-
zon. In the following, the basics of the Self-Adjusting Bid-Price (SABP) concept
are explained. Subsequently the customized concept named Customized Bid-Price
Policy (CBPP) is presented, which uses a genetic algorithm for calibrating the con-
trol variables. Additionally, Section 4.5 outlines a thorough statistical analysis of the
benchmark.
In SABP two different linear bid-price functions are explained (Klein, 2007). One
is time-oriented, and involves the time remaining to sell the services, and the other
one is resource-oriented. However, the focus here is on the resource-oriented alter-
native, because it takes into account information about the future resource demands
of incoming requests. It can describe the current booking situation more accurately,
and is better suited to evaluate resources in Clouds. Klein (2007) has also proved that
the resource-oriented version outperforms the time-oriented approach. Bid prices
are calculated for each resource h every time a request occurs. The variable πht de-
notes the bid price of resource h at time t. In the case of an arrival of a request for
service class i at time t, the bid-price control decides whether to accept or to reject
the request.
The components of the bid-price function describe the current booking situation.
Consequently, if many requests arrive, the computations of bid prices take place
more frequently. Therefore, the accept/reject decisions directly affect the values of
future bid prices. The formula of the bid-price function for a resource h at time t is:
(4.11) πht = πh + αh · cht − βh · uht.
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πh denotes the base bid price, which is a control variable and provides the basis
for the bid price calculation. It is determined by simulation-based optimization.
Naturally, the value of πh influences the bid prices. Therefore, the question arises
sa to how the base bid price is set. Klein (2007) calculates it by creating a random
number and multiplying it with the minimum bid price of resource h. The minimum
bid price is the value at which, if it is exceeded, requests for at least one service class





The bid-price function further consists of two parts: The first part of (4.11)
(+αh · cht) is responsible for the increase of the respective bid price over time. The
amount of reserved capacity of resource h at time t (cht) can only be natural numbers
counting the number of resources that are already allocated. If a request is accepted,
the bid price of a resource increases by the value cht multiplied with αh. Thus, the
bid price of resource h increases only through the acceptance of incoming requests.
This corresponds to the fact that available resources get less due to sales and hence
become more expensive.
The second part of the formula (−βh · uht) decreases the bid price for every re-
quest made. A decrease is required to avoid free capacity leading to a revenue loss.
If the function had no decreasing part, the bid price would increase monotonically
after every acceptance. From a certain point in time every future request will be
rejected, and no more sales could take place, although free capacity is still available.
uht is the capacity required to satisfy the demand for service i ∈ Ah until t. The de-
mand until t for a service i ∈ Ah can be calculated by DiT − Dit = D̂it. It requires
forecasts of the total expected demand per service i (DiT), as well as forecasts of the
expected demand-to-come (Dit) for every point in time t until the end of the booking
period. uht is calculated by
(4.12) ∑
i∈Ah
ahi · (DiT − Dit).
For every service, its demand for resource h (ahi) is multiplied by the expected
demand until t (DiT − Dit), and the sum of these services is taken. The values of
uht increase over time as more demand is realized. This leads to a decrease in the
bid-price function when additional demand arrives over time. The two parts of the
resource-oriented bid-price function ensure that the total value of a bid price (πht)
only increases, if requests are accepted and decrease otherwise. The increase am-
plifies if the amount of reserved capacity (cht) is high. The parameters αh and βh
are control variables required for calibration purposes in the simulation-based op-
timization. They have a strong impact on the accept/reject decisions. For instance,
very high values for coefficient αh and very low values for coefficient βh lead to more
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frequent reject decisions, because the increase of the bid-price function turns out to
be too high. This would imply losses in revenues due to rare sales. In the opposite
case, very low values of αh and very high values of βh result in rather low bid prices,
and thus, it can happen, that capacity is mostly sold to low-fare classes leading to
potentially lost revenues, which could be yielded by high-revenue requests arriv-
ing later. Because of these reasons, promising values for the control variables are
obtained via simulation-based optimization.
The Customized Bid-Price Policy (CBPP) approach is based on the resource-
oriented bid-price function of SABP. The bid price of resource h at time t is cal-
culated by the formula:






The control variables πh, αh, and βh are determined via a genetic algorithm,
which is described below. Again, the bid price calculation is based on the base bid
price πh. In CBPP policy, the genetic algorithm uses the minimum bid price (πminh )
as upper bound for the base bid price. Thereby, it is guaranteed that the base bid
price does not turn out to be too high, which would lead to rejects of requests for all
service classes.
The customized bid-price function is also based on two parts. The first part
(+αh · chtch ) increases the bid price πht if requests are accepted. The amount of re-
served capacity of resource h at time t (cht) is divided by the total capacity of re-
source h (ch), and hence can only take values in [0;1]. An acceptance of a request for
service i leads to an increase of the bid price of resource h to the amount of the delta
of the value chtch . The increase of the bid price also depends on the value of αh.
The decreasing part (−βh · uhtUhT ) lowers the bid price every time a request is made.
As explained above, uht corresponds to the amount of capacity needed to satisfy the
demand until t for the services i ∈ Ah.
UhT is the capacity of resources that is required to satisfy the total expected de-
mand of the complete booking period calculated by ∑i∈Ah ahi · DiT. UhT can also be
denoted as the total resource demand. It requires a forecast of the total demand for
service class i in the booking period. The quotient uhtUhT is always in [0;1], and in-
creases over time as more demand is realized. Hence, the bid price decreases with
incoming requests. Reasonable values for the control variables πh, αh, and βh are
obtained by a genetic algorithm in order to minimize inefficient outcomes.
The main advantage of SABP and CBPP is the very frequent recalculation of bid
prices with minimum computational effort. Thereby, information about the current
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booking situation is always considered, and the bid prices exhibit a certain preci-
sion. Klein (2007) states that this approach is robust to errors in the forecast. If the
realized demand is less than the forecasted one, less capacity units may be reserved,
and more capacity is available to satisfy incoming requests. Thus, the increasing
part of the bid-price function is lower, and more requests with lower revenues can
be accepted. On the other hand, if the realized demand is higher, the bid price
increases strongly as more capacity is reserved due to the acceptance of requests.
Furthermore, a strict fragmentation of the services into only two subsets (S1: Ac-
cepted, i.e. ri ≥ ∑h∈Ai ahi · πht; S2: Rejected, i.e. ri < ∑h∈Ai ahi · πht) is avoided. This
fragmentation arises in models, which do not perform a frequent recalculation of
bid prices. Given static bid prices, it is fixed, which service classes can be accepted
and which not. Through permanently updating the bid prices a certain accuracy is
guaranteed, and a strict fragmentation cannot occur. Moreover, the offline optimiza-
tion of the control variables allows to save time during the period, when requests
arrive. A sum of the current bid prices for every resource has to be calculated, while
the bid prices are updated automatically over time.
Although the concept shows some robustness against forecast errors as men-
tioned above, it does not imply stochastic information about demand. This assump-
tion is not very realistic, and is not considered in other deterministic models as well,
such as DLP and CEC. The computational effort before the incoming request period,
which is required for finding appropriate values for the control variables πh,αh, and
βh is significantly high. It mainly comes from the necessity for simulation-based
optimization. Another weakness of the CBPP model is the large amount of fore-
cast values needed, which requires a lot of memory. For each point in time and for
each service offered, the expected demand-to-come (Dit) must be stored in order
to be able to calculate the demand until t and the resource demands (uht) for each
incoming request.
Note that the SABP concept of Klein (2007) has been developed for managing
resources in the context of airlines. The resource consumption of airline services,
which are seats in certain booking classes on certain flights at certain dates, is very
different to the resource usage by services in Clouds. To demonstrate this, consider
the following example. An airline offers different types of booking classes (e.g. econ-
omy class and business class) on each of its flight. Depending on the booking classes
and on the flights offered, the airline can offer a certain number of services. How-
ever, in this case the resource consumptions by the different services usually are all
one unit of a single resource. Table 4.2 represents a service-resource mapping for
Cloud services with m = 3 resources and n = 3 services.
It can be easily observed that the resource demands (ahi) in the two areas of
application show a major difference. Matrix Ai in case of services in Clouds ex-
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Table 4.2: Resource usage by services in Clouds
Service i i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
CPU 2 4 8
Memory 2 8 4
Storage 8 2 4
hibits significantly higher natural numbers than in case of airline services, which
usually consume one seat on a single-leg flight. Even if an airline offers multi-leg
services, that is, if someone buys a sequence of flights over multiple destinations,
the resource usage per flight is always one seat. Note that group bookings are not
considered in these models. Group bookings require a different demand modeling,
since the amount of services in group bookings vary over time. The service resource
mapping is fixed over the entire time horizon. Hence, accepting one booking re-
quest in the context of services in Clouds means a considerably larger change in
capacity compared to the acceptance of a booking request for an airline ticket, but is
not comparable to the group booking problem. Furthermore, accepting service with
different kinds of resource demand can significantly affect the yield. It is possible
to accept services which have a lower revenue, but need abounded resources, while
high-fare services have to be rejected due to resource scarcity.
Depending on the type of service requested by the consumer, the capacity of
multiple resources may be decreased in case of an acceptance, which applies to all
three services in this example (table 4.2). Therefore, a stronger competition for mul-
tiple resources takes place between services in Clouds. Hence, the usage of the
original bid-price function (4.11) would lead to very high values of the increasing
and decreasing part of the function in the setting of Cloud services, and thus, some
bid price values can turn out to be inappropriate. This is avoided by using relative
values in (4.13).
4.3.3 Non Optimal Outcome
In certain cases bid-price control can fail to produce an optimal decision (Talluri and
van Ryzin, 1998). In the context of services in Clouds, an illustration of these cases
is provided below:
Example one:
Assume that a provider offers three resources and three services. The resource con-
sumptions of the services are given in table 4.3.
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Table 4.3: Non-optimality example 1 - service-resource mapping and service prices
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
h = 1 2 4 8
h = 2 2 8 4
h = 3 8 2 4
Price ri 15.00 17.00 23.00
Due to low resource availability only one request for all services can be accepted.
It is assumed that a request for service i occurs with different probability pi at time
t. There are three possible options for which type of service to accept at t = 2. One
possible acceptance option may arise at t = 1: A request for service i = 3 occurs with
a probability of p3 of 0.8, and a probability of 0.2 for no request to arrive (Table 4.4).
Remember that only one request can arrive per time slot.
Table 4.4: Non-optimality example 1 - available capacity for acceptance of one more request
Request for i i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
t = 2 pi 0.4 0.4 0.2 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
t = 1 pi 0 0 0.8 - - i = 3
The amount of available capacity is 8 units of each resource. Therefore, at t = 2
an acceptance of a request for service i leads to the values of available capacity at
t = 1 as outlined in table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Non-optimality example 1 - capacity left at t = 1 after acceptance of service i
Acceptance of service i i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
h = 1 6 4 0
h = 2 6 0 4
h = 3 0 6 4
Obviously, an acceptance of any service request at t = 2 leads to a lack of capacity
for one resource in the next timeslot t = 1 and therefore no incoming request could
be accepted. An optimal decision in this case is to reject incoming requests for the
services with lower revenues (i = 1 and i = 2) at t = 2, and to only accept a request
for the high-class service i = 3 (if it occurs). The corresponding bid-price control
requires the following conditions, where bid prices are weighted with consumptions
of the respective resources:
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• Condition 1: r1 < ∑h∈Ai=1 ah1 · πht with
∑h∈Ai=1 ah1 · πht = 2 · π1t + 2 · π2t + 8 · π3t
• Condition 2: r2 < ∑h∈Ai=2 ah2 · πht with
∑h∈Ai=2 ah2 · πht = 4 · π1t + 8 · π2t + 2 · π3t
• Condition 3: r3 >= ∑h∈Ai=3 ah3 · πht with
∑h∈Ai=3 ah3 · πht = 8 · π1t + 4 · π2t + 4 · π3t
Table 4.6 contains the respective resource consumptions (Ah) and a set of bid
prices in period t = 2, for which conditions one and two hold, but condition three is
violated.
Table 4.6: Non-optimality example 1 - set of bid prices
πht i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
h = 1 1.75 2 2 8
h = 2 1.55 4 8 2
h = 3 1.25 8 4 4
ri 15 17 23
∑h∈Ai ahi · πht 16.6 21.9 25.2
For the given revenues per service all three conditions cannot be kept. There is
a conflict in the requirement that ∑h∈Ai=1 ah1 · πht must be above r1 = 15.00 as well
as ∑h∈Ai=2 ah2 · πht above r2 = 17.00, but at the same time ∑h∈Ai=3 ah3 · πht must be
below r3 = 23.00 with the same bid prices πht.
As table 4.6 shows, the set of bid prices would lead to the rejection of all service
requests at time slot t = 2, because the revenue of each service ri is below the sum
consisting of the resource consumption weighted with the bid price for all resources
(e.g. 23 < 25.2). However, the optimal policy would be to accept service i = 3 and
to reject the other two services. This example demonstrates the non-optimality of
bid-price control in the Cloud context, although it shows some difference compared
to the airline case provided by Talluri and van Ryzin (1998).
An interesting aspect in the given example is that through lowering the bid price
π1t by the amount of 0.3, the bid-price policy would produce the optimal decision,
i.e. reject requests for services i = {1,2} and accept a request for service i = 3. This
can be explained by the highest amount of consumption of resource h = 1 by service
i = 3 compared to the other service classes. Hence, bid price π1t has a strong impact
on the calculation of ∑h∈Ai=3 ah3 ·πht, and lowering the value of π1t leads to a smaller
total sum (∑h∈Ai=3 ah3 · πht) below price r3.
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From the observations above, the question is raised, whether bid-price control is
able to compute bid prices which can lead to optimal decisions in the above cases.
Another important aspect is that these situations can only occur, if demand for the
services shows a certain mix of different incoming requests, i.e. there is no order of
low-fare requests arriving strictly before high-fare requests (see Section 4.3). From a
theoretical point of view bid-price control can produce non-optimal decisions. How-
ever, the previous example showed that there is also the possibility of optimal de-
cisions. Bid prices depend on the service prices, the realized demand, the reserved
capacity as well as on future requests. Regular updates of bid prices is a key feature
to achieve accurate results. If updates are performed less frequently, the bid prices
are more static, and the potential of producing an optimal decision is decreased.
The previous example only considered a small fraction of time slots. Examples
for non-optimal bid prices are neither restricted to the end of the booking period
nor to the amounts of available capacity close to the total capacity limits. Two main
reasons exist for the potential non-optimality of bid-price controls. First, bid prices
have some kind of marginal costs property and cannot reasonably evaluate large
changes in capacity (Domschke and Klein, 2004), which are realized by selling a
service, in relation to the availability of the services. Another reason for the non-
optimality is that the relation between the amount of capacity used to satisfy a re-
quest and the opportunity cost of selling a service may be non-linear. That is, if a
sale of a service i = 1 has the same opportunity cost as the sale of service i = 2 and
service i = 3, and the resource demand by the different services is different as well,
it is not possible to express this relation by a linear interrelation. However, bid-price
control assumes to have a linear relationship between the resources for one service.
In the application context of Cloud Computing a sale of a service means a con-
siderably larger change in capacity compared to the airline context (Section 4.3.2).
It is important to note that in case of different resource consumptions by the Cloud
services the complexity of the interdependency between resources and services in-
creases. The bid price of resource h is weighted with the amount of consumption
of this resource by the respective service class. Moreover, it is common that Cloud
services consume several resources at once. In case of an incoming request for a
low-revenue service in time slot t at a scarce level of available capacity, and when
the probability of a high class request in next time period is high, a decision rule
could be to explicitly set the bid prices in period t to high values, so that low-fare
requests are rejected. Thereby, capacity is reserved for the potentially high-revenue
request in period t− 1. This suggestion is based on the internal provider policies,
e.g. preferring “gold customers” over “silver customers” and is not modeled explic-
itly in the approach of this thesis. However, it can be integrated in this model by
limiting the available capacity for a certain time ∆t.
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Table 4.7: Non-optimality example 2 - requests arriving
Time No. Request for i Revenue ri
t = 8 1 i = 1 15.00
t = 7 2 i = 2 17.00
t = 6 3 i = 1 15.00
t = 5 4 i = 3 23.00
t = 4 5 i = 2 17.00
t = 3 6 i = 1 15.00
t = 2 7 i = 3 23.00
t = 1 8 i = 2 17.00
t = 0 9 i = 3 23.00
Example two:
This example outlines how mixed strategies of accepting different kind of Cloud
services can increase revenue. Instead of only accepting the most beneficial services,
a low-fare service could have more impact on revenue. Due to the larger change
in capacity, this scenario plays a major role in Clouds. In this example, sufficient
capacity is available for accepting three or four service requests (depending on the
type of service requests). The same values of revenues and resource demands as in
the previous example are used. Table 4.7 contains an ex-post view on the arrival of
different requests at time t and subsequent time slots. Arrival probabilities are not
considered. The values of available capacities at time t are for c1 = 24, for c2 = 20,
and for c3 = 20.
In this situation the provider can sell the remaining capacity in multiple ways.
Possible acceptance strategies are summarized in table 4.8. Strategy no. 2 yields the
highest revenue in this example, by accepting one i = 1 request, one i = 2 request,
and two i = 3 requests. This strategy further results in the best utilization, i.e. lowest
amount of unused capacity of each resource. It does not depend on which of the
requests are accepted, e.g. for i = 1 the capacity control can accept request no. 1, 3,
or 6.
Due to the multiple options of allocating capacity and due to the uncertainty of
demand, i.e. at time t it is not clear, which types of requests will occur in which
order. Given the remaining amounts of available capacities, the outcome can easily
become non-optimal. For instance, if the provider accepts the first three incoming re-
quests (no. 1, 2, and 3) in a first-come-first-serve manner, a high-fare request cannot
be accepted due to insufficient capacity of resource h = 3. But a request for service
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i = 2 can still be accepted, e.g. no. 5 or 8. Then, the maximum possible revenue is 64
(similar to strategy no. 5).
Strategy no. 6 (Table 4.8) provides an example of a rather poor result concerning
revenue performance: Through the admission of requests no. 1 and 3 (or also 3 and
6) as well as request no. 8 the capacity for an additional acceptance of a service-2
requests remains unused and the revenue output is only 47. Such cases may appear
when the bid prices between two certain time slots are too high. Strategy 7 also
results in unused capacity, because no more requests occur after t− 9.
Table 4.8: Non-optimality example 2 - possible strategies in example 2
Strategy Admissions per i Admit requests Unused capacities Revenue
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 with no. h = 1 h = 2 h = 3
1 0 0 3 4, 7, 9 0 8 8 69
2 1 1 2 1, 2, 4, 7 2 2 2 80
3 0 2 1 2, 4, 5 8 0 12 57
4 2 0 1 3, 6, 9 12 12 0 53
5 2 2 0 2, 3, 5, 6 12 0 0 64
6 2 1 0 1, 3, 8 16 8 2 47
7 1 1 1 3, 5, 9 10 6 6 55
The explained aspects demonstrate that even if the bid-price control accepts
three high-class requests (i = 3), the revenue and utilization is poorer compared
to the best strategy no. 2. In terms of utilization and revenue performance, a mixed
acceptance strategy of service requests performs better in some cases than accepting
only high-fare requests. Naturally, it strongly depends on the service configura-
tions, the number of services offered as well as on the prices of the services. In ad-
dition, the considerations clarify that there is a conflict between reserving capacity
for requests for high-revenue services arriving later and the risk of achieving poor
utilizations and revenues. This is due to the sale of too many low-revenue services
or due to significant fluctuations in high-fare demand.
Since demand modeling implies uncertainty, the described scenarios are very
hard to discover during the booking period. It is possible that a multitude of
such situations occur. Therefore, the use of an appropriate and accurate forecasting
method is important in practice. Furthermore, the determination of the optimal allo-
cation of services can only be performed ex-post by trying all possible combinations
of acceptance of the different requests occurred in the booking period (Talluri and
van Ryzin, 2004b). Although there are circumstances, under which bid-price con-
trols produce non-optimal decisions, Talluri and van Ryzin (1998) state that when
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capacity and the volumes of sales are large, bid-price controls perform asymptoti-
cally optimal.
4.4 Simulation Environment
CBPP was implemented in Java to evaluate the outcome of the algorithms and to
understand the dependency of the several parameters. The simulation was executed
on a Windows 7 machine with an Intel Centrino Core 2 Duo CPU and 2GB RAM in
a Java Runtime Environment 1.6. The OR-Objects5 package for Java was used to
solve the DLP or CEC instances. The genetic algorithm was implemented via the
Java Genetic Algorithms Package6).
Furthermore, several assumptions, which are common in the Revenue Manage-
ment context, also apply in this simulation. It is assumed that the provider has
certain demand information from past booking periods, and is able to perform a
more or less accurate demand forecast. Fluctuations in demand will be handled
by generating different demand scenarios during the simulation. Customers, who
do not use the booked services, do not get a refund. Hence, if consumers book a
service they will have to pay for it. Cancelations and no-shows are not considered
in the model. Demand for each service is independent and can be modeled by a
probability distribution (Weatherford and Belobaba, 2002).
Several parameters describe the setting of the simulation. This thesis focuses es-
pecially on the interdependency between the bound values for the genetic algorithm
parameters, the price variation, the service-resource mapping and their impact on
Demand-to-Capacity ratio (DCR), the bid price for each resource and the achieved
revenue. Changes in demand and capacity will obviously influence the DCR and
thus the outcome of the algorithm. The impact of these parameters will be described
in the next two subsections, since they are necessary to evaluate CBPP in Section 4.5.
4.4.1 Genetic Algorithm
Genetic algorithms, introduced in 1975 by John Holland (Holland, 1975), are used
as a tool for search and optimization. They belong to the class of evolutionary al-
gorithms defined in the 1960s by Rechenberg (1973). Genetic algorithms are opti-
mization concepts, which search a solution space of a given problem for reasonable
solution values. When searching for good or optimal solutions, a genetic algorithm
does not create all potential solutions at the beginning. Rather, it works by regard-
5OR-Objects Java package 1.2.4 (http://opsresearch.com/)
6Java Genetic Algorithms Package 3.4.3 (http://jgap.sourceforge.net)
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ing only a small part of the solution space. Given this part of the solution space,
a simulation of an evolution is performed using the survival of the fittest strategy.
Individuals who are fitter than other individuals, have a higher probability of sur-
viving and of still being persistent in the next generation in the evolution process.
The term fitness has to be adapted to certain circumstances or to an environment
(Goldberg, 1989). Before describing the structure of the genetic algorithm, some
common terminology from biology is introduced (Mitchell, 1998).
Chromosomes are the carriers of the genes. They contain a set of genes. A gene
is a unit within a DNA double-strand molecule. Genetic information about a certain
characteristic is encoded in the gene. Each gene represents a certain attribute of an
individual and is located at a certain position (locus) within the chromosome. The
possible values or settings of a gene are denoted as alleles. An individual in this
context contains one chromosome, thus, the term chromosome refers to the term in-
dividual here. A population consists of a collection of chromosomes or individuals.
A genetic algorithm consists of the following parts, which have to be defined
depending on the application context and the problem to solve (Mitchell, 1998):
• An appropriate chromosome has to be defined and the number of genes in the
chromosome as well as the gene values have to be determined. A definition of
the bounds for the genes is essential.
• Several genetic operators describe the evolution process. It is essential to de-
fine which methods to be used for recombination and evolution of the genes.
There are three basic types of genetic operators: The selection operator, the
crossover operator, and the mutation operator.
• A random initial population has to be created. Before starting the evolution
process, an initial population according to the defined chromosome represen-
tation has to be created.
• A fitness function has to be defined, which is responsible for calculating the
fitness of each chromosome within the population. The term fitness depends
on the application context. It can be measured in positive real numbers, and
high fitness values mean that the given chromosome is well adapted to certain
circumstances.
• Furthermore, it has to be specified when to stop the evolution process. For
instance, a maximum number of evolution steps can be defined.
As mentioned before, the objective of the genetic algorithm is to find adequate
values for the control variables of the customized bid price function (4.13). The
bid price function contains three control variables: The base bid price πh as well
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as αh and βh. All the parameters are calculated for each single resource. Hence, the
genetic algorithm has to find three adequate values for each resource, which leads to
a total number of genes in a chromosome of 3 ·m. Moreover, the genetic algorithm
must simulate a complete booking period T, which includes the demand expected
for the given sales period based on the forecast by the provider. The application of
the genetic algorithm in CBPP is described below:
Chromosome representation:
The choice of an appropriate chromosome representation, which defines how many
genes the chromosome contains, and which values the genes are allowed to obtain,
is a key component. The control variables (πh,αh, βh) in (4.13) are used as genes
within the genetic algorithm and are optimized in the evolution process. The size of
the chromosome depends on the number of resources used by the provider to con-
figure the offered services. Another important issue is how to specify the numerical
range in which the values of the control variables can lie. The genes containing





which guarantees that the base bid price is always below the minimum bid price.
Thereby, the production of counterproductive values is avoided, as in the case when
the base bid price exceeds the price of service i (πh > ri), which would lead to reject-
ing requests for all services i already at the beginning of the booking period.
Genetic Operator:
Based on the three basic genetic operators “selection operator”, “crossover oper-
ator” and “mutation operator”, extended versions such as “averaging crossover
operator” or “ranged swapping mutation operator” were created to receive bet-
ter results. After testing all these operators integrated in JGAP, two of them were
selected for the evaluation, namely “swapping mutation operator” and “two way
mutation operator”, since they outperformed the others. While the crossover oper-
ator randomly chooses a position in a chromosome and changes the subsequence of
genes after that locus with the subsequence of genes of another chromosome at the
same locus, the swapping mutation operator does not alter (mutate) the genes of a
chromosome. It selects a start position in a chromosome, and swaps the genes after
that position. The two way mutation operator works in two steps. In step one it as-
sumes that every gene in a chromosome has a different effect on the fitness value if
it is mutated. Therefore, it dynamically adapts the mutation rate for different genes,
and selects a gene for mutation with a higher probability to least affect the fitness
value. After the selection of a gene, step two continues with a traditional mutation.
It randomly mutates the genes of a chromosome. It goes through all chromosomes
in the population, and mutates a gene with a certain probability, which is called the
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mutation rate. If a gene of a chromosome is mutated, it is a candidate chromosome
for the natural selection process.
Initial population:
Given the numerical bounds of the gene values and the genetic operators, an initial
population is created randomly depending on the population size specified in the
genetic algorithm. Based on this random input, the optimal parameter values are
determined during the evolution steps. A bigger population size would lead to
higher computation time, but it could also lead to better results.
Fitness function:
The fitness function calculates the fitness of each chromosome. Fitness in this con-
text is the revenue yielded with a set of gene values based on the expected demand.
The fitness function runs through the complete forecast, and simulates accept and
reject decisions using the gene values of the chromosome to be evaluated as control
variables. In doing so, the potential revenue based on the accept/reject decisions is
determined.
Evolution steps:
Through various simulation settings it was identified that 20 evolution steps already
lead to remarkable results without a large computation effort. An analysis of the
runtime is provided below.
The genetic algorithm needs more computational power than DLP and CEC to
identify the best gene values for an optimal decision. Naturally, the runtime is de-
pendent on the population size (POP), the number of variables (genes) to search for
and the number of evolution steps (ES). The number of genes are static and repre-
sented by the variables α, β and πh. The impact of the values for these variables are
analyzed below. A higher population size leads to significantly more computation
time. For example, the runtime for a setting with a population size = 9 and 30 evo-
lution steps is almost 4 times longer than for a population size of 12 with the same
amount of evolution steps on average (Figure 4.3a).
An increase of the evolution steps will result in a higher runtime as well. A
doubling of the number of evolution steps leads almost to a doubling of the runtime
of the genetic algorithm. It is important to state that a longer evolution time does
not necessarily lead to a better solution. For example, in Figure 4.3b the setting with
POP = 9 and ES = 30 gains higher revenue than the settings with POP = 6 and ES
= 50. Furthermore, the runtime is slightly better (Figure 4.3a). Moreover, a rise in
the population size leads to a longer runtime of the genetic algorithm, but it also
adds diversity to the population, which in turn increases the probability of finding a
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(a) Runtime comparison (b) Revenue comparison
Figure 4.3: Runtime and revenue analysis with different number of population
and evolution steps for a 4x5 setting.
better solution more quickly in terms of number of evolution steps. However, even
in this case, the performance will not monotonically increase with higher population
size. For ES = 50 the setting with POP = 9 performs slightly better than with POP =
12 on average despite the latter setting having a 34% longer runtime. The difference
between the setting with the lowest revenue (POP = 3; ES = 10) and the setting
with the highest revenue (POP = 9; ES = 50) is about 3% increase in revenue, which
is significant in the Revenue Management context (van Ryzin and Vulcano, 2008).
Since runtime and revenue are based on average values analyzed over 50 different
runs, the outcome can strongly vary in these runs. Thus, an analysis on the standard
deviation for every setting reveals that the deviation decreases with the increase of
evolution steps (Table 4.9). Hence, it is more likely to receive a good revenue with
more evolution steps and with a higher population size.
Table 4.9: Standard deviation for all settings
Pop=3 Pop=6 Pop=9 Pop=12
ES=10 323,1 179,8 143,1 140,6
ES=20 232,4 146,0 135,2 129,4
ES=30 151,7 142,8 117,5 114,0
ES=50 128,9 121,6 107,1 94,3
After the definition of the chromosomes, operators, population size, the fitness
function and the evolution steps, the genetic algorithm is executed. The genetic
algorithm performs the following steps7:
7The pseudocode of a genetic algorithm is available in chapter 4 in the book from (Schöneburg
et al. (1995)).
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1. At the beginning an initial population is created based on the chromosome
representation as described above. This generation is numbered as generation
zero.
2. In the second step, the fitness value of all chromosomes in the population is
calculated by the fitness function, which runs through the expected demand
scenario using the gene values as control variables in the bid-price function.
3. After steps 1 and 2, the evolution process is started. In each evolution phase
the selection operator randomly selects pairs or bigger subgroups of the pop-
ulation of chromosomes for reproduction.
4. The chromosomes selected by the selection function are reproduced, and then
they are recombined (crossover) or mutated by the genetic operators defined.
5. Subsequently, some chromosomes of the current population are replaced by
the new altered chromosomes thereby creating a new generation.
6. Given the new generation, the generation enumerator is incremented by one.
7. Steps 2 to 6 are repeated until the maximum number of allowed evolutions is
reached.
8. When the evolution process is terminated, the fittest chromosome, i.e. the set
of control variables with the highest potential revenue, is taken as input for
the self-adjusting bid prices function.
In general, it is reasonable to use a higher population size and a larger number of
evolution steps in order to increase the probability of reaching a near-optimal solu-
tion, provided that the runtime is reasonable as well. The outcome of the simulation
depends on the simulation setting (e.g. service-resource mapping or pricing).
4.4.2 Simulation Process and Hypotheses
The previous two sections are embedded in a larger simulation process. This process
can be subdivided into three phases: Demand modeling, offline calculation and on-
line calculation (see Figure 4.4). Compared to online algorithms like DLP and CEC,
CBPP requires an offline calculation phase to determine the appropriate values for
the control variables.
Demand modeling defines the incoming request according to a certain probabil-
ity function. A standard approach is to use a non-homogeneous Poisson process
(Talluri and van Ryzin, 1999). Although a discrete time model is assumed for the
demand modeling and the Poisson process is based on continuous time model, this
demand data can be applied for discrete time simulation as well (Bertsimas and
Popescu, 2003; Subramanian et al., 1999). Several studies have chosen a Beta dis-
tribution in combination with a Gamma distribution to model the demand data.
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The Gamma distribution is used for the expected demand of a service and the Beta
density function for the distribution of the incoming services over the time horizon
(Bertsimas and de Boer, 2005; Weatherford et al., 1993). This thesis adapts this ap-
proach. The flexible structure of the Beta density function enables a flexible model-
ing of the demand over time for each service. Hence, the probability of each service
class can have its peaks at different points in time during the entire period, which
is required to have a certain mix of different services over time and not to follow
a strict low-before-high order (see Section 4.3). Kimms and Mueller-Bungart (2007)
provide a thorough literature review about on-demand data assumptions for Rev-
enue Management and describe the demand modeling in detail.
Not only the demand has a certain probability function, but the prices and the
service-resource mapping as well. Prices are selected from a uniform distribu-
tion between [10;50] and every value ahi for the service-resource mapping between
[0;10]. These values were necessary to appropriately distinguish between each ser-
vice setting and to reduce homogeneity in the price set. The simulation-based opti-
mization is commonly based on forecast (van Ryzin and Vulcano, 2008; Gosavi et al.,
2007). Hence, forecast values for every timeslot have to be determined by using the
same probability function as for the demand. Then, the actual demand is created
and it can be compared to the forecast values in every timeslot. However, an analy-
sis on forecast errors is not considered in this thesis.
The implementation of the simulation separates the demand generation from the
actual simulation according to Frank et al. (2008). The determination of the control
variables is done by the genetic algorithm in the offline calculation phase. The fitness
function is equal to the revenue achieved by the algorithm. A higher revenue means
a higher fitness value of the chosen chromosome. The genetic operators are crucial
to identify good parameter values during the evolution steps. The initial popula-
tion size and the evolution steps have to be defined as well. For the simulation the
population size was set to 9 and the evolution steps to 25. This setting does not al-
ways provide the best results (see Section 4.4.1), but it is an average benchmark for a
trade-off with an acceptable runtime and acceptable volatility of the revenue results.
Hence, results can be improved by selecting a bigger population size and a higher
number of evolution steps. After the parameters are set, the genetic algorithm has
to be executed. The outcome is the achieved revenue and values for the parameters
α, β and πh. These values were determined based on the forecasted demand, the
current price setting, the predefined service-resource mapping and the predefined
bounds for the control variables. They will be used in the online phase.
In the online phase at most one request arrives per timeslot. CBPP analyzes, if the
request can be accepted or rejected based on the control variables determined in the
offline phase. If the bid price is equal or below the fixed price for the service, the
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service will be accepted; otherwise, it will be rejected. After each timeslot (whether a
request has arrived or not) the bid price for every resource will be updated according





















h b d th
Accept or reject incoming 
services
eac  resource  ase  on  e 
best fitness value
Figure 4.4: The three simulation phase
Klein (2007) has outlined the difficulty of updating bid prices during incoming
requests for online algorithms. Thus, DLP or CEC algorithms are not executed ev-
ery time a request occurs. One reason is the runtime of these algorithms are too long
to execute between two requests. Although software like CPLEX8 can handle very
complex scenarios (Bixby, 2002), the execution of a sum for CBPP is always faster
than a linear programming problem. The complex calculation of CBPP is done of-
fline, while the update of the bid prices is performed online during the incoming
requests. Moreover, requests can arrive within milliseconds, which requires a sim-
ple automatically updating algorithm. This thesis analyzes the behavior of CBPP
statistically and provides an evaluation of its performance in the Cloud context to
answer the RQ 2.4:
How accurately can a simple linear function approximate well known algorithms for bid
price calculation without reoptimization between two or more timeslots, taking the assump-
tions and requirements from Revenue Management in general and from Cloud Computing
into account?
The linear optimization function of CBPP was defined in Section 4.3.2. It is an of-
fline algorithm and the relevant parameters are optimized before the time horizon
of incoming requests. Then, the bid prices are automatically updated, whenever
a request occurs. If online algorithms like DLP or CEC cannot be updated at ev-
ery incoming request, CBPP can be applied to automatically adapt the current bid
price. This thesis analyzes different variations of the online algorithms. At first,
8CPLEX (http://www.cplex.com/)
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both algorithms are updated in every timeslot (DLP-D and CEC-D). Then, a quasi-
static version (DLP-S and CEC-S) is analyzed, which only permits to be updated
DLP and CEC in certain timeslots (e.g. every second, third or tenth timeslot). The
performance of CBPP is measured by the revenue achieved in the simulation. Sev-
eral aspects have to be analyzed when comparing the online and offline algorithms.
Obviously, the revenue of CBPP has to be higher than the online algorithms for dif-
ferent kinds of fare class settings:
Hypothesis 4.1. The revenue yielded with CBPP is higher than the revenue obtained with
CEC-S.
Hypothesis 4.1 will give a general idea of the performance of CBPP. A more
detailed analysis is necessary to understand, if the revenue is differing between the
fare class settings. This should not be the case to derive a general statement for
Hypothesis 4.1. Otherwise, a sensitivity analysis is necessary to understand, which
variables affect the outcome. For example, the choice of the fixed prices can in-
fluence the accept/reject decision significantly. However, it not obvious how the
selection of a certain price will affect the revenue outcome of CBPP:
Hypothesis 4.2. The revenue yielded with CBPP does not vary among different prices for
the same service-resource mapping.
Furthermore, the control variables for the genetic algorithm, namely α, β and πh,
have an impact on the accuracy of the genetic algorithm and thus on the outcome.
Every control variable requires an upper and a lower bound. These bounds nar-
row down the possible values of the control variables for the genetic algorithm. If
the spread is too small, the optimization function is less flexible, which results in
lower revenue. A large spread provides too many options from which the genetic
algorithm can select. It reduces the probability of finding the near-optimal solu-
tion unless the population size and evolution steps are high enough. Therefore, the
impact of the control variables has to be analyzed:
Hypothesis 4.3. The fine-granular selection of upper bounds does not influence the revenue.
In Revenue Management the parameter Demand-to-Capacity ratio (DCR) plays
an important role in the understanding of how bid price decisions may change,
when demand changes (Weatherford and Belobaba, 2002). DCR defines the ratio
between the total incoming requests and the total capacity of each resource. A ra-
tio of one means the total demand can be satisfied. DCR > 1 represent an excess
in demand and in case of DCR ≤ 1, resources are not used at the end of the time
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period. The modeling of DCR in the simulation will influence the revenue. A very
high demand (e.g. DCR > 2) for certain or all services may result in a minor im-
pact of the bid price control. If there are too many high-fare service requests (vs.
available capacity), all of them can be accepted and the highest revenue is yielded.
If capacity is still available, other services can be accepted, if it is possible to back-
fill the available capacity. The bid-price control will reject most of the demand for
low-fare services unless some of them are necessary for backfilling. Furthermore, a
service provider, who faces such a high demand, tends to shift resources in order to
satisfy this demand. Since this thesis analyzes a scarce market, the case of DCR ≤ 1
is disregarded. The optimal strategy in this case would be to accept all services.
The assumptions of Revenue Management mentioned in the RQ 2.4 refer to the
demand modeling applied from the Revenue Management context, since no data
profile of current demand data in Clouds is available yet. In the simulation the
demand is modeled according to Kimms and Mueller-Bungart (2007).
4.5 Results & Implications
In this section the results from the simulation are presented. The goal of the simu-
lation is to understand the dependency between the parameters, such as the genetic
parameters, the base bid price or the number of services and prices, in the simula-
tion and their impact on the revenue. This analysis is required to answer the RQ 2.4.
In Section 4.5.1, the simulation results are analyzed statistically to accept or reject the
hypotheses outlined in Section 4.4.2. Subsequently, a sensitivity analysis has been
carried out to scrutinize the impact of the parameters on the revenue (Section 4.5.2).
4.5.1 Statistical Results
The CBPP algorithm provides a heuristic approach to automatically and efficiently
update the bid prices between two or more timeslots in order to maximize the rev-
enue. It comprises three simulation phases to identify good bid prices. In these
phases different parameters can influence the outcome of the simulation. Hence,
three hypotheses were defined to understand the dependency between the parame-
ters and the simulation outcome (see Section 4.4.2).
In general, the overall performance of CBPP is the most important aspect. Fig-
ure 4.5 shows an excerpt of 50 runs of the simulation. Here it can be seen graphi-
cally that the performance of DLP-S and CEC-S do not yield as much revenue as the
continuous updates variant of their algorithms. CEC-D is quite close to optimum
(100%) in every run. DLP-D is not always achieving optimal values and in some
116 CHAPTER 4. CAPACITY MANAGEMENT IN CLOUDS
cases also performs worse than its quasi-static version, CEC-S and CBPP. Cooper
(2002) already stated that in some cases frequent reoptimization of DLP can decrease
the revenue. However, he also emphasized that in general a reoptimization is ben-
eficial. This simulation includes some of these cases. Even CBPP underperforms
compared to all other algorithms in some cases. In this specific case, the genetic
parameters α and β were not set properly. Bad values were the result of the offline
phase, which had an impact on the revenue in the online phase. In Figure 4.5 the
forecast and the genetic parameters were created for 10 demand scenarios. The out-
come of every algorithm is based on the same demand scenario data and the same
forecast data. In the last 10 scenarios (runs 40-49), the genetic parameters performed
worse in some scenarios compared to the others, since the incoming demand was
differing sometimes quite strongly from the forecast. The goal of CBPP is to au-
tomatically update the price, when only CEC-S or DLP-S can be applied. Conse-
quently, the outcome of CBPP will be compared with the quasi-static versions. It
is obvious from Figure 4.5 that no algorithm is always superior to all the others.
















Figure 4.5: Revenue for 50 different runs
Hypothesis 4.1 states that CBPP outperforms CEC-S. According to van Ryzin and
Vulcano (2008) an increase of 1% to 3% is already significant in Revenue Manage-
ment. To corroborate the hypothesis, a one-tailed one sample t-test was executed.
CBPP has to show at least 2% higher revenue than CEC-S to gain significant results
(H0 : µ ≤ 2% and H1 : µ > 2%). Different service-resource mappings were chosen to
show the significance over several settings. The service-resource mapping was cre-
ated by a uniform distribution (see Section 4.4.2). Consider that in certain settings,
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CBPP can also underperform compared to the static algorithms. It depends on the
prices between high and low valued services as well as on the resource usage of
each service. Thus, 50 different service-resource mapping with different prices were
created randomly. Each mapping consists of 20 different forecast dataset and 100
demand dataset. One forecast dataset was used for five different demand scenarios.
The data analysis is based on 5000 revenue outcomes for one comparison (e.g. 3x3
with DCR=1.2), which is sufficient for a sound statistical analysis. Moreover, vari-
ous DCR settings can influence the revenue outcome. Thus, the different settings for
DCR vary between 1.1 and 1.8. (see Section 4.4.2). The DCR is usually set for every
resource individually.
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show the difference between CBPP and CEC-S in yielded
revenue. Almost all theses cases are highly significant (p < 0.001) or significant
(p < 0.01). However, in the settings with few resources and services (e.g. 3x3) no
significant increase can be proven except for DCR=1.8. In most cases the revenue in-
creases with higher DCR. A DCR above 2 decreases the revenue significantly. Com-
paring the outcome between DLP-S and CEC-S, DLP-S seems to outperform CEC-S
in the small settings. For 3x3 the revenue difference between CBPP and CEC-S is
always higher than between CBPP and DLP-S. DLP-S performs well for small set-
tings. Even for DLP-S, there is no significant revenue increase for the 3x3 setting, if
CBPP is applied. In general, the small setting provides a worst case scenario. Since
the runtime is short, heuristics are not relevant for these cases. Furthermore, such
small settings are very uncommon (see Section 2.3.1). For larger settings CBPP can
increase the revenue significantly.
Table 4.10: Results for Hypothesis 4.1: Revenue difference between CBPP and
CEC-S (* denotes significance at the level of p = 0.05, ** at p = 0.01, and *** at p =
0.001.)
DCR=1.1 DCR=1.2 DCR=1.4 DCR=1.6 DCR=1.8
3x3 1.7% 1.6% 2.2% 2.2% 3.5%***
4x4 2.8%** 4.0%*** 5.2%*** 4.7%*** 5.2%***
4x5 2.9%*** 3.5%*** 6.4%*** 5.5%*** 6.4%***
4x7 2.5% 4.5%*** 6.5%*** 6.6%*** 6.9%***
4x10 3.1%*** 3.8%*** 4.6%*** 4.8%*** 5.2%***
6x8 3.0%*** 4.2%*** 5.6%*** 6.3%*** 6.6%***
10x10 3.2%*** 3.7%*** 4.9%*** 4.6%*** 5.1%***
The analysis above focuses on the general outcome of CBPP. Different settings
for DCR, for genetic parameters and for service-resource mapping were chosen. The
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Table 4.11: Results for Hypothesis 4.1: Revenue difference between CBPP and
DLP-S (* denotes significance at the level of p = 0.05, ** at p = 0.01, and *** at p =
0.001.)
DCR=1.1 DCR=1.2 DCR=1.4 DCR=1.6 DCR=1.8
3x3 0.8% 1.2% 1.4% 0.9% 2.1%
4x4 2.8%** 4.4%*** 5.0%*** 6.5%*** 6.3%***
4x5 2.2% 3.8%*** 5.4%*** 5.9%*** 6.9%***
4x7 3.3%*** 4.7%*** 5.8%*** 6.3%*** 7.3%***
4x10 2.7%** 3.6%*** 4.2%*** 5.1%*** 6.8%***
6x8 2.9%*** 4.6%*** 5.2%*** 5.3%*** 6.4%***
10x10 3.0%*** 5.1%*** 7.3%*** 8.6%*** 7.9%***
dependency between the various parameters of CBPP have to be scrutinized. For
the following hypotheses an ANOVA9 was conducted.
Hypothesis 4.2 is a negated phrase. It is assumed that small changes in the price
of a service do not have an impact on the revenue (alternative hypothesis). In other
words, applying CBPP to different price setting will lead to similar results in all
runs. Tables 4.12 and 4.13 show the results for a 4x4 setting, when only small in-
crease or decrease of one specific price changed the outcome of CBPP and CEC-S
or DLP-S, respectively. There is a significant difference, since certain services are ac-
cepted by one service more than by others. If prices change, CBPP seems not always
to outperform other algorithms, because in some cases the improvement is less than
1%. For example, price changes for i = 4 does not significantly differ from the orig-
inal setting. However, a marginal difference in the price of i = 2 had a big impact
on the outcome of CBPP, while the price for CEC-S was quite stable compared to
the original setting. Consequently, prices for different Cloud services do not have
the same impact on the outcome, but they can have an impact. Thus, a sensitivity
analysis is required to understand the dependency.
As outlined in Section 4.4.1 the parameters of CBPP influence the revenue. In
particular, the upper bounds are in focus of this analysis after presenting the impact
of the population size and the evolution steps. Again, the hypothesis is formulated
in a negated way. The results in Table 4.14 show that at least for one case there
is a significant deviation in the revenue over all runs. Especially, for bounds with
low values, there is a high variance in the outcome and therefore the probability
of receiving near-optimal solution decreases. The objective function is not flexible
enough to identify good revenue results. Hence, in this case a sensitivity analysis
9A Levene test proved the homoscedasticity of the statistical population.
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Table 4.12: Results for Hypothesis 4.2: small price changes of a specific service
affect revenue difference between CBPP and CEC-S
i=1 i=2 i=3
i=1 X X X
i=2 p<0.01** X X
i=3 p<0.01** p=0.43 X
i=4 p=0.13 p=0.02* p=0.4
Table 4.13: Results for Hypothesis 4.2: small price changes of a specific service
affect revenue difference between CBPP and DLP-S
j=1 j=2 j=3
j=1 X X X
j=2 p<0.01** X X
j=3 p<0.01** p=0.27 X
j=4 p=0.07* p<0.01** p=0.2
is necessary as well to understand why a certain bounds should be preferred. The
bounds should be neither too low nor too high. Low bounds will not enable a cor-
rect adaptation of α and β. Too high bounds with a low population size result in
scattered values for these parameters and consequently prevent the identification of
near-optimal solutions. The results in table 4.14 are created for a 4x4 setting with
DCR=1.4 and a population size of 9. Similar results were achieved for other fare
classes and settings as well.
Table 4.14: Results for Hypothesis 4.3: Upper bounds affect revenue
αU = 2, αU = 3, αU = 5,
βU = 2 βU = 3 βU = 5
αU = 3, p<0.001*** X X
βU = 3
αU = 5, p<0.01** p=0.06* X
βU = 5
αU = 8, p<0.01** p=0.08* p=0.12
βU = 8
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The results of Hypotheses 4.2 and 4.3 emphasize the necessity for further analy-
sis to determine how these variables affect the revenue. Thus, a sensitivity analysis
is presented in the following section to explore the dependency and to elicit the
cases, where CBPP performs worse than other algorithms.
4.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis is necessary to understand the impact of different param-
eters in the simulation setting. A common and reasonable approach is to fix all
parameters except the examined one. The main parameter is the bid price. The bid
price is calculated by the algorithms and thus influenced by many other parameters.
The goal is to identify the best bid prices to approximate the optimum accurately.
The genetic upper bounds define the search space to receive good values for αh
and βh of every resource h. These parameters have been analyzed by selecting seven
representative bound settings for each service-resource mapping (Table B.1 in the
appendix). The average revenue of CBPP, the standard deviation over all simulation
runs and the revenue difference to CEC-S are used as a metric to understand the
dependency. For the price range chosen for this simulation (see Section 4.4.2), a
bound for αU = βU = 10 yields the highest revenue with the lowest deviation. As
assumed low bounds do not have a high standard deviation, but the revenue is
lower than in the best case. High values for αh and βh can decrease the revenue on
average compared to αU = βU = 10, since the standard deviation is higher than in
the best case. These statements are valid for all the tested settings. In general, there
is a difference of about 1% in revenue between the worst case and the best case.
According to van Ryzin and Vulcano (2008), this is already a significant delta. The
volatility of the revenue can increase up to 40% between the best case (here usually
αU = βU = 10) and the worst case (αU = βU = 20). A countermeasure for avoiding
volatility for high bounds is to increase the population size and the evolution steps
to achieve better values on average. Then, the probability of finding appropriate
values is higher, but the runtime increases as well (see Section 4.4.1).
Providers in some domains change prices frequently. They are forced to do this
due to internal (e.g. increasing cost) or external (e.g. competition) factors. How-
ever, price variation has a great impact on the decision policy and the revenue. It is
important to understand the dependency between prices and other factors. In the
previous section, it was shown that small price changes already lead to significant
revenue gain or loss. A first step is to incrementally vary the prices for each service
and to monitor when the revenue significantly drops. The scenario presented in ta-
ble 4.15 builds the basis for the analysis by fixing the service-resource mapping and
defining certain prices for the services. The data was created randomly according to
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Table 4.15: Service-resource mapping and price in the basic scenario
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4
h=1 2 4 8 6
h=2 7 5 4 4
h=3 4 9 4 3
h=4 4 3 4 9
Price 16.2 18.9 20.5 33
Section 4.4.2. One of these prices is slightly increased or decreased, while the others
are kept fixed. This approach enables to explicitly analyze one price change for one
service at a time and isolates other influential parameters.
Table 4.16 gives an overview on the price changes. Note that this table represents
28 variations, since only one price is changed at a time to determine the effects of
changes accurately. The prices are changed in small steps to understand the depen-
dency of the price setting and the prices of each service do not overlap with the other
services. The critical cases are shown in bold in the table. In these cases, there is a
significant jump in the revenue between two selected variation. For example, the
price change from 16 (variation 21) to 17 (variation 25) drops the revenue by 4.5%.
With a low price for service i = 1 the revenue is not changing significantly. A lower
price than the randomly chosen price 16.2 does not have an impact on the revenue
difference between CBPP and CEC-S10. However, a higher price decreases the value
by more than 4%. Here, the price for service i = 1 was increased to 17 (variation 25).
Comparing the outcome from CBPP and CEC-S the revenue of CBPP is similar
in both cases. Variation 25 leads to a slightly higher outcome by 1% due to the
higher price of service i = 1. CEC-S shows a significant increase in the revenue (in
some settings up to 8%). Both algorithms are based on forecasts. While CBPP is
relatively robust against forecast errors, CEC-S had problems to compensate this
loss. In variation 21, 10% fewer requests for service i = 4 arrived than expected.
Since, CEC-S has reserved capacity for the expensive service i = 4, other service
requests were rejected. Especially, in the beginning of the period, more service i = 1
were rejected in variation 21 than in variation 25. A total bid price of 16.4 at the
beginning resulted in declining service i = 1 requests during the first quarter of the
period, when most of the requests for service i = 1 arrive. The higher price for
service i = 1 in variation 25 caused better bid prices and thus a better acceptance
10The comparison with DLP-S has been disregarded, since it showed a similar behavior to CEC-
S for the first analysis. The analysis in the remaining part of this section is related to the CBPP
algorithm and does not depend on the performance of CEC-S or DLP-S.
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Table 4.16: Price variations for randomly selected scenarios
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
basic price 16.2 rev diff 18.9 rev diff 20.5 rev diff 33 rev diff
variation 1-4 11 5.4% 16.5 -0.2% 21 4.9% 23 4.5%
variation 5-8 12 5.3% 17 0.3% 22 1.5% 24 4.9%
variation 9-12 13 4.5% 17.5 0.4% 23 1% 35 4.7%
variation 13-16 14 4.5% 18 0.4% 24 0.6% 36 4.2%
variation 17-20 15 4.6% 18.5 5.0% 25 0.9% 37 4.4%
variation 21-24 16 5.1% 19.5 4.9% 26 0.6% 38 4.3%
variation 25-28 17 0.6% 20 4.8% 27 0.7% 39 4.3%
rate. While in variation 21 the scarce resource was h = 1, in variation 25 resource
h = 4 was the bottleneck (Table 4.17). Resource h = 4 mainly used by service i =
4 and resource h = 1 by service i = 3, which reflects the lower acceptance rate of
service i = 3 in order to accept more service i = 4 requests. Both services compete
for resource h = 1. Hence, this resource is rarely available in both cases. CBPP
generally accepted less service i = 4 requests and focused more on service i = 1 and
i = 2. Although the revenue discrepancy was not significant in variation 25, CBPP
yielded a higher revenue in both cases than CEC-S11. For variation 3 and 7 similar
interpretations apply.
Table 4.17: Capacity occupation for specific scenarios in variation 21 and 25 at
the end of the period
Variation 21 Variation 25
h = 1 99.9% 99.7%
h = 2 75.5% 84.6%
h = 3 85.4% 81.1%
h = 4 91.2% 99.9%
average 88.8% 91.3%
The case of service i = 2 outlines another important aspect of CBPP. Variation 14
and 18 are distinguished by the prices for service i = 2 with a discrepancy of 0.5. This
small change leads to an average decrease of revenue of more than 4% (Table 4.16).
11Although the analyzed scenarios for comparing both cases were selected randomly, it was con-
sidered to have similar request scenarios and forecasts, if available, to isolate the scenario from other
effects.
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Analyzing several runs, a typical pattern recurs. Figure 4.6 depicts the development
of the bid prices for each resource in the 4x4 setting for CBPP. The resource h = 2
plays a crucial role for the outcome of CBPP. It is the most important resource for
service i = 1 with a resource consumption of 7 (Table 4.15). Although service i = 2
needs more capacity from resource h = 3, it still requires the second highest amount
of resource h = 2. The price of service i = 2 in variation 14 is closer to the price
of service i = 1 than in variation 18. To accept service i = 2 the bid prices on the
resource level have to be adapted appropriately. In variation 18 the bid prices are
set almost equally and behave in a similar way over time (Figure 4.6b). Variation
14 shows a difference in the curve progression. The bid price for resource h = 2
decreases continuously, since service i = 2 needs to be accepted, while other bid
prices increase (Figure 4.6a). This indicates a low α and a high β for resource h = 2,
while the others have a slightly higher α than β. Hence, more service i = 2 requests
can be accepted. However, due to the proximity of the prices for service i = 1 and
i = 2, more service i = 1 requests are accepted in variation 14 than in variation 18.
Consequently, less capacity is available for service i = 3 and i = 4. A decrease in the
price for service i = 1 from 16.2 to 15 and keeping the other prices as in variation 14
increases the revenue by 2%. Thus, prices should not be set too close to each other in
order to improve the ability of the genetic algorithm to find appropriate bid prices
for the resources. This is a disadvantage of the linear dependency of the bid prices.
They cannot be adapted flexibly, since they depend on the incoming request and the



















(b) Resource bid prices of variation 18 with price for i = 2: 18.5
Figure 4.6: Bid price development over time for each resource (4x4 setting).
4.5.3 Implication
Providers can implement CBPP to manage revenue and resource utilization more
efficiently, when bid prices cannot be updated between two or more incoming re-
quests. Usually, the service-resource mapping is relatively fixed for their settings.
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They have a portfolio of standard services. Thus, changes in the service-resource
mapping is only useful, when providers often renew their portfolio by introducing
new innovative services. The results above have proved that CBPP can outperform
standard algorithms by up to 6% on average (RQ 2.4). However, it highly depends
on the applied scenario. First of all, the provider has to be aware of the dependen-
cies between services and resources. They must be able to technically map services
to the consumed resources. The service-resource mapping has a great impact on
the revenue. There is no general policy for which service-resource mapping CBPP
performs best, since it depends on the price and the incoming demand.
The analysis of runtime in Section 4.4.1 provides a worst case scenario, where
the algorithm is executed on a single machine. Genetic algorithms are capable of
generating parallel threads to improve the runtime significantly. Hence, the runtime
of CBPP will be much better, if the algorithm is executed in a cluster or Cloud.
Furthermore, the revenue can be improved by selecting a higher population size
and evolution steps, since the runtime can be reduced due to parallelization.
Cloud service prices are set by providers. They have to consider the current mar-
ket prices and the willingness to pay of the consumers for their services. Changes
in prices will change the bid price for every resource as well and thus influence the
accept/reject decision of the provider. In some cases, CEC-S can outperform CBPP,
if the prices are set too close. Providers can adjust the prices or the resource con-
sumption of the services to avoid this issue. Service prices can also help to calculate
the optimal reservation prices, if services are auctioned. For example, Amazon has
three different pricing models. By defining the service price internally as reservation
price, Amazon can calculate how many services may be offered as Spot instances,
Reservation instances or On-Demand instances.
Demand is often a reaction on the offered Cloud services, the necessity for these
services and their prices. In the simulation, it was assumed that the demand follows
a Non Homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) and expensive services are likely to
be requested later in time than inexpensive services. The provider has to analyze the
incoming requests and model the forecasts accurately. Since service-resource map-
ping often cannot be changed instantly and demand can only be affected indirectly,
other parameters play a more important role. Capacity for Cloud services is usually
relatively fixed (see discussion in Section 2.3.1). Providers can virtually limit the
capacity for certain services to guarantee a promised service level. This approach
allows them to calculate the risk of accepting a predefined amount of service and
still fulfill the SLA. Obviously, the virtual limit can be extended based on previous
experience or if providers are risk takers.
The DCR depends on the demand and the capacity. By setting different virtual lim-
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its, this parameter can limit the resource usage to make it scarce, which will have an
impact on the service and thus its price, because accept/reject policies change.






In a Long Tail economy, it’s more expensive to evaluate than to release.
[Chris Anderson, 2004]
T he thesis is divided into two self-contained chapters with their contributions.The results in these chapters are summarized in Section 5.1 and their interre-
lation are explained to understand the integrated view and their impact in general
(Section 5.2). There are still questions and opportunities left for future work. These
are outlined in Section 5.3.
5.1 Summary of Contributions
Cloud Computing is a paradigm of providing infrastructure, platform and software
as services over the Internet. Instant service request from consumers can be satisfied
on-demand and the service are highly scalable. The provision of such services chal-
lenge Cloud service providers to manage their computing resources efficiently and
also to price their services appropriately. Both aspects are best handled by Revenue
Management methods and tools.
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the interrelation of Revenue Manage-
ment and Cloud Computing. At first, the properties of Revenue Management meth-
ods and Cloud Computing were outlined and compared with each other (Chap-
ter 2). Eight characteristics are relevant for Revenue Management. The offered
Cloud services possess inherent Revenue Management characteristics such as per-
ishability and inflexibility (Section 2.3.1). Cloud service providers use IT hardware
to provide these services. On the one hand, they have to manage the utilization
of these resources and, on the other hand, they have to fulfill the promised service
levels. In case of scarce resources and uncertain demand, overbooking strategies
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enable the increase of the resource utilization. From the consumers’ perspective,
Cloud Computing promises high flexibility by outsourcing IT resources and their
maintenance. This, however can lead to volatile demand and uncertain consumer
behavior for a Cloud service provider. Furthermore, consumers have different kinds
of demands. Some may prefer a guaranteed service while others focus on low-price
services. Hence, the heterogenic consumers and the problem of uncertainty can be
addressed by introducing advance reservation or price segmentation for Cloud ser-
vices.
All these characteristics fit to the Cloud Computing paradigm, however, con-
sumers’ preferences have not been analyzed in the Cloud context from a Revenue
Management perspective. Thus, a survey was conducted in this thesis to identify
how consumers would react to the introduction of typical Revenue Management
methods like advance reservation (Chapter 3). This survey comprised of three parts.
At first, general questions like frequency of Cloud service usage were asked to clas-
sify the participants into different user categories. In a second step, more specific
questions were necessary to analyze whether Revenue Management methods are ac-
cepted by consumers. The theoretical motivation for these questions stems from the
Revenue Management literature about customer choice theory. The relevant papers
were categorized to identify similar research questions. Then, important questions
were derived and embedded in the survey. The third part analyzed the consumer
preferences via a conjoint analysis. This research method enables the derivation
of the utility of a service for every customer from the evaluation of the customers’
perception for different combinations of the predefined service attributes.
Three research questions have been answered by this survey. Initially, the appli-
cability of certain provider policies were examined (Research Question 2.1). Con-
sumers were asked how they would react to advance reservation and price dis-
crimination. Furthermore, the dependency on their usage frequency of IaaS was
analyzed. The answers were quite positive. Consumers are open to price discrimi-
nation, when the offered services have different characteristics. Even advance reser-
vation was appreciated by the survey participants. Thus, Revenue Management
methods are applicable to Cloud services.
Price discrimination plays an important role in Revenue Management, since cus-
tomer segmentation and different service characteristics enable the increase of rev-
enue through different prices. Different survey questions were analyzed via a Chi-
square test for the Research Question 2.2. Consumers’ profit from different prices
according to the service levels. They are ready to buy services with lower or no
guaranteed service level for a lower price. However, there were no significant re-
sults between price discrimination and booking in advance. Hence, it is not obvi-
ous whether a service with an advance reservation option should have a different
price to an on-demand service. Maybe consumers would buy both services for the
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same price or even pay a higher price for the advance reservation. For example,
the provider for rendering software RenderRocket asks a higher price for advance
reservation services with a guaranteed service level.
The conjoint analysis revealed the preferences of the consumers to answer Research
Question 2.3, which attributes are most important for the consumers. The operating
system is an essential part in the IaaS offer when consumers decide between vari-
ous offers. Both Windows and Linux should be available. Linux is more attractive
than Windows. The operating system is followed by the price. Obviously, a lower
price is preferred to a higher price. Furthermore, the consumers benefit from a good
support level with direct contact to the help desk via phone. This support makes
them feel that they have more control by directly influencing the recovery process
in the case of failure. The survey from Avanade also substantiates the fact that loss
of control is the biggest fear of the Cloud users (Leipold et al., 2009).
An IaaS provider will increase revenue by introducing price discrimination and var-
ious service offers for heterogeneous customers. Operating systems and price have
a great impact on the provider selection process of the consumer. Thus, offering var-
ious Linux or Windows versions (or even other operating systems) can result in a
higher market share. However, a provider should consider other additional services
like phone support as well to distinguish the offered services from the competitors’
offers.
After knowing the consumer preferences, the provider has to design the Cloud
services accordingly. These services are offered to a variety of consumers with cer-
tain service level conditions. To fulfill these service levels, systems are often run
redundantly. The provider faces the problem of utilizing the hardware resources
and to meet the SLA. In case of scarce resources the provider has to decide when
to accept or reject certain service requests. In another way of interpretation, he
can compare different scenarios with different prices assuming to have almost per-
fect knowledge about the demand. When requests for these Cloud services appear
rapidly, the provider has to decide in an automated way when to accept or reject the
requests.
Chapter 4 suggests an automated update of bid prices called Customized Bid-Price
Policy (CBPP) as a heuristic to efficiently make these decisions. It performs bet-
ter than well-known algorithms, if an update of the bid prices in not possible after
every incoming request or in every timeslot, respectively. While the alternative al-
gorithms are calculated online, CBPP estimates the price decision for every timeslot
offline and then uses an additive approach to determine the bid price during the
incoming requests. The revenue of CBPP is, in most of the scenarios, better than
standard algorithm with a less frequent update. It can increase the revenue by up to
20%, but it can also perform 10% worse than other algorithms. Several parameters
affect the revenue outcome, which have not been scrutinized in the literature before.
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The impact of price changes were analyzed to understand its effect on the bid price.
A small difference between the prices for each service can lead to substantially bad
results for CBPP compared to the quasi-static CEC-S algorithm. However, the re-
sults for CBPP are stable, while price changes may influence the CEC-S outcome.
Small price differences are less error-prone and thus increase the revenue of CEC-S.
One assumption is to have a Non Homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) to model
the demand. Another aspect is the Demand-to-Capacity ratio (DCR) value, which
is assumed to be between one and two. The service-resource mapping was mod-
eled by a random distribution. It can be concluded that an offline algorithm with
an additive function for the online update can increase the revenue under the above
mentioned conditions (Research Question 2.4).
5.2 Integrated View of the Results
Revenue Management encompasses many aspects of a service providers’ decision
process how and when to allocate a service to a certain consumer. This thesis cov-
ered two aspects of the entire process discussed in Chapter 3 and 4. Cloud services
have to be consumed electronically over a network. Cloud consumers can accept a
posted price offer or participate in an auction. Some companies like 3Tera allow only
a direct negotiation without a posted-price offer. Consumers have different demand
characteristics and ask for various additional services from a simple phone support
to complex pre-configured several virtual machines with workflow management
application. By identifying the consumers’ preferences, a provider can efficiently
design basic and complex services to satisfy the demand. The preference analysis
can be done via survey (Chapter 3) or by analyzing historical customer data (if avail-
able). Historical data and current demand can also help to accurately forecast the
demand for certain services at certain points in time. An accurate forecast will lead
to higher revenue, since the (hardware) resources can be utilized efficiently. More-
over, both consumer preferences and forecasting are necessary to provide the price
optimization engine with the right information at the right time. Current prices are
based on the market situation, the demand, the resource availability and strategic
decisions of the provider. For example, it is common practice in the travel indus-
tries that the prices increase over time, while in the field of fashion, the retailing
prices decrease (Su, 2007). Amazon.com is currently the most dominant Cloud ser-
vice provider and they seem to be open to various pricing policies. Their portfolio
comprises posted-price offers, subscription models and dynamic pricing. It is likely
that Cloud services offers will have many facets.
From a provider’s perspective, these aspects have to be taken into consideration
in order to efficiently price the offered services. Capacity control algorithms like
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CBPP enable to determine different demand scenarios and calculate the appropri-
ate price according to the demand. This, however, assumes that each provider has
profound knowledge about the price sensitivity of the customers, i.e. the provider
knows how the customers will react, if prices are increased or decreased by a cer-
tain percentage. Often, the provider has imperfect information and thus has to ap-
proximate the optimal decision supported by historical data and experience. Rev-
enue Management provide tools and methods to achieve a near optimum solution.
Though, it is often based on various assumptions (see Chapter 2). A Cloud service
provider has to conceive these assumptions to apply these methods efficiently in
practice.
5.3 Future Work
The current developments in the market for Cloud Computing services have not led
to a mature stage yet. Technical and economical challenges remain to be solved. Sev-
eral surveys have already emphasized the fear of Cloud customers to loose control
of the hardware management and thus to be unable to react quickly in emergencies.
Even the data management and the access to the data is convoluted, since a con-
sumer does not know who has access to the data. This is in line with the security
concerns, when data transfer and data storage are not 100% secured by encryption
methods. Currently, there is no guarantee of who is responsible, if data security is vi-
olated. SLAs often do not take this aspect into consideration. Gens (2008) identified
that security, performance and availability are the biggest challenges. Developing
reliable security mechanisms for Cloud services will help to reduce the fear of the
consumers. This approach can be enhanced by establishing international laws to
enforce minimum requirements for Cloud service SLAs.
Comments from the respondents of the conducted survey also corroborate what
other surveys pointed out: changing providers is very complex, and missing stan-
dards make it hard to transfer operations from one provider to the other. Sunk cost
at one provider lead to a lock-in effect for the consumer (Varian et al., 2004). Al-
though prices influence the first choice decision, migrating operations to another
provider for a better price is only an option for non-critical operations and signif-
icantly lower prices (at least 25%) according to the conducted survey in this the-
sis. The initiative “Open Cloud Manifesto” comprises currently over 175 companies
including major companies like IBM and SAP amongst others. Though, Amazon
and Google as the current big players in the Cloud are, however, missing. It indi-
cates that these companies, which are already successfully offering Cloud services,
are not interested in abolishing the lock-in effect. Consumers will definitely bene-
fit from such an initiative, if they agree on standards. One step towards lowering
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the switching costs is enabled by the company CloudSwitch1. They offer a service
to migrate virtual machines created with VMWare2 to Amazon EC2. This service
saves the time of configuring an EC2 instance from scratch.
The tools from Revenue Management described in this thesis are only applicable,
if a service-resource mapping is possible. Providers have to at least estimate the
resource consumption of each service. Virtualization technologies help to allocate a
certain amount of resource for certain virtual instance on the IaaS layer. An in-depth
control of the service consumption will help to manage the hardware resources effi-
ciently, which has to be analyzed technically.
From an economic point of view, price determination and Cloud service design
need a profound knowledge about the consumer preferences. The conducted survey
was a first step towards understanding these preferences. However, each parameter
analyzed in this survey has to be examined more closely. Detailed knowledge on
how changes in the availability rate may have an impact on the customer’s choice
is valuable information for the providers. They can calculate their revenue better
by considering the outages, the willingness of a customer to take a certain outage
rate into account and to derive the penalty rates for their SLA violation. Cloud
Computing is currently in an evolving stage. The survey in this thesis provides
a snapshot from the consumer preferences in 2009. More continuous surveys are
necessary to evaluate the historical and dynamical development of the service offers.
Furthermore, finite price changes over time as proposed by Bitran and Mondschein
(1997) are interesting approaches to understand how often prices are allowed to
vary. Since the Cloud Computing market is still in its infancy, there is no common
price structure or pricing policy. Pay-as-you-go, subscription model and capacity
pricing are common and widely used on all layers (infrastructure, platform and
software as a service). Another interesting aspect is to analyze consumer preferences
on other layers beside the infrastructure level as well. A first approach on SaaS was
done by Köhler et al. (2010).
The proposed heuristic CBPP is based on an additive function to calculate the bid
prices. The disadvantage of the additive function is its dependency on the bid prices
in each timeslot, which makes the function less flexible. Perhaps non-linear function
may approximate the bid prices more accurately. For example, some resources may
have a higher impact on the service value than other resources. An adaptive non-
linear function can put a heavier weight on selected resources to approximate the
bid prices in a better way.
Moreover, this approach defines the time horizon as finite. The provider limits his
view to a certain time period. If CBPP is applied for reservation and the usage
will start at the end of the time horizon, this approach is appropriate. An interesting
1http://www.cloudswitch.com
2http://www.vmware.com
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extension would be a continuous usage case. CBPP can be applied to the continuous
case with certain limitation, i.e. the customer instantly using this service will use it
until the end of the time horizon. Though, the used resources will not be released
for further offers. An extension would take the duration of usage of a Cloud service
into account, which provides a more realistic scenario.
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Figure A.1: Websurvey Questionnaire Part 1
A.1. QUESTIONNAIRE 141
Figure A.2: Websurvey Questionnaire Part 2
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Figure A.3: Websurvey Questionnaire Part 3
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Figure A.4: Websurvey Questionnaire Part 4
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Figure A.5: Websurvey Questionnaire Part 5
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Figure A.6: Websurvey Questionnaire Part 6
A.2 Profile Cards
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Figure A.7: Websurvey Conjoint Analysis Part 1
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Figure A.8: Websurvey Conjoint Analysis Part 2
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Figure A.9: Websurvey Conjoint Analysis Part 3
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A.3 Theoretical Models Overview
see next two pages
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Appendix B
Genetic Algorithm
Table B.1: Analysis of upper bound settings on outcome of CBPP
αU = 2. αU = 3. αU = 5. αU = 8. αU = 10. αU = 15. αU = 20
βU = 2 βU = 3 βU = 5 βU = 8 βU = 10 βU = 15 βU = 20
3x
3
avg rev 19192 19239 19255 19288 19334 19306 19275
std dev 619 633 642 605 499 676 712
rev diff 1.7% 1.9% 2.0% 2.2% 2.4% 2.3% 2.1%
4x
4
avg rev 18735 18794 18869 18884 18937 18896 18837
std dev 658 678 696 649 565 704 748
rev diff 3.8% 4.2% 4.6% 4.7% 5.0% 4.7% 4.4%
4x
5
avg rev 23692 23735 23804 23840 23908 23876 23842
std dev 628 665 689 625 537 688 734
rev diff 4.8% 5.0% 5.3% 5.5% 5.8% 5.6% 5.5%
4x
7
avg rev 26116 26175 26221 26354 26429 26401 26366
std dev 318 321 375 287 245 354 394
rev diff 5.7% 5.9% 6.1% 6.6% 7.0% 6.8% 6.7%
4x
10
avg rev 21489 21510 21577 21625 21683 21611 21556
std dev 315 316 332 267 232 327 368
rev diff 4.1% 4.2% 4.5% 4.8% 5.1% 4.7% 4.4%
6x
8
avg rev 22173 22263 22324 22409 22472 22426 22384
std dev 439 431 401 358 296 376 447
rev diff 5.2% 5.6% 5.9% 6.3% 6.6% 6.4% 6.2%
10
x1
0 avg rev 22209 22267 22312 22370 22438 22393 22361
std dev 525 506 483 459 384 470 521
rev diff 3.8% 4.1% 4.3% 4.6% 4.9% 4.7% 4.6%
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